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Summary 
Servitudes are regulated in South African law by the principles of the common law. 
One set of principles regulate servitudes ex ante – limiting and controlling the 
establishment of servitudes. Another set of principles regulate the continued 
relationship between the parties. They include the principle that a servitude, once 
granted, includes all that is necessary for the effective exercise of the servitude by the 
dominant proprietor and the principle that requires reasonable exercise of the 
servitude rights with due regard for the interests of the servient proprietor. The problem 
lies in determining the scope of a servitude and establishing whether “what is 
necessary for the effective exercise of the rights” is a flexible concept, especially when 
flexible interpretation of servitudes creates tension between the two principles 
mentioned above. The approach of South African courts is to maintain stability in the 
system of property law, thus emphasising the principle that servitudes are to be 
interpreted strictly.  
A comparative and theoretical overview indicates that a recent shift has taken 
place in the regulation of servitudes from an ex ante approach focussing on security 
and stability of property rights, towards a flexible regulation of servitudes by way of ex 
post controls that allow amendment or termination of obsolete or undesirable burdens 
on land. This shift is underpinned by the reality of changed circumstances and the 
need for servitudes, as long-standing property arrangements, to adapt to changes so 
as to ensure the productive use of land as a resource. With reference to Dutch, Scots, 
English and Louisiana state law, this dissertation considers ways to incorporate 
flexibility in servitude law, usually by way of statutory intervention. However, in South 
African servitude law the possibility of statutory intervention is slim. Accordingly, 
innovative measures must be developed within the common law framework.  
The need for flexibility in South African servitude law can be satisfied by 
development of the common law in the form of ex post application of the existing 
common law principles. If these principles are applied in a manner that takes account 
of the current context of the servitude, many of the problems created by the view that 
servitudes are static and unchangeable can be solved. If properly implemented, this 
can allow for the amendment of existing entitlements or acknowledgement of new 
ancillary entitlements, without compromising the security of property rights.  
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Opsomming 
In die Suid Afrikaanse reg word serwitute gereguleer deur die beginsels van die 
gemenereg. Een stel beginsels reguleer serwitute ex ante deur geldigheidsvereistes 
wat hul vestiging beheer en beperk. ŉ Tweede stel beginsels reguleer die verhouding 
tussen die partye. Hierdie beginsels behels onder andere dat ŉ serwituut alles insluit 
wat noodsaaklik is vir die effektiewe uitoefening daarvan, asook dat serwitute redelik 
uitgeoefen moet word. Die omvang van serwitute is onduidelik en dit is onseker of “wat 
noodsaaklik is vir die effektiewe uitoefening van die regte” ŉ buigsame begrip is, veral 
aangesien ŉ buigsame interpretasie van serwitute spanning veroorsaak tussen die 
bogenoemde beginsels. Die uitgangspunt van Suid Afrikaanse howe is dat stabiliteit 
in die Sakereg noodsaaklik is en hulle beklemtoon dus die beginsel dat serwitute op 
die mins beswarende wyse vir die dienende erf uitgelê moet word.  
ŉ Vergelykende en teoretiese perspektief toon aan dat ŉ verskuiwing 
plaasgevind het vanaf die ex ante benadering, met sy sterk fokus op sekuriteit en 
stabiliteit in die Sakereg, na ŉ buigbare regulering wat die wysiging of beëindiging van 
ongewensde of uitgediende regte moontlik maak. Een van die hoofredes vir hierdie 
verskuiwing is die realiteit van veranderende omstandighede en die noodsaaklikheid 
vir serwitute om aanpasbaar te wees ten einde die effektiewe gebruik van grond te 
verseker. Met verwysing na Engelse, Skotse Nederlandse en Louisiana-reg, oorweeg 
hierdie proefskrif verskillende wyses waarop buigsaamheid verseker kan word in die 
regulerende raamwerk wat op serwitutevan toepassing is, meestal deur statutêre 
ingryping. Aangesien statutêre ingryping in die Suid Afrikaanse stelsel onwaarskynlik 
is, sal innoverende maatreëls binne die gemeenregtelike raamwerk ontwikkel moet 
word.  
Die behoefte aan buigsaamheid in die Suid Afrikaanse serwituutreg kan 
bevredig word deur die gemenereg sodanig te ontwikkel dat die bestaande beginsels 
ex post toegepas word, met klem op die huidige konteks en omstandighede. Hierdie 
ontwikkeling sal baie van die probleme oplos wat ontstaan as gevolg van die standpunt 
dat serwitute staties en onveranderbaar is. Indien dit behoorlik geïmplementeer word, 
kan hierdie ontwikkeling verseker dat bestaande bevoegdhede gewysig of nuwe 
bevoegdhede erken kan word, sonder om die sekuriteit van saaklike belange in 
gedrang te bring.  
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1 1 Introduction 
In 2012, the South Gauteng High Court heard the case of Jersey Lane Properties v 
Hodgson.1 The facts of the case illustrate an interesting problem in the South African 
law of servitudes that I aim to explore in this dissertation. The applicant in the case 
(Hodgson), the owner of a property subject to a servitude of right of way, applied for 
the removal of a structure built on his property by the servitude holder, who owned an 
adjoining lot. The servitude holder was the developer of a hotel situated on the 
dominant property. The servitude was registered as an exclusive right of way over a 
road referred to by the parties as “Jersey Lane” and provided access to the hotel 
premises from a public road. An electronically operated palisade gate was previously 
situated along this road, on the property of Hodgson. However, after a group of VIP’s 
showed their interest in staying at the hotel, but expressed their discontent with the 
security and entrance to the premises, the respondent hastily effected a replacement 
of the entrance gate with a huge entrance portico described as “a security gate 
entrance, elaborately built with a flat roof and a guardhouse which is almost two 
storeys high”.2 The question the court considered was whether the portico was 
necessary for the effective exercise of the servitude. It was mentioned in the decision 
that various factors would influence the reasonableness of the exercise of rights by 
the servitude holder, including the general aesthetics of the surroundings, the security 
                                                          
 
1 Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa v Hodgson and Another 
(A5030/11) [2012] ZAGPJHC 86 (7 May 2012).  
2 Hodgson v Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa unreported case no 
36702/10 (23 February 2011) para 1.  
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requirements of the property and the general tendency to erect portico’s at the entries 
of upmarket properties in the area.  
The effect of this decision was that the change effected by the servitude holder 
had a serious impact on the servient property. The burden on the servient land no 
longer consisted simply of vehicles passing over the property, but of extensively 
increased security measures (including floodlights and a guardhouse) that involved 
the construction of an elaborate building situated on the servient land.  
The Scottish case of Moncrieff v Jamieson3 provides another example that 
illustrates a similar problem. In this case the applicants asked for a declaratory order 
to the effect that the registered servitude of right of way also included an ancillary right 
to park vehicles on the servient land. The facts of the case and the unique 
geographical situation from which the dispute arose are of crucial importance to the 
decision. The dominant land was situated on a cliff so that it was bordered on one side 
by the sea and on the other by the cliff. The only access to and from the property by 
land was over a road on the servient land and then via a stairway that led to a gate at 
the top of the cliff. If the Moncrieffs were not allowed to park on the land, they would 
be required every time they (or anyone else) wanted access to their home, to stop and 
unload all baggage and passengers at the point closest to the house, and then turn 
around and park at a point that is no longer on the servient property. This would mean 
that they would have to cover a distance of about 140 metres on foot that involved “a 
significantly steep descent or climb”, regardless of the time of day, the weather or other 
circumstances.4 
                                                          
 
3 Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42.  
4 Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42 para 34.  
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Both these cases concern a servitude holder who argues that he is entitled to 
exercise additional entitlements over the servient land that were not mentioned 
explicitly in the servitude creating documents. Furthermore, the entitlements claimed 
by the dominant proprietors had not been recognised before, since the need for them 
only arose as a result of recent developments, long after creation of the servitude. 
However, if these entitlements were allowed, there would be a significant increase in 
the burden on the servient property.  
The question faced in both the Jersey Lane Properties and Moncrieff cases was 
whether the additional entitlements sought by the dominant proprietors could be seen 
as ancillary to the registered servitude of right of way, which in principle involved no 
more than the right to use a road over the servient land. In both cases, the servitude 
holders needed their servitude rights to fulfil additional functions, including using the 
servient land for new and additional purposes. A particularly relevant question that 
emerges from comparison of the two cases is whether it can be said that the supposed 
ancillary right, and the additional use of the servient land it involves (parking on the 
servient tenement, as opposed to building a permanent structure on it), is strictly 
necessary for effective use of the servitude. While it is arguably reasonable to use 
space on the servient land in Moncrieff to park, it is not immediately evident why it 
should be necessary or justified to build the entrance portico in Jersey Lane Properties 
on the servient (as opposed to the dominant) land. The question is whether servitude 
law can accommodate recognition of the new and additional requirements and if so, 
how this can be done.   
There are a few ways to approach this question. In South African law, servitudes 
are regulated by common law and the first step is thus to consider whether the 
common law provides some solution to the problem. Secondly, insofar as the 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
5 
 
applicable common law principles do not provide a solution, can a flexible 
interpretation of the servitude deed provide a satisfactory result? Depending on the 
formulation of the servitude in the deed, interpretation might provide some flexibility 
for the servitude rights to be exercised differently in different circumstances. However, 
where the parties failed to provide for the new situation that arises, can the law step in 
and do so on their behalf? Furthermore, insofar as a solution cannot be found in the 
rules of the common law, is it possible to solve the problem through statutory 
intervention? Finally, assuming that a way is identified to recognise the new and 
additional needs of the servitude holder, does that have any constitutional 
implications? 
 
1 2 Research question 
The point of departure is that servitudes are real rights. This has important 
implications. Security of title is a key element of real rights as stability is of vital 
importance in the system of property rights to encourage investment and continued 
development of land.5 However, in principle servitudes are perpetual rights, which 
means that they exist for long periods of time, and therefore they might need to be 
flexible to adapt to changes in the modern world. The question is whether the stability 
required for the existence and proper functioning of real rights can accommodate the 
flexibility required for proper exercise of servitudes in changed circumstances. The 
basis for acceptance of the notion of ancillary rights is the principle that everything 
                                                          
 
5 CG van der Merwe “Numerus clausus and the development of new real rights in South Africa” (2002) 
119 South African Law Journal 802-815 814. 
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necessary for the effective exercise of a servitude is deemed to be granted along with 
it. However, determining the necessity of additional rights is problematic. The problem 
lies in determining the scope of a servitude and establishing whether “what is 
necessary for the effective exercise of the rights” is a flexible concept, especially when 
flexible and extensive interpretation of servitudes clashes with another basic principle, 
namely that the exercise of servitudal rights must place the least possible burden on 
the servient land. 
South African servitude law is regulated almost exclusively by the common law.6 
For the most part, the common law principles focus on the establishment of servitudes, 
typically by limiting and controlling the creation of new servitudes.7 The principle of 
numerus clausus8 is intended to prevent excessive burdens on land. The principle is 
aimed at protecting potential acquirers of servient land from idiosyncratic or excessive 
burdens over their property that might be hard to ascertain. Another method to limit 
burdens on land is by way of strict requirements for the establishment of servitudes. 
The requirements of praediality, utility and passivity9 are attempts to ensure that a 
                                                          
 
6 The Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1947 contains a number of provisions pertaining to formal 
requirements and registration of servitudes, but the exercise and functioning of servitudes are regulated 
by established common law rules.  
7 These measures, imposed at creation to regulate servitudes by limiting their creation, are an example 
of ex ante controls. See 1 4 where the terminology is explained and a distinction is drawn between ex 
ante and ex post regulatory control.  
8 AJ van der Walt “The continued relevance of servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 19 
explains that although there is no strict numerus clausus of servitudes in modern South African law, the 
function of this principle is fulfilled by the registration requirement, coupled with the subtraction from the 
dominium test.  
9 The exact requirements for valid establishment of a servitude are controversial, as there are different 
views on which principles constitute true requirements and which are simply consequences or 
characteristics of servitudes. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. See also MJ de Waal “Die 
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servitude, once registered, will provide adequate benefit to the dominant land so that 
it may outweigh the burden imposed on the servient land and that this will remain the 
case even for future owners of the properties. Servitudes are sometimes described as 
odious10 because they burden land and can detract from the unity of ownership, thus 
leading to a fragmentation of property rights.11 Accordingly, the very rules that allow 
the creation of servitudes also limit them so as to ensure the stability of property rights 
and to encourage development of and investment in land.  
However, there is also a measure of flexibility in the common law regulation of 
servitudes. The principles that govern the relationship between the parties to a 
servitude are aimed at regulating the continued efficacy of real rights. Both the 
dominant and the servient property owners enjoy a measure of protection under these 
principles. On the one hand, the principle requiring reasonable exercise of the 
servitude protects the servient property owner in that it ensures that the servitude 
holder does not abuse his rights by imposing a heavier burden on the servient land 
than is necessary to give effect to his rights.  This same principle also maintains the 
stability of real rights. On the other hand, the principle that everything necessary for 
the effective exercise of a servitude is deemed to be granted along with it provides the 
dominant proprietor with a guarantee of the functionality of the servitude, thus ensuring 
a measure of flexibility in the enjoyment of the right.  
                                                          
 
vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute: ’n Herformulering” (1990) 1 Stellenbosch Law Review 
171-185 183-184.   
10 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 8 2 2 (Gane's translation vol 2) 440.  
11 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished 
LLD dissertation University of Stellenbosch 1989) 14. See further Landman v Daverin 1881 EDC 1 7; 
Ferguson v Pretorius 1892 4 SAR 246 250; Smit v Russouw and Others 1913 CPD 847 853; Head v 
Du Toit 1932 CPD 287 291.  
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Although these principles are powerful tools intended to strike a balance between 
the interests of the parties, they do not always solve the problems that arise when 
servitudes exist for a long time. Considering recent case law, with Jersey Lane 
Properties as one of the most striking examples, it seems as though courts have 
sometimes failed to find workable solutions to the problem when relying purely on the 
common law principles.12  
Addressing the problem set out before requires an analysis of the common law 
principles that are applicable to the issue of ancillary rights. As this area of law is rather 
underexplored in the literature, it is necessary to unravel the case law to find the 
common law framework within which ancillary rights are understood. In Chapter 2, the 
common law principles that are relevant to ancillary rights are considered to determine 
their scope and their potential to solve the problem.  
An overview of case law relating to ancillary rights indicates that courts tend to 
respond to the apparent failure of common law principles to provide an adequate 
solution by turning their focus to interpretation of the servitude deed to solve the 
problem. This tendency to focus on the words of the deed seems to be an attempt to 
provide a flexible solution by reconciling the desired outcome with a grammatical 
interpretation of the words used by the parties. However, since the point of departure 
is contractual interpretation, courts are bound to the principles of interpretation. This 
is problematic on a few counts. It might be difficult if not impossible to determine the 
original intention of the parties to the servitude agreement, and in case of servitudes 
created by operation of law, there is no grant or agreement to interpret. A more 
                                                          
 
12 The decision of Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa v Hodgson and 
Another (A5030/11) [2012] ZAGPJHC 86 (7 May 2012) is discussed in Chapter 2.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
9 
 
fundamental problem is that this approach shifts the focus away from property 
principles to contract.  
Statutory regulation could offer a solution to the problem set out above. However, 
in South African law, there are no statutory instruments regulating the exercise of 
servitudes and this possibility must therefore be explored with reference to 
comparative law. A comparative overview suggests that legislative intervention is used 
in both common law and civilian systems as a method to simplify and provide certainty 
in the system of servitude law. In Chapter 3, I consider the interventions that have 
been undertaken in foreign jurisdictions. Systems that have recently implemented or 
considered some form of regulation aimed at rendering the law of servitudes more 
flexible include Dutch, English, Scots and Louisiana law. Dutch law is particularly 
relevant because the 1992 reform of the Dutch Civil Code provides interesting options 
for the variation and termination of servitudes. Furthermore, Dutch servitude law 
shares the Roman-Dutch heritage of South African law, but has the advantage of 
having considered and implemented reforms in the Code. English law is considered 
mainly because of the extensive research and discussion accompanying the proposed 
reform of English law relating to land burdens. The discussion paper on easements, 
covenants and profits à prendre13 provides extensive information on the problems 
experienced with land burdens and explores a range of solutions to these problems, 
including the issue of flexibility set out above. Scots law provides an interesting 
comparison to South African law because it is also a mixed jurisdiction and the slow 
                                                          
 
13 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report (accessed 
13/03/2013). 
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and incremental development in the two systems is comparable up until the 
implementation of the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003. The Act brought about 
only minor changes to the law of servitudes, but introduced some elements of certainty 
which were previously lacking. The state law of Louisiana compares well to South 
African and Scots law because it is also a mixed jurisdiction. The Civil Code introduces 
the same tension between legal certainty and flexibility that appears in the Dutch Civil 
Code. The sections relating to servitudes in the Louisiana Civil Code have also been 
amended, although this amendment is not as recent as that of the Dutch Civil Code. 
As a further comparative element, occasional reference is made to the American 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes (“Restatement”).14 Although this 
document is not regarded as law and is not even intended to inspire legislation, it is 
influential and the ideas suggested in the Restatement have provoked major debate 
in the area of servitude law, in particular on the shift from ex ante to ex post regulation 
of servitudes. The Restatement influenced reforms in both English and Scots law, and 
although American law is not included as a separate jurisdiction in the comparative 
part of this dissertation, the Restatement is referred to where relevant. 
 The aim of the comparative overview is to determine how different jurisdictions 
formulate the problems experienced in relation to ancillary rights and what solutions 
they have developed to solve these problems. Although there is not necessarily more 
certainty about the best approach in the jurisdictions considered, they do acknowledge 
the problems surrounding ancillary rights and attempts have been made to clarify the 
issues.  
                                                          
 
14 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes: Volume 1 (2000) 202. 
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In South African law it does not seem plausible at this stage to attempt a large-
scale codification of the law relating to servitudes. Accordingly, any solution to the 
problem of ancillary rights in South African servitude law will have to fit into the unique 
legal landscape in which it functions and the responsibility will fall on the judiciary to 
implement any development. However, the common law authority of the judiciary is 
limited: although the courts have the inherent power and responsibility to develop the 
common law, their authority remains subject to the Constitution15 and the constraints 
of existing law.16 The judiciary will accordingly be limited in the steps that it can take 
to implement new rules relating to servitudes. However, courts have, in limited 
instances, displayed a willingness to allow developments of the common law which 
would render the law of servitudes more flexible.17 In the absence of the political and 
policy debates that would precede statutory reforms, reforms implemented by judicial 
force will necessarily provoke theoretical questions.  
 A relatively significant amendment to or development of the common law of 
servitude has to be theoretically justifiable. In Chapter 4, the possibilities for reform 
that emerged from the comparative analysis are considered in light of theoretical 
debates that emerged alongside the reforms across various jurisdictions. The 
theoretical issues relevant to the discussion focus on the character of servitudes as 
real rights and on the tension between stability and flexibility. I consider different views 
regarding the nature and security of real rights and the need to protect the stability of 
property rights. On the other hand, the ex post regulatory measures introduced in 
                                                          
 
15 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (“Constitution”). 
16 S 165 of the Constitution.  
17 Refer to the discussion of Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA) in 
section 2 4 below.  
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foreign jurisdictions incorporate flexibility into the servitude system, which might 
compromise the security of existing rights. Examples of these measures include the 
ex lege or judicial amendment or termination of servitudes or a general limitation on 
the lifespan of servitudes. These changes can be either supported or undermined in 
theoretical debates, and in Chapter 4 I consider the weight of various theoretical 
approaches.  
In South African law a development of the common law must not only be 
theoretically justifiable, but also constitutionally, particularly if it has a constitutionally 
relevant impact on existing rights. An ex post unilateral (or judicial) amendment of a 
servitude, for instance, might amount to an expropriation of property in terms of section 
25(2) of the Constitution.18 If the action does not amount to an expropriation, it might 
constitute a deprivation of property. Section 25(1) of the Constitution states that a 
deprivation of property may only take place in terms of law of general application and 
further, that it may not be arbitrary. This means that there must be some legislative or 
common law authority for the deprivation, and the deprivation must satisfy the test for 
non-arbitrariness set out in First National Bank of SA v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service.19 Chapter 6 addresses these constitutional questions.  
                                                          
 
18 S 25 (2) of The Constitution reads as follows:  
25 (2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application 
 (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
 (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of 
which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court 
19 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). See 
also AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3rd ed (2011) 194.  
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The main hypothesis of this dissertation is that the South African law relating to 
servitudes in general, and ancillary rights in particular, is overly rigid and that there are 
convincing doctrinal, economic and policy reasons to incorporate a measure of 
flexibility into this area of law. South African courts have shown a willingness to view 
servitudes more progressively,20 but the general tendency is to favour the security of 
ownership and the stability of property rights in general above the flexibility that is 
required for property rights to function effectively in modern property law. The law of 
servitudes apparently needs to develop but, unlike foreign systems that have 
implemented developments in this area by way of statutory means, the South African 
legal landscape will require the development to be implemented by the judiciary, 
relying on the scope that common law principles allow. Courts will accordingly have to 
adopt an approach that takes account of the nature of servitudes as real rights when 
determining their content and the ancillary rights that might be added to them. 
Furthermore, when introducing flexibility into the law of servitudes the courts have to 
account for the constitutional validity of the changes brought about in the process.  
 
1 3 Methodology  
The first methodological step is an analysis of the common law position in South 
African servitude law, particularly of the interpretation and application of the common 
law principles in case law. The main sources used in this analysis are case law and 
                                                          
 
20 Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa v Hodgson and Another 
(A5030/11) [2012] ZAGPJHC 86 (7 May 2012) para 9; Linvestment CC v Hammersley 2008 (3) SA 283 
(SCA) para 32. 
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secondary literature. This does not include a first-hand overview or analysis of Roman 
or Roman-Dutch authorities, although some original sources are cited insofar as they 
are relevant.  
As is explained in section 1 2 above, there is no example of statutory 
interventions in South African servitude law. Accordingly, statutory intervention can 
only be considered with reference to foreign law. The comparative overview in Chapter 
3 is by no means a complete or extensive analysis of servitude law in the respective 
systems, but aims to consider relevant examples of intervention in four foreign 
jurisdictions. Each of the jurisdictions discussed either has some form of statutory 
regulation of servitude law, or is in the process of introducing or considering statutory 
measures to overcome the static nature of this area of law. The comparative analysis 
is aimed only at considering these converging points of interest insofar as they relate 
to the research problem.  
The third methodology, theoretical analysis, is similarly limited in scope. The 
analysis of property theory in Chapter 4 only relates to the questions that emerge in 
response to the reforms discussed above. As was mentioned before, the relevant 
theoretical debates in this regard turn on the value of stability and security versus 
flexibility in property law; property theory is referred to and discussed only to the extent 
that specific theories touch on this narrow issue more or less directly. 
The final methodology is constitutional analysis, considering the possible 
constitutional implications of the reforms considered in previous chapters. In the South 
African legal context, any significant amendment of the common law position will have 
an impact on existing rights and it is therefore necessary to determine the 
constitutional validity of the change in view of the Constitution as the supreme law. 
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The constitutional analysis is undertaken against the backdrop of the section 25 
methodology set out in the FNB decision.21 
 
1 4 Terminology 
The terminology used in relation to ancillary rights is inconsistent. In South African 
case law, courts use the terms “ancillary”, “accessory” and “auxiliary” to describe rights 
that are supplementary to independent servitudal rights. Furthermore, the term 
“implied rights” is also used to describe rights that are not clearly expressed in the 
servitude-creating deed. This creates some confusion. In this dissertation, 
supplementary rights are consistently described as “ancillary”, and a distinction is 
further made between implied and explicit ancillary rights. A deed of servitude may 
sometimes include an explicit description of the ancillary rights that accompany the 
servitude. This practice improves legal certainty and can eliminate problems when 
circumstances change. However, where a deed does not make explicit provision for 
particular ancillary rights, they may be implied if they are necessary for the effective 
exercise of the servitude.22 
                                                          
 
21 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
22 A deed may also contain a general clause that simply states that all necessary ancillary rights are 
granted along with the servitude. For example, in Eskom Holdings Ltd v Dorfling NO and Others 
(10487/2008) [2008] ZAWCHC 262 (8 September 2008) the servitude deed held that the servitude 
included “every ancillary right necessary or convenient for the proper exercise of the servitude to convey 
electricity across the property and for telecommunication purposes”. 
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In foreign law, the terminology differs from one jurisdiction to the next.23 However, 
unlike in South African law, implied rights (sometimes called implied servitudes) are 
something quite distinct form ancillary or implied ancillary rights. Some foreign 
jurisdictions accept the implied creation of independent servitudes upon subdivision of 
a property, based on the argument that the servitude is necessary for the effective use 
of one of the subdivided parcels of land. This becomes clearer in the comparative 
discussion in Chapter 3, but for purposes of simplicity, it is important to distinguish 
clearly between the notion of “implied terms” as terms read into an existing servitude 
relationship, and implied servitudes in this sense.   
Another important qualification should be made in relation to the terms “changed 
circumstances” or “changed conditions”. The idea that the physical context within 
which a servitude is exercised changes (both physically and circumstantially) over time 
is an important element in the research relating to the topic at hand. There are different 
ways in which change can affect a servitude. It is possible that the physical features 
of the land or the elements relevant to the servitude change so that the functionality of 
the servitude is affected. For now, I will refer to this occurrence as “changed 
conditions”. Examples of changed conditions would be where floods or heavy rains 
cause erosion of the land subject to the servitude, or where droughts or other changes 
occur slowly and incrementally over time that leave the servient (or dominant) land in 
a different state than when the servitude was created. Furthermore, changes in 
society, the economy, technology or the political sphere that are relevant to the use of 
property might fall under this category.  
                                                          
 
23 Scots and English law mostly refer to “ancillary” rights, while Louisiana uses the term “accessory”.  
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 It is also possible that more subjective changes occur over time. For now, I refer 
to these as “changed circumstances”. Where one of the property owners feels the 
subjective need to develop his land or use it in a different way, it could have an effect 
on the manner in which an existing servitude is utilised. According to the common law 
principles of servitude law a dominant proprietor may not change the use of his 
property to the extent that it would create a significant increase in the burden on the 
servient land. However, if the changed use has a minor effect on the servient land, 
such a changed use might be possible.  
In this dissertation, I often refer to changed circumstances in a general sense. 
This includes both categories set out above (in other words, both “changed conditions” 
and “changed circumstances”), unless there is an indication of the particular conditions 
or circumstances referred to.  
The ex ante and ex post regulation of servitudes is also referred to repeatedly 
throughout the following chapters. These terms refer to the two approaches followed 
in the regulation of servitudes to avoid the effects of inefficient or undesirable burdens 
upon land.24 Ex ante regulation is aimed at limiting the creation of new servitudes by 
restricting the kinds and contents of servitudes before they come into being.25 Ex post 
regulation is aimed at limiting and controlling servitudes after their creation by allowing 
                                                          
 
24 S French “The American Restatement of servitude law: Reforming doctrine by shifting from ex ante 
to ex post controls on the risks posed by servitudes” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a 
unified system of land burdens (2006) 109-118; KGC Reid “Modernising land burdens: The new law in 
Scotland” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of land burdens (2006) 63-108; 
JA Lovett “Creating and controlling private land use restrictions in Scotland and Louisiana: A 
comparative mixed jurisdiction analysis” (2008) 19 Stellenbosch Law Review 231-257. 
25 Ex ante can be translated as meaning “before the fact”. Likewise, ex post would translate as “after 
the fact”.  
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remedies for the effective modification and termination of existing servitudes. The 
theoretical debates discussed in Chapter 4 consider what is seen as a shift from the 
traditional ex ante regulation of servitudes towards an ex post remedial approach. 
Finally, the very nature of the topic of ancillary rights lends itself to an almost 
exclusive consideration of praedial servitudes in the chapters that follow. Furthermore, 
the nature of the topic has the effect that most of the examples discussed are rights of 
way or similar servitudes that only allow a very specific, singular act on the servient 
property. Anything else that might not fall within that specific description, but adds 
something to the main servitudal rights will necessarily be the kind of additional 
entitlements considered to be ancillary rights for purposes of this dissertation.
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2 1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explore South African servitude law for signs of 
established legal principle relating to implied or ancillary rights to servitudes. Since 
servitude law is not an area regulated by legislation, a survey of the common law will 
be the principal means to this end. A basic explanation of the methods of creation and 
the requirements for the establishment of a valid praedial servitude will provide some 
context to the discussion that follows later in the chapter. De Waal states that these 
principles or requirements are meant to guard against the uncontrolled increase of 
burdens on land, but that they should at the same time be flexible enough to allow for 
the creation of praedial servitudes for which need has arisen as a result of agricultural, 
economic, social and technological progress and development.1  
Since the topic of servitudes has not enjoyed much academic attention in recent 
years,2 the task of unravelling the true common law position relating to any servitude 
issue is considerably harder. Currently there seems to be general uncertainty, even in 
the courts, regarding the common law of servitude. One of the areas where this 
uncertainty becomes most apparent is in the determination of the content and scope 
of servitudes, and by association, the recognition of implied terms or ancillary rights to 
servitudes.  
Case law on this topic is inconsistent and often does not provide sufficient 
explanation of the law and reasons underlying the decisions made. In order to 
                                                          
 
1 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785-817 804. 
2 AJ van der Walt “Development of the common law of servitude” (2013) 130 South African Law Journal 
722-756 723. 
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effectively settle any dispute regarding a servitude it is necessary to interpret the 
servitude or to delineate its contents. To do this, one may have regard to the 
agreement concluded to create the servitude, while also keeping in mind the unique 
nature of the property rights that are being dealt with. An overview of case law shows 
how these principles have been applied by South African courts since the early 19th 
century and how there has more recently been a shift towards the implementation of 
principles borrowed from contract law in order to interpret servitudes. 
According to Van der Merwe3 there are three factors that should be considered 
when giving content to a servitude, namely the wording used in the servitude grant, 
the manner in which the servitude was established and surrounding circumstances. 
However, the impression created in recent case law is that courts attach considerable 
weight to the exact wording used in the original agreement between the parties. The 
problems arising from this approach are three-fold: it treats the property rights created 
at registration of a servitude as contractual rights; it does not take into consideration 
the fact that servitudes are not always created by way of agreement; and it assumes 
that the context of the originating agreement is easily ascertainable. These problems 
will be discussed in more detail to provide perspective on the current common law 
position. However, another obstacle in determining the scope of a servitude is tied to 
the last problem. The perpetual nature of servitudes means that not only the parties to 
a servitude, but also the surrounding circumstances might change during its existence. 
Viewing servitude relationships as contractual creations when determining the content 
and scope of the rights involved introduces a rigidity into the approach toward 
                                                          
 
3 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 465 fn 39.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
22 
 
servitudes that does not accord with their function of ensuring the continued efficient 
use of land.  
From the discussion that follows it will become apparent that there are signs in 
South African servitude law that point toward the acceptance of implied terms or 
ancillary rights to servitudes. However, there seems to be a deviation from these signs 
in the current approach toward the interpretation of servitudes in general and the 
acceptance of implied terms and ancillary rights in particular. The aim of this chapter 
is to examine the occurrence of these rights and to consider whether they hold any 
promise in introducing a measure of flexibility into the current rigid approach followed 
to determine the scope of servitude rights.   
 
2 2 Creation of servitudes 
A servitude was defined in Lorentz v Melle and Others4 as a right of one person in the 
property of another, either entitling the former to exercise some right or benefit in the 
property or to prohibit the latter from exercising one or other of his normal incidents of 
ownership. There are two broad categories of servitudes, namely praedial and 
personal servitudes. Personal servitudes are constituted to benefit a specific person, 
while praedial servitudes confer a benefit on a specific parcel of land. In the latter case, 
the benefit will be enjoyed by the owner of the benefitted land in his capacity as owner 
and it will run with the land, which means that subsequent owners will enjoy the benefit 
                                                          
 
4 Lorentz v Melle and Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1050, following JTR Gibson Wille’s Principles of 
South African law 7 ed (1977) 221 (currently F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African law 9 ed 
(2007)). See also MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
reg (unpublished LLD dissertation University of Stellenbosch 1989) 4.  
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connected to the land once it is transferred. For purposes of this dissertation, the focus 
is on praedial servitudes.  
Praedial servitudes are constituted in various ways. A statutory provision can 
provide for the establishment of servitudes in particular instances. Section 28 of the 
Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 creates an implied servitude of subjacent and lateral 
support and of passage and provision of water and electricity, which are deemed to 
be incorporated into the title deeds of all sectional title owners. Servitudes may be 
created by court order5 or by state grant when the state grants land subject to a 
servitude or with the benefit of a servitude or by granting a servitude over state land.6 
A servitude can be established through acquisitive prescription if a person has, openly 
and as though he were entitled to it, exercised the rights and powers which someone 
with a servitude would be entitled to exercise, for an uninterrupted period of thirty 
years.7 Finally, most praedial servitudes are created by way of agreement between 
                                                          
 
5 A right of way of necessity is created by court order as a result of the necessity arising when a property 
is landlocked and has no access to a public road other than by using a road over neighbouring land. 
See Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A). Van Leeuwen (Rooms-Hollands regt 2 21 12) was 
of the opinion that where a property was landlocked as a result of subdivision, the servitude right of way 
would necessarily be created over the part of the subdivided land that does have access to a public 
road. The reason for this, according to Van Leeuwen, was that a neighbour could not be burdened as 
a result of a subdivision. The basis for the creation of the servitude is accordingly the implied consent 
of the owner of the other subdivided parcel of land.  
6 CG van der Merwe & MJ De Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert (ed) The law of South Africa vol 24 
(1993) (now CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert (founding ed) & JA Faris 
(planning ed) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed updated by CG van der Merwe (2010)), republished 
as the second part of CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal The law of things and servitudes (1993). For 
purposes of this dissertation the publication is cited as CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” 
in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 612. 
7 Section 6 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. 
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the owners of two neighbouring properties, followed by registration.8 Such an 
agreement may be recorded in a notarial deed executed by the owners of the relevant 
properties,9 or in a transfer of land upon subdivision of a property that results in each 
of the current parties now owning part of the previous single parcel of land.10  
In the first instance, the owners of the servient and dominant properties will draw 
up the servitude-creating agreement in the form of a notarial deed and have it 
registered against the title deed of the servient property.11 A servitude agreement 
usually contains basic terms and conditions related to the servitude, such as the extent 
of the servitudal rights and the consideration offered in return.12 In the second 
instance, the landowner wishing to subdivide his property can, in the deed of transport, 
grant or reserve certain rights in the form of a servitude over one of the subdivided 
portions. In each situation the original contract containing the terms simply creates 
personal rights between the parties. These rights are converted to limited real rights 
upon registration, which is effected once the Registrar of Deeds endorses the 
servitude against the title deeds of the properties.13 This conversion from personal 
                                                          
 
8 Jackson NO and Others v Aventura Ltd and Others [2005] 2 All SA 518 (C) 527; Lorentz v Melle and 
Others 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1050; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s 
The law of property 5 ed (2006) 332 334; P Van Warmelo “Die reg betreffende servitute in Suid Afrika” 
1960 Acta Juridica 106-115 112-114. 
9 S 75 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. 
10 S 76 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937.  
11 It is also common practice to register a servitude against the title deed of the dominant property 
although this is not required.  
12 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
332. 
13 S 3(o), 75, and 76 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 332. 
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(contractual) rights into real (property) rights has important implications for the way in 
which these rights are interpreted.  
The purpose of registration is to create publicity in order to protect third parties 
who buy burdened properties. The fact that the servitude is endorsed on the title deed 
means that a purchaser is reasonably expected to be aware of the burden at the time 
of purchase and this knowledge is rightly attributed to him in cases where disputes 
arise.  
Section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 states that: 
“No deed, or condition in a deed, purporting to create or embodying any 
personal right, and no condition which does not restrict the exercise of any right 
of ownership in respect of immovable property, shall be capable of registration: 
Provided that a deed containing such a condition as aforesaid may be 
registered if, in the opinion of the registrar, such condition is complementary or 
otherwise ancillary to a registrable condition or right contained or conferred in 
such deed.”14 
This section was amended by the General Law Amendment Act 62 of 1973 to include 
the proviso that allows registration of (personal) rights if they are ancillary to the main 
right or condition. Although this proviso pertains to the registration of personal rights, 
it serves as an indication that the legislature envisaged the inclusion of ancillary rights. 
Nevertheless, the registration of any servitude is subject to compliance with various 
requirements for the valid establishment of these particular limited real rights.   
 
                                                          
 
14 Emphasis my own.  
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2 3 Nature and requirements of servitudes 
The establishment of servitudes is regulated extensively by a number of common law 
principles. The numerus clausus principle is one of the most well-known regulatory 
controls imposed on servitudes. According to this principle there is a closed list of 
recognised real rights, and as it applies to servitudes, it means that there are only a 
limited number of rights that can be established as servitudes.15 Although this principle 
does not form part of modern South African property law,16 its function of preventing a 
proliferation of burdens on land is fulfilled by the requirement of registration and the 
subtraction from the dominium test.17  
To determine whether a right is real and registrable, it must pass the subtraction 
from the dominium test. According to the test, a right will qualify as a limited real right 
if its correlative obligation is a burden upon the land and accordingly subtracts from 
                                                          
 
15 The principle is of Roman origin, but De Waal mentions that it was already abandoned to some extent 
in classical and post-classical Roman law. According to Voet Commentarius 8 3 12, there was no 
numerus clausus of servitudes in Roman-Dutch law: MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van 
grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD dissertation University of Stellenbosch 
1989) 14. See PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 
5 ed (2006) 321 for a different view. Merrill and Smith argue that the principle of numerus clausus 
“appears to be a universal feature of all modern property systems” – whether it is expressly 
acknowledged as such (as in most civillian jurisdictions) or simply enforced under the guise of some 
other principle of standardisation (as is seen in common-law countries): TW Merrill & HE Smith “Optimal 
standardization in the law of property: The numerus clausus principle” (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 1-
70 3-4. See also BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation 
of the law of servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 13-14.  
16 CG van der Merwe “Numerus clausus and the development of new real rights in South Africa” (2002) 
119 South African Law Journal 802-815 802; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 321.  
17 AJ van der Walt “The continued relevance of servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 19; CG 
van der Merwe “Numerus clausus and the development of new real rights in South Africa” (2002) 119 
South African Law Journal 802-815; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 460. 
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the dominium.18 This means that it must diminish the ownership of the land in that it 
either provides the servitude holder with certain entitlements inherent to the owner’s 
right of ownership or prevents the owner from exercising certain of the entitlements 
inherent to his ownership.19 This test merely determines whether a particular right is 
real. To determine whether a right can be established as a valid praedial servitude, it 
must comply with more specific requirements.  
The literature regarding the establishment requirements in South African law 
seems to be inconsistent, since writers have different ideas about and lists of the real 
requirements that should be met. De Waal20 states that notwithstanding the 
impression to the contrary created in legal literature, there is no certainty as to what 
exactly the requirements are for the establishment of a valid servitude in South African 
law. After considering the views of a few authoritative sources in South African 
servitude law,21 he composes a list of common denominators which most of these 
sources recognise as relevant or necessary elements to consider in a discussion of 
                                                          
 
18 Nel v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1960 (1) SA 227 (A) 233A; Schwedhelm v Hauman 1947 (1) 
SA 127 (E) 135; Ex Parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155 162; B Akkermans The principle of numerus 
clausus in European property law (2008) 473-482; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
& Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 55-57. 
19 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 458, in accordance with the view that ownership is not a 
bundle of rights, states that an owner granting a servitude does not relinquish some of his property 
rights, but merely agrees to the limitation or suspension of some of the entitlements inherent to his right 
of ownership. 
20 MJ de Waal “Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute: ’n Herformulering” (1990) 1 
Stellenbosch Law Review 171-185 176.  
21 CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s principles of South 
African law 9 ed (2007) 591-629 593-601; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 321-342; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 
2 ed (1994) 584-614; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 467-479; CG Hall & EA Kellaway 
Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 1-5. 
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validity requirements. The requirements include the presence of two tenements 
belonging to different owners;22 the vicinity of the properties;23 utility provided to the 
                                                          
 
22 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
323; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785-817 798-799; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra & R Zimmermann 
(eds) Das römisch-holländische Recht. Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (1992) 
567-595 574; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 468-469; CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 
ed (1973) 3-4. 
23 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
323; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785-817 790-792; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 604-610; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra & R Zimmermann (eds) Das römisch-
holländische Recht. Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (1992) 567-595 574-577; 
MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished 
LLD dissertation University of Stellenbosch 1989) 66-98; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 470. 
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dominant tenement; 24 an objective of permanence;25 and passivity on the part of the 
servient property owner. 26 
Praedial servitudes always involve two tenements belonging to different 
owners.27 The dominant tenement derives some benefit from the servient tenement. If 
                                                          
 
24 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
323; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785-817 795-799; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 585-603; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Feenstra & R Zimmermann (eds) Das römisch-
holländische Recht. Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (1992) 567-595 580-582; 
MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished 
LLD dissertation University of Stellenbosch 1989) 99-209 ; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 
469-471; CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 2. 
25 Voet Commentarius 8 6 4 and 8 4 17; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 323; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D 
Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785-817 793-795; JC 
Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 611-613; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R 
Feenstra & R Zimmermann (eds) Das römisch-holländische Recht. Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17. 
und 18. Jahrhundert (1992) 567-595 577-580; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van 
grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD dissertation University of Stellenbosch 
1989) 30-65; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 471; CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed 
(1973) 11. 
26 D 8 1 15 1 (also see Voet Commentarius 7 1 1, 8 4 17); PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 324-325; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R 
Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 785-
817 799-803; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 550-551; MJ de Waal 
“Servitudes” in R Feenstra & R Zimmermann (eds) Das römisch-holländische Recht. Fortschritte des 
Zivilrechts im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (1992) 567-595 583-586; MJ de Waal “Die passiwiteitsvereiste 
by grondserwitute en die skepping van positiewe serwituutverpligtinge” 1991 Tydskrif vir die Suid 
Afrikaanse Reg 233-249; MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg (unpublished LLD dissertation University of Stellenbosch 1989) 210-293; CG van der 
Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 471-477; CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 1. 
27 Van der Vlugt v Salvation Army Property Co 1932 CPD 56; included in this requirement is the principle 
that no one can have a servitude over his own property (nulli res sua servit; Voet Commentarius 7 4 3). 
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there is no dominant tenement, only a personal servitude can be established.28 This 
requirement seems to be the least controversial and has not caused many problems.29  
The requirement of vicinitas provides that the two tenements must be sufficiently 
close to one another or in the same vicinity. This is one of the more disputed elements 
of servitudes, since it is the subject of quite a few different interpretations. Some writers 
see it simply as an element of the utility requirement30 discussed below, while others, 
who categorise it as an independent requirement for establishment, do not always 
agree on the closeness of the vicinity that is required. According to Voet the dominant 
and servient tenement ought to be neighbouring,31 but he further explains that this 
neighbourhood should be assessed not so much on contiguity as upon the affording 
of benefit and the aptitude for serving.32 Hall and Kellaway33 agree with this view, 
stating that vicinity is indeed a requirement for the establishment of a valid servitude 
but that it does not entail contiguity. 
The requirement of perpetuity (perpetua causa) implies that a servitude should 
be created with a long-term vision. It holds that the dominant tenement must on a 
continuous basis have a need for the benefit provided by the servient tenement, which 
must again be able to fulfil this need perpetually. This idea of permanence affirms the 
                                                          
 
28 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 468. 
29 MJ de Waal Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg (unpublished 
LLD dissertation University of Stellenbosch 1989) 32. 
30 JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 605; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R 
Feenstra & R Zimmermann (eds) Das römisch-holländische Recht. Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17. 
und 18. Jahrhundert (1992) 567-595 577; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 468. 
31 Voet Commentarius 8 4 19. 
32 Voet Commentarius 8 4 19. See CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 468 for examples of how 
this applies to different servitudes. 
33 CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 3.  
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real nature of the servitudal rights. However, as is the case with the vicinitas 
requirement, many writers see perpetuity as part of the utility of a servitude.34 It seems 
that the requirement for perpetua causa was not strictly adhered to in Roman-Dutch 
law or by the pandectists35 and no South African court has considered it in much detail 
either.36  
Utility (utilitas) is one of the most prominent elements required for the 
establishment of praedial servitudes.37 This requirement entails that the servitude 
offers a permanent increase in usefulness to the dominant tenement. 38 It is important 
that the benefit accrues to the dominant land and does not simply benefit the person 
who happens to be the owner of the tenement at a particular time.39 As mentioned 
above, the requirements of vicinity and perpetuity are often seen as elements of 
                                                          
 
34 JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 613; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R 
Feenstra & R Zimmermann (eds) Das römisch-holländische Recht. Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17. 
und 18. Jahrhundert (1992) 567-595 577-580. 
35 JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 612; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R 
Feenstra & R Zimmermann (eds) Das römisch-holländische Recht. Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17. 
und 18. Jahrhundert (1992) 567-595 613; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 471.  
36 MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 785-817 793-794. See also JL Neels Onderskeidende kenmerke by 
diensbaarhede: Die vereistes van praedio utilitas, perpetua causa en vicinitas vir erfdiensbaarhede 
(1989) unpublished LLM thesis University of Johannesburg 62-63.  
37 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
323. 
38 De Kock v Hänel 1999 (1) SA 994 (C) 998; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 323; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 470. 
39  CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 470.  
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utility.40 De Waal41 states that the formulation of these two elements as separate and 
independent requirements has no convincing historical or legal-comparative basis and 
is, from a practical point of view, meaningless. Thus, he only recognises three 
requirements for the valid establishment of a servitude, namely the existence of two 
tenements, utility and passivity.  
The passivity requirement prohibits the imposition of positive duties on the 
servient property. This requirement forms an important part of South African servitude 
law. It is sometimes controversial and in some foreign jurisdictions, the imposition of 
positive obligations has been accepted. This requirement holds that an owner of a 
servient tenement can be obliged either to endure some or other act performed on his 
property or to refrain from performing some act himself, but could not be compelled to 
perform any positive duty in terms of a servitude42 or to maintain the works necessary 
for the effective exercise of a servitude by the owner of the dominant tenement.43 
Apart from the validity requirements there are also other important principles44 
regulating the creation and content of servitudes. These include the principles of 
                                                          
 
40 JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 613; MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in R 
Feenstra & R Zimmermann (eds) Das römisch-holländische Recht. Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17. 
und 18. Jahrhundert (1992) 567-595 577-580; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 470-471. 
41 MJ de Waal “Die vereistes vir die vestiging van grondserwitute: ’n Herformulering” (1990) 1 
Stellenbosch Law Review 171-185 183-184.  
42 CG van der Merwe “Die nutsvereiste by erfdiensbaarhede” in DJ Joubert (ed) Petere fontes: LC Steyn 
gedenkbundel (1980) 163-176 165. See also Lorentz v Melle 1978 3 SA 1044 (T) 1049. 
43 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 472. See e g Roeloffze NO and Another v Bothma NO and 
Others 2007 (2) SA 257 (C) para 37. There is one exception to the passivity rule: the servitus oneris 
ferendi, a servitude of support, which placed a positive obligation on the owner of the servient tenement 
to maintain the building providing support to the building on the dominant tenement. 
44 There is some controversy about the categorisation of these “principles”. CG van der Merwe Sakereg 
2 ed (1989) 461-467 and JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 548-583 identify 
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servitus in servitutis esse non potest (there can be no servitude over an existing 
servitude),45 nemini res sua servit (no one can have a servitude over his own 
property),46 and the indivisible nature of servitudes.47  
If a right meets all the requirements set out above, it is registrable as a praedial 
servitude. It is generally accepted that the role of the validity requirements is to prevent 
ownership of land from becoming excessively encumbered by a proliferation of 
praedial servitudes. Sonnekus and Neels48 emphasise that the requirements for 
establishment are compulsory and not merely regulatory law and that parties should 
not be able to thwart the policy considerations behind the requirements by way of 
agreement.  
Regulating servitudes by requiring compliance with certain rules to restrict their 
establishment, is described as ex ante control49 because the measures are used to 
regulate servitudes before the event or before their creation. These measures are 
                                                          
 
them as characteristics while other writers see them as requirements. MJ de Waal “Die vereistes vir die 
vestiging van grondserwitute: ‘n Herformulering” (1990) 1 Stellenbosch Law Review 171-185 182 
explains the importance of distinguishing between requirements and characteristics.  
45 There can be no servitude of a servitude (Voet Commentarius 8 4 7).  
46 D 8 2 26; Voet Commentarius 8 4 14; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 323. 
47 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 460.  
48 JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 597. See also MJ de Waal “Die vereistes 
vir die vestiging van grondserwitute: ’n Herformulering” (1990) 1 Stellenbosch Law Review 171-
185 181. 
49 JA Lovett “Creating and controlling private land use restrictions in Scotland and Louisiana: A 
comparative mixed jurisdiction analysis” (2008) 19 Stellenbosch Law Review 231-257; S French “The 
American Restatement of servitude law: Reforming doctrine by shifting from ex ante to ex post controls 
on the risks posed by servitudes” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of land 
burdens (2006) 109-118; KGC Reid “Modernising land burdens: The new law in Scotland” in S van Erp 
& B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of land burdens (2006) 63-108. 
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aimed at maintaining stability in the property system in order to encourage investment 
in land and ensure continued development of property. They prevent the fragmentation 
of property rights by placing limits on the kinds of real rights that may be created.50 
Another way of preventing fragmentation is through ex post control measures, which 
are aimed not at preventing the establishment of servitudes but rather at providing 
certain remedies to prevent or reduce the negative effects of inefficient and 
undesirable servitudes already established.51 This is done by providing for remedies 
to interpret, modify and terminate existing servitudes that have become inefficient or 
undesirable.52 
 
2 4 Effective use and reasonableness  
The granting of servitude rights to a dominant proprietor necessarily limits the 
ownership entitlements of the servient proprietor. Nevertheless, the servient proprietor 
maintains the residual rights to use and enjoy her property as far as this does not 
                                                          
 
50 AJ van der Walt “The continued relevance of servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 2. 
51 This was introduced by the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes (2000) in American law; S 
French “The American Restatement of servitude law: Reforming doctrine by shifting from ex ante to ex 
post controls on the risks posed by servitudes” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified 
system of land burdens (2006) 109-118 110. 
52 In South African law servitudes are terminated by prescription (after 30 years of non-use); through 
statutory provision; by agreement; by a clear intention of the dominant proprietor to abandon his rights; 
where the dominant and servient properties are owned by the same person; or when of the properties 
is destroyed. However, these measures of termination are all determined ex ante. The value of ex post 
measures for termination (or modification) is that they are a result of circumstances that arise at some 
time after establishment of the rights.  
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interfere with the exercise of the servitude.53 The result is that the two parties 
simultaneously have rights to use and enjoy the same property. This causes an 
inherent tension in their relationship, and since servitude relationships are created to 
exist in perpetuity, it is necessary to address this tension.54 Accordingly, clear 
principles are necessary to regulate the relationship between the parties and ensure 
a fair balancing of interests between them.55  
The approach of South African courts to the relationship between the parties was 
summarised by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of Anglo Operations Ltd v 
Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd56 (“Anglo Operations”): 
“In accordance with the principles applicable to servitudes, the owner of a 
servient property is bound to allow the holder to do whatever is reasonably 
necessary for the proper exercise of his rights. The holder of the servitude is 
in turn bound to exercise his rights civiliter modo, that is, reasonably viewed, 
with as much possible consideration and with the least possible inconvenience 
to the servient property and its owner.”57 
There are a number of common law principles that aim to regulate the relationship 
between the parties and ensure a fair balancing of interests between them.58 The first 
principle holds that the servitude holder enjoys preference in exercising the 
entitlements of use and enjoyment that form part of the servitude.59 The servient 
                                                          
 
53 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 465; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 330-331.  
54 AJ van der Walt “The relationship between the servitude holder and the owner” in The law of 
servitudes (2016) (forthcoming) 1.  
55 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 464. 
56 Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 2 SA 363 (SCA). 
57 Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 2 SA 363 (SCA) 373A–B. 
58 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 464. 
59 Cillie v Geldenhuys 2009 (2) SA 325 (SCA) para 15; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 464. 
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property owner is accordingly obliged to allow the enjoyment of the servitude and to 
use his property in a way that does not restrict its exercise.60 This provides protection 
to the dominant proprietor and ties in with the principle that he may do all that is 
necessary for the effective exercise of his servitudal rights.61  These protective 
measures aim to ensure that the servitude holder can achieve the full functionality of 
the rights he was granted. He may erect necessary structures such as steps or 
bridges, lay pipes and access the servitude works for maintenance purposes.62  
Of course, the servient proprietor is protected against abuse of these rights. She 
may exercise all entitlements of ownership which are not inconsistent with the 
servitude and is free to establish such other servitudes as she wishes, as long as the 
servitude right of the dominant owner is not negatively affected.63 More significantly, 
the servient proprietor is protected against an undue increase in the burden imposed 
on her property by the servitude. This is ensured by the principle that requires civiliter 
modo exercise of the servitude.64 According to this principle, the dominant proprietor 
                                                          
 
60 Texas Co (SA) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1926 AD 467 474; Rabie v De Wit 1946 CPD 346 351; 
Kakamas Bestuursraad v Louw 1960 (2) SA 202 (A) 226B; Stuttaford v Kruger 1967 (2) SA 166 (C) 
172F; Brink v Van Niekerk en 'n Ander 1986 (3) 428 (T) 434; Johl and Another v Nobre and Others 
(23841/2010) [2012] ZAWCHC 20 (20 March 2012) para 15.  
61 Johl and Another v Nobre and Others (23841/2010) [2012] ZAWCHC 20 (20 March 2012) para 14; 
Rubidge v McCabe & Sons 1913 AD 433 441; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 544. 
62 This is discussed in more detail in section 2 6 below.  
63 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 464-467; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in 
WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 544. 
64 Johl and Another v Nobre and Others (23841/2010) [2012] ZAWCHC 20 (20 March 2012) para 13; 
Kakamas Bestuursraad v Louw 1960 (2) SA 202 (A) 226B; J Scott “A growing trend in source application 
by our courts illustrated by a recent judgment on right of way” (2013) 76 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg 239-251 242-244; JC Sonnekus “Erfdiensbaarhede en die uitoefening 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
37 
 
must exercise his servitude reasonably,65 in a manner that will cause the least damage 
or inconvenience to the servient property.66 He may not bring about changes in the 
condition of the dominant property that would have a more burdensome effect on the 
servient property than could reasonably have been foreseen at the creation of the 
servitude.67 According to Van der Merwe, this means that the servitude holder might 
be able to erect a factory on his land, but the servient property cannot be expected to 
tolerate the use of an existing agricultural servitude of right of way for the transport of 
materials and factory goods for this new purpose.68It is not entirely clear where the 
line is drawn between allowing the dominant property full effective use of his servitude 
and limiting his exercise on the basis that it is inciviliter; the balance must be 
determined on the grounds of reasonableness.  
These principles are aimed at regulating the continued (ex post) existence of 
servitudes after establishment by ensuring the reasonable conduct of both parties over 
time. This suggests a measure of flexibility in servitude controls. However, the 
balancing exercise necessary to address the inherent tension in the relationship 
                                                          
 
daarvan civiliter modo” (2007) 70 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 351-370 360-362; 
CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 466.   
65 Johl and Another v Nobre and Others (23841/2010) [2012] ZAWCHC 20 (20 March 2012) para 13. 
66 Or with due consideration to the interests of the servient proprietor. See in this regard Anglo 
Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 2 SA 363 (SCA) 373A–B; Rabie v De Wit 1946 CPD 
346 351; J Scott “A growing trend in source application by our courts illustrated by a recent judgment 
on right of way” (2013) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 239-251 242-244; JC 
Sonnekus “Erfdiensbaarhede en die uitoefening daarvan civiliter modo” (2007) 70 Tydskrif vir 
Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 351-370 360-362; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 466. 
67 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 467. This includes burdens that are neither required for 
proper exercise of the servitude nor clearly specified in the servitude grant. 
68 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 467. 
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between the parties has proved challenging to courts.69 The first step to determine 
whether an infringement of rights has occurred in a specific dispute is to know the 
exact scope of the servitude rights.70 In determining the scope of the rights, these ex 
post considerations must be taken into account in the weighing of interests of the 
parties 
In Kakamas Bestuursraad v Louw71 (“Kakamas Bestuursraad”) the court stated 
the following:  
“The more precise the description in the grant of the ways in which the 
servitude is to be exercised, the less room there is for complaint on the ground 
that it has not been exercised civiliter modo. By their agreement the parties 
may fix or indicate what is to be deemed to be a proper use of the servitude.”72 
This statement highlights a crucial intersection in the process of determining the scope 
of a servitude. It is true that the parties to a servitude conclude an agreement that sets 
out the terms and particulars of their relationship. However, because servitudes are 
real rights, their contents need to conform, first and foremost, to the principles of 
property law. Even though the content of the servitude is determined to a large extent 
by the particular terms of the contract between the parties, this can only be done within 
the framework that the principles of property law allow. Examples in case law show 
that courts sometimes fail to find workable solutions to solve disputes by relying on the 
common law rules at hand.  
                                                          
 
69 Roeloffze NO v Bothma NO 2007 2 SA 257 (C). 
70 JC Sonnekus “Erfdiensbaarhede en die uitoefening daarvan civiliter modo” (2007) 70 Tydskrif vir 
Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 351-370 360-362.   
71 Kakamas Bestuursraad v Louw 1960 (2) SA 202 (A). 
72 Kakamas Bestuursraad v Louw 1960 (2) SA 202 (A) 218C. 
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In Linvestment CC v Hammersley73 the court decided to develop the applicable 
common law rules in order to bring about a result that was better aligned with “the 
interests of justice”. The case involved a plea for the unilateral relocation of a servitude 
of right of way. According to the principles of the common law, a servitude could only 
be altered by mutual consent of the parties.74 However, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
decided that:  
“[A] modification of our existing law may better serve the interests of justice 
when the existing law is uncertain or does not adequately serve modern 
demands on it.”75 
The court accordingly declared that a servient proprietor is permitted to apply for 
unilateral relocation of a servitude of right of way, provided the relocation will not 
prejudice the owner of the dominant tenement.76 This marks a significant shift in the 
direction of ex post regulation. However, the flexibility allowed here is limited in scope 
and application, as it only applies to the specific instances of relocation of a servitude 
right of way and only in favour of the servient proprietor. As for dominant proprietors, 
there is no indication that courts will allow flexibility in the interpretation of their rights 
or even in the consideration of the extent of their interests in light of changed 
circumstances that result in a diminution of their rights. 
                                                          
 
73 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA).  
74 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA) para 11; Gardens Estate Ltd v 
Lewis 1920 AD 144 at 150; LA Kiewitz Relocation of a specified servitude of right of way (unpublished 
LLM thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2010) 20. 
75 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA) para 25.   
76 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA) para 35. For a more detailed 
discussion of the case see sections 5 2 and 5 4 below.  
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In other cases, courts try to achieve flexibility in the scope of the servitude by 
focussing on the words used in the servitude deed or originating agreement to find an 
interpretation that can be reconciled with the desired outcome. 
 
2 5 Interpretation of servitude grants  
Van der Merwe states that the content of a servitude relationship and a contractual 
relationship is often identical.77 However, they should not be confused.  
The case of Fourie v Marandellas Town Council78 (“Fourie”) is a good example 
to illustrate the tendency of courts to focus to a large extent on the interpretation of the 
servitude grant to determine the contents and scope of a servitude. The servitude in 
this case was phrased as follows:  
“A servitude of storage as defined in section 94 (1) of the Water Act, Chapter 
251... for the purpose of storing water in connection with the dam constructed 
by the Board... and the grantor agrees that the Board shall be entitled to make 
further use of the area covered by the servitude of storage as it may desire.” 79 
The court, in interpreting the servitude, said that because the servitude grant was 
worded unambiguously, its duty was not to find the least burdensome interpretation of 
the servitude, but simply to give effect to the words used in the grant “unless this would 
lead to an absurdity or to something which, from the instrument as a whole, it can 
clearly be gathered the parties could not have intended”. The court eventually 
                                                          
 
77 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 462. 
78 Fourie v Marandellas Town Council 1972 (2) SA 698 (R).  
79 Fourie v Marandellas Town Council 1972 (2) SA 698 (R) 699 (emphasis my own). Footnotes omitted. 
The Act referred to is the Water Act 54 of 1956. 
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concluded that the wording used in this grant was explicit (and precise)80 in granting 
the right to do anything “it may desire” to the servitude holder, even to the extent that 
this included the lease of a part of the servient property to a third party and the 
construction of buildings by that third party for purposes totally unrelated to the 
servitude itself. In doing so, the court focussed on the words of the originating 
document to the extent of ignoring the applicable property law principles. If the court 
had considered the servitude agreement in the light of the relevant property law 
principles, the use of the servitude of water storage for the further and unrelated 
purposes contended would not be in line with the principle of civiliter modo exercise of 
the rights.81  
The approach followed in this case highlights the propensity of courts to refer to 
the deed or contract, not simply as an aid to establish the original terms of the 
servitude, but to the extent that it is the main source to determine the content and 
scope of the relevant rights. 
The most prominent principle dictating the interpretation of servitudes holds that 
they must be interpreted strictly, so as to impose the least possible burden on the 
servient tenement.82 This principle follows from the assumption that all property is in 
                                                          
 
80 Fourie v Marandellas Town Council 1972 (2) SA 698 (R). 
81 Both the renting of the servitude to a third party (who is in no way using the dominant land) and the 
construction of buildings on the servient property create abnormal and weighty burdens on the servient 
land. According to the principles of servitude law, it will be very hard to include these uses as implied 
ancillary rights to an existing servitude. These rights will most likely require separate negotiation and 
establishment as servitudes in their own right.  
82 Johl and Another v Nobre and Others (23841/2010) [2012] ZAWCHC 20 (20 March 2012) para 16; 
Kruger v Joles Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd and Another 2009 (3) SA 5 (SCA) 10; Cillie v Geldenhuys 2009 
(2) SA 325 (SCA) para 20; Eskom Holdings Ltd v Dorfling NO and Others (10487/2008) [2008] 
ZAWCHC 262 (8 September 2008); Nach Investments (Pty) Ltd v Yaldai Investments (Pty) Ltd and 
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principle unburdened and free from servitudes.83 According to Van der Merwe,84 a 
servitude holder may exploit a servitude generously, to the boundaries of his needs, 
and according to its content. He clarifies that the content of a servitude will depend on 
the wording used in the servitude grant, the way of establishment of the servitude and 
the surrounding circumstances. In order to apply the principle of strict interpretation, 
courts seem to focus on the wording of servitude grants85 to give content to servitudes. 
In Cillie v Geldenhuys86 (“Cillie”) the court confirmed a statement made in the much 
earlier case of Snijman v Boshoff87 that the scope of a servitude created by 
agreement88 will depend on the interpretation of the terms used in the servitude grant 
and “has nothing to do with common law rights”.89  
                                                          
 
Another 1987 (2) SA 820 (A) 820; Pieterse v Du Plessis 1972 (2) SA 597 (A) 599; CG van der Merwe 
& MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) 
para 543; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 464.  
83 Kruger v Joles Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd and Another 2009 (3) SA 5 (SCA) 10; Willoughby's Consolidated 
Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1918 AD 1 16; CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 543; CG van der Merwe 
Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 464. 
84 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 465. 
85 See the following cases for examples where courts have confirmed the importance of interpreting the 
words used in the servitude grant: Johl and Another v Nobre and Others (23841/2010) [2012] ZAWCHC 
20 (20 March 2012) para 16; Cillie v Geldenhuys 2009 (2) SA 325 (SCA) para 16; De Kock v Hänel 
1999 (1) SA 994 (C) 997; Kruger v Downer 1976 (3) SA 172 (W) 175; Van Rensburg en Andere v Taute 
en Andere 1975 (1) SA 279 (A) 302-303; Fourie v Marandellas Town Council 1972 (2) SA 698 (R) 700; 
Murray v Schneider 1958 (1) SA 587 (A) 592; Delmas Milling Co v Du Plessis 1955 (3) SA 447 (A) 453-
455; Cliffside Flats v Bantry Rocks 1944 AD 106 117-118; Snijman v Boshoff 1905 ORC 1 9. 
86 Cillie v Geldenhuys 2009 (2) SA 325 (SCA) para 16. 
87 Snijman v Boshoff 1905 ORC 1 9. 
88 As opposed to servitudes created by prescription, in which case the scope will depend on the exact 
nature of the right acquired by prescription.  
89 CG van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South 
Africa vol 24 2 ed (2010) para 544 fn 1. 
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In the case of Le Roux NO and others v Burger and others90 (“Le Roux”) the court 
confirmed the statement made in various previous cases that it had no discretion to 
derogate from the words used in the agreement between the parties if the meaning 
thereof is unambiguous;91 even though the term might have unreasonable 
consequences. 92 Moreover, a number of judgements reiterate the application of basic 
contractual principles of interpretation in servitude cases. The Le Roux case refers to 
the framework set out in Van Rensburg en Andere v Taute93 for the interpretation of 
servitudes.  
The central ground of dispute in Le Roux was the determination of the content 
and scope of the servitude.94 The court stated that the point of departure in this inquiry 
is the principle that a servitude must be interpreted strictly. Furthermore, it was held 
that where there is any doubt regarding the content of the servitude, the ordinary rules 
that apply to the interpretation of contracts are equally applicable to the interpretation 
                                                          
 
90 Le Roux NO & Others v Burger & Others (21020/2008) [2010] ZAWCHC 127 (10 June 2010). See 
also Le Roux v Burger (249/2011) [2011] ZASCA 194 (15 November 2011), confirming the decision of 
the Western Cape High Court.  
91 Eskom Holdings Ltd v Dorfling NO and Others (10487/2008) [2008] ZAWCHC 262 (8 September 
2008); Berdur Properties (Pty) Ltd v 76 Commercial Road (Pty) Ltd 1998 (4) SA 62 (D) 68; Kruger v 
Downer 1976 (3) SA 172 (W) 178H; Van Rensburg en Andere vs Taute en Andere 1975 (1), S.A. 279, 
(AD) 301-302; Haviland Estates (Ptv) Ltd and Another v McMaster 1969 (2) SA 312 (A) 336B-C; 
Stephens v De Wet 1920 OPD 78 81.  
92 Le Roux NO & Others v Burger & Others (21020/2008) [2010] ZAWCHC 127 (10 June 2010) para 
22. As authority for this statement, the court referred to a statement made in the case of Sun Packaging 
(Ptv) Ltd v Vreulink 1996 (4) SA 176 (A) relating to a contract of employment: “It may be regarded as 
anomalous that a party breaching a contract be in a better position than if he had performed it. But such 
a result is no warrant for not giving effect to the plain meaning of the clause. The sanctity of contract 
behoves us to do so". 92 
93 Van Rensburg en Andere v Taute 1975 (1) SA 279 (A) 302. 
94 Le Roux NO & Others v Burger & Others (21020/2008) [2010] ZAWCHC 127 (10 June 2010) para 5.  
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of servitudes created by agreement.95 The starting point is thus the golden rule of 
interpretation that requires that the words in the document be afforded their 
grammatical meaning.96 Once the grammatical meaning has been determined, other 
considerations must also be taken into account, namely, the context in which the 
words are used in the contract as a whole and the background circumstances relating 
to the contract (such as matters probably present in the minds of the parties). If the 
language of the document is ambiguous, a court may consider extrinsic evidence 
regarding the surrounding circumstances by looking at previous negotiations between 
the parties, or other factors that may indicate their intentions relating to the contract.97  
It seems from all these instances that case law on the topic of interpretation has 
consistently affirmed the idea of a narrow, literal interpretation of the words used in 
servitude contracts, often including reference to the intention of the parties at creation 
of the servitude. What is significant about this approach is the strong resemblance to 
(if not adoption of) contract law principles. In several instances, courts have directly 
applied contractual principles of interpretation to give content to the servitudal rights 
of parties, discounting the fact that the rights they are dealing with are property rights 
                                                          
 
95 Le Roux NO & Others v Burger & Others (21020/2008) [2010] ZAWCHC 127 (10 June 2010) para 
12.  
96 Le Roux NO & Others v Burger & Others (21020/2008) [2010] ZAWCHC 127 (10 June 2010) para 
13.  
97 In Glaffer Investments (Pty) Ltd and others v Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry and Another 2000 
(4) SA 822 (T) 828 consideration of the physical features surrounding the servitude were taken into 
account to determine the intentions of the parties at the time the servitude was granted. However, the 
court insisted that only the circumstances existing at the time of creation of the rights should be 
considered. The court held that: “It is clear that the [dominant proprietor] seeks to impose present-day 
departmental policy upon the servitude and to interpret it in the light thereof. This is incorrect. The 
servitude has to be interpreted according to its wording and in the light of the surrounding circumstances 
prevailing when it was granted.” 
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and should be interpreted as such, with reliance on property principles. Applying a 
contractual methodology to determine the contents of limited real rights is 
fundamentally problematic.  
As explained in section 2 2 above, not all servitudes are created by agreement. 
The contractual approach does not provide at all for servitudes created by way of state 
grant, statute or through acquisitive prescription. In these cases, there is no agreement 
or wording to interpret. In the Cillie case the court said that the extent of a servitude 
created by prescription was to be determined by the true nature and scope of the rights 
actually acquired.98 It is not clear how the exact “nature and scope” of the servitude 
can be established practically in such a case. The assumption can be made that only 
the exact rights exercised by the dominant owner, or subsequent owners, over the 
prescription period will be granted as part of the servitude.99 However, this approach 
leaves no room for any change in circumstances and seems quite inflexible. It also 
raises the questions of how important the words of the grant should be where a 
servitude is created by agreement and whether other factors might sometimes carry 
more weight in the process of interpretation to ensure effective use of all servitudes, 
regardless of their manner of creation.  
Another shortcoming of the contractual approach is that it denies the real nature 
of servitudes. As discussed before, servitudes are established as limited real rights 
                                                          
 
98 Cillie v Geldenhuys 2009 (2) SA 325 (SCA) para15. 
99 Voet (Commentarius 8 2 2), referring to a servitude of letting in beams and anchors into a neighbour’s 
wall, says no more can be prescribed as was possessed or held in quasi possession.  
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upon registration.100 At this stage, the originating agreement concluded between the 
parties obtains a secondary role. The registered servitude serves as proof (publicity) 
of the limited real right created and any rights or additional terms of the agreement 
that are not registered along with the servitude will be enforceable between the current 
parties, but should not enjoy third party effect and do not, strictly speaking, form part 
of the servitude.  
The approach followed by courts seems to be an attempt to reach a flexible 
solution by reconciling the wording of the agreement or grant with the desired outcome 
in a particular dispute, but even a liberal interpretation of the contract does not result 
in an effective solution as it is still a contractual solution.  
The perpetual nature of servitudes provides another obstacle to the contractual 
approach as changes over time are inevitably going to have an effect on the context 
within which the rights are exercised. This means that an interpretation of the servitude 
agreement that is focussed on the intention of the original parties and the 
circumstances existing at the time of creation will be ill-suited to determine how the 
servitude should be exercised at a later stage. Apart from a change in ownership or 
use of the relevant properties, changes in society, the economy, technology or the 
political sphere relevant to the use of property can all influence the manner in which 
the servitude is exercised.  
    In South African law the need for and general use of servitudes originated 
mainly from agriculture and servitude law in general saw little change since the original 
                                                          
 
100 Note that servitudes created ex lege are an exception to the rule. Furthermore, servitudes acquired 
by acquisitive prescription, state grant or statute are not required to be registered, although registration 
is advisable. 
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incorporation of Roman-Dutch law. It can be supposed that many servitudes that were 
originally constituted to serve some kind of agricultural or other rural purpose that has 
undergone drastic development might have become wholly irrelevant in recent times. 
An example of this would be a right of way that is said to be exercisable by horse-
drawn vehicles or carriages. This issue was addressed by a Scottish court.101 In the 
case of Crawford v Lumsden,102 the court had to interpret a servitude created in 1917 
said to reserve a “right of access by horse and cart”.103 In 1950, when motor vehicles 
had largely replaced horses and carts, the dominant proprietor was allowed by the 
court to exercise his right by motor vehicle. The court stated that “when a grant like 
this is asked and obtained, the parties are contemplating a privilege which is to endure 
for a long stretch of time, and that what we are really purporting to define is a user of 
some specified kind, expressed in the language of the day”. The exercise of the right 
by means of a motor vehicle was not seen by the court as really being a different kind 
of use. However, on appeal, the Court of Session reversed the decision104 and held 
that in the specific circumstances of this case, the steady increase in the use of motor 
vehicles was known to or could reasonably have been foreseen by the original parties 
to the deed.105 Lord Jamieson, delivering the decision on appeal made an obiter 
remark to the effect that a servitude granted with a specific limitation relating to its 
                                                          
 
101 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the Scottish position on servitudes.  
102 Crawford v Lumsden 1951 SLT 64 revised 1951 SLT (Notes) 62.  
103 RRM Paisley “The demon drink and the straight and narrow way: The expansion and limitation of 
praedial servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 
193-237 230-231. 
104 Crawford v Lumsden 1951 SLT 64 revised 1951 SLT (Notes) 62. 
105 Support for this conclusion was also found in the fact that the owner of the servient tenement was 
shown in the deed to be a motor hirer and the attached plan of the properties showed a garage on his 
land.  
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exercise may be exercised in a new way if the new method was not foreseen by the 
parties but becomes a generally accepted substitute for the old method of exercise.106 
I would argue that South African courts should likewise be flexible to adapt to changing 
circumstances in this way. 
 A recent South African example of the impact of technological development on 
a servitude is the case of Zeeman v De Wet,107 where the servient tenement was part 
of an award-winning wine estate. In keeping with the latest research on optimal use of 
weather conditions, the owner needed to change the direction in which the vineyards 
were planted over the area subject to the servitude of aqueduct. Consequently, this 
had an impact on the dominant owner’s right of access to inspect and maintain the 
servitude works and led to the dispute.  
The case of Jersey Lane Properties108 seemed to hold some promise to bring 
about a tipping point on the inflexibility apparent in the application of the contractual 
approach to servitudes. The a quo decision109 concerned a servitude of right of way in 
favour of a property that was being used for the purpose of running a boutique hotel 
and spa. The servitude was exercised by the owners of the hotel (“Jersey Lane”) for 
thirteen years before the problem arose. According to the case, it was only when a 
                                                          
 
106 RRM Paisley “The demon drink and the straight and narrow way: The expansion and limitation of 
praedial servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 
193-237 231. 
107 Zeeman v De Wet NO and Others (325/2011) [2012] ZASCA 22; 2012 (6) SA 1 (SCA) (23 March 
2012). 
108 Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa v Hodgson and Another 
(A5030/11) [2012] ZAGPJHC 86 (7 May 2012) paras 7-9. 
109 Hodgson v Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa unreported case no 
36702/10 (23 February 2011) (copy on file with author). 
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certain group of VIP’s110 decided to lodge in their hotel that Jersey Lane was advised 
by their agents to enhance the access to the hotel. Upon this request, they immediately 
commenced with the upgrading of the entrance and built a portico, or “what is 
commonly known as a security gate entrance, elaborately built, with a flat roof and 
what seems to be a stoep on top, with gates and a guardhouse which is almost two 
storeys high immediately adjacent to the neighbouring property”.111 The servient 
owners only became aware of the construction after it had commenced, since they 
had been abroad during the initial stages of planning and construction, and their 
attempts to put a stop to the building at that time failed. The question that the court 
focussed on in this case was whether the construction of the portico was necessary 
for the proper utilisation of the right of way by Jersey Lane.112 The court remarked that 
the servitude was unambiguous and required no further interpretation. It eventually 
decided that Jersey Lane had exceeded the bounds of what was regarded as 
necessary for adequate utilisation and that it had accordingly built the portico 
unlawfully and in contravention of the right of way.113 However, in the decision on leave 
to appeal, Van Joosten J stated that “a progressive interpretation of the servitude was 
                                                          
 
110 The important guests were  described as “some eminent group of elders which included ex-president 
Jimmy Carter of the USA”; Hodgson v Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & 
Spa unreported case no 36702/10 (23 February 2011) par 8 (copy on file with author). 
111 Hodgson v Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa unreported case no 
36702/10 (23 February 2011) (copy on file with author) par 1. 
112 One question that the court should have paid more attention to was the unlawful construction of a 
building on another’s property, or in the very least, the absence of the necessary municipal building 
approval.  
113 Hodgson v Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa unreported case no 
36702/10 (23 February 2011) (copy on file with author) par 9. 
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called for, having regard to modern day urban developments”.114 The judge contended 
that the single consideration relied upon by the court a quo was insufficient to properly 
interpret the servitude and that there were a number of other factors affecting the 
reasonableness of the appellant’s exercise of his rights that ought to have been 
considered. To illustrate this point he referred to certain specific features of the 
property.115 The court concluded that a wide interpretation of the servitude grant, if 
properly applied, would not have violated the applicable common law principles. These 
comments simply formed part of the High Court’s judgement on application for leave 
to appeal. After leave was granted by Van Joosten J in the High court,116 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal refused the application without giving reasons.117 Since the applicant 
did not take the matter further, the decision of Van Joosten J, contending for a 
progressive interpretation of the grant is the final say on this case. It is unfortunate that 
there is no indication of how the proposed progressive interpretation should be 
approached.  
What is noteworthy about this case, from a servitude perspective, is that the court 
a quo did not spend much time on an in-depth analysis of the wording of the servitude 
                                                          
 
114 Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa v Hodgson and Another 
(A5030/11) [2012] ZAGPJHC 86 (7 May 2012) para 9. 
115 Van Joosten J mentioned “the general aesthetics of the surroundings, the security requirements of 
the property and the general tendency to erect porticos at entrances to upmarket […] properties in that 
area” as factors which could be relevant to consider in deciding the reasonableness of the dominant 
owner’s actions. See Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa v Hodgson 
and Another (A5030/11) [2012] ZAGPJHC 86 (7 May 2012) para 10. 
116 Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa v Hodgson and Another 
(A5030/11) [2012] ZAGPJHC 86 (7 May 2012) para 13. 
117 Hodgson v Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa unreported case no 
375/2012 (28 August 2012) (SCA) (copy on file with author). 
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grant.118 Since the grant stated in very simple terms that the servient tenement was 
subject to a right of way along a certain route, the court said that the servitude was 
unambiguous and did not need further interpretation. The appeal court, on the other 
hand, had more to say on the matter of interpretation of the rights and proceeded to 
mention the applicable property law principles that could help provide content to the 
servitude. It explained that the singular focus of the court a quo to establish the 
boundaries of the servitude rights and determine whether the construction of the 
portico fell within these boundaries, was insufficient to properly interpret the 
servitude.119 The court held that the principle of civiliter modo ought to be considered 
“more fully”. This meant, firstly, that the servitude had to be exercised reasonably, with 
due regard to the interests of the servient proprietor.120 However, the particular nature 
and context of the current servitude also required consideration and could affect the 
reasonableness of the exercise of the rights under the servitude. On these grounds, 
the court expressed the view that a wide interpretation of the servitude is called for, 
“and if properly will not violate the common law principles […] referred to”.121 However, 
because the appeal application never reached the trial court, this approach was never 
elaborated on and we are yet to see whether courts will actively engage with the 
question of civiliter modo exercise in this manner.  
                                                          
 
118 Hodgson v Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa unreported case no 
36702/10 (23 February 2011) (copy on file with author) par 9.  
119 Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa v Hodgson and Another 
(A5030/11) [2012] ZAGPJHC 86 (7 May 2012) para 9; Hodgson v Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa unreported case no 36702/10 (23 February 2011) para 5.  
120 Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa v Hodgson and Another 
(A5030/11) [2012] ZAGPJHC 86 (7 May 2012) para 8.  
121 Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa v Hodgson and Another 
(A5030/11) [2012] ZAGPJHC 86 (7 May 2012) para 10. 
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This case is a good example of a court failing to apply the available common law 
tools to solve problems relating to ancillary rights that regularly arise during the 
existence of servitudes (ex post). In a small number of cases, such as Linvestment 
CC v Hammersley,122 the courts have indicated a willingness to develop the common 
law to render it more flexible so as to cope with changed circumstances that render 
the use of an existing servitude inefficient.  
 
2 6  Implied terms and ancillary rights in South African law 
Although the practice of describing the exact scope of a servitude along with all related 
rights in the servitude grant has developed in South African law in recent years,123  this 
has not always been the case. Existing servitudes are often still described in simple 
terms, containing only the key terms of the agreement between the parties. This 
vagueness creates the potential for ambiguity and makes it hard to determine what 
rights can be implied in the servitude. 
The foundation upon which the notion of implied and ancillary rights in South 
African servitude law can be developed lies in the notion that a servitude includes 
everything that is necessary for its effective exercise.124 This notion originated in 
                                                          
 
122 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA). Refer to the discussion of the 
case in section 2 4 above, as well as in sections 5 2 and 5 4 below. 
123 RRM Paisley “The demon drink and the straight and narrow way: The expansion and limitation of 
praedial servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 
193-237 234. 
124 Fourie v Marandellas Town Council 1972 (2) SA 698 (R) 700; Du Plessis Estates Ltd v South African 
Railways and Harbours 1933 EDL 140 154; Van Heerden v Coetzee 1914 AD 167 171; Steyn v Zeeman 
(1903) 20 SC 221 224; Retief v Louw (1874) 4 Buch 165 192; Hawkins v Munnik (1830) 1 Menz 465. 
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classical Roman law125 and has its roots firmly set in Roman-Dutch law where Voet,126 
Grotius,127 Huber128 and others confirmed and applied it as a principle of servitude law. 
In this regard it was accepted that where a right to draw water has been granted, a 
right of foot-passage to the well is also understood to have been granted. The Digest129 
refers to the statement of Neratius130 that where a man is granted the right to draw 
water and the right of access for the purpose, he will have both; if he is granted only 
the right to draw water, the right of access will be presumed and, in the same sense, 
if he is granted only the right of access to a spring, the right to draw water from it will 
be presumed.131 Furthermore, where there is a right to lead water, a person who has 
been granted this right could lay pipes in the channel or do anything else as he pleases 
whereby he may take the water more freely, provided that he does not worsen the 
passage of water for the owner or other users of the channel. Other examples 
explained by Voet132 include the right to build steps or ramps in order to reach your 
property from a road or path over which you have a right of way, as well as the right 
to build a bridge or other structure in order to make a foot passage properly accessible. 
Another example from the Digest refers to servitudes of pasturage or watering of 
                                                          
 
125 RRM Paisley “The demon drink and the straight and narrow way: The expansion and limitation of 
praedial servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 
193-237 234. 
126 Voet Commentarius 8 4 16. 
127 D 8 3 3 3. 
128 Huber Hedendaegse rechtsgeleertheyt 2 43 16. 
129 D 8 3 3 3. 
130 In the third book of his Parchments. 
131 This does not apply in the same way to a public river.  
132 Voet Commentarius 8 4 16. 
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cattle, which could include the ancillary right for the dominant proprietor to erect a hut 
on the servient tenement so that he might take refuge there in times of storm.133  
This principle that a servitude includes all rights necessary for its effective use 
was incorporated into early South African law.134 One of the earliest cases confirming 
this Roman law principle is that of Hawkins v Munnik135 (“Hawkins”). In Retief v Louw 
the court referred to: 
“[T]he principle of law that when a servitude has been conceded everything 
necessary to give effect to the enjoyment of that right must also be held to have 
been granted.”136 
In Steyn v Zeeman it was phrased as follows:  
“All the authorities lay down clearly that where a servitude has been created 
the owner of the dominant tenement has all those rights without which it is 
impossible for him to enjoy his servitude, and the illustrations given by the 
authorities show what is meant.”137 
However, the classification and scope of the rights that arise as a result of this principle 
remain unclear. In the Hawkins case138 the court referred to an implied right of way to 
describe a right which was supplementary to a servitude to take drinking water from a 
                                                          
 
133 D 8 3 6 Paul refers to this opinion of Maecianus; RRM Paisley “The demon drink and the straight 
and narrow way: The expansion and limitation of praedial servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) 
Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 193-237 234. 
134 Johl and Another v Nobre and Others (23841/2010) [2012] ZAWCHC 20 (20 March 2012) para 14; 
Fourie v Marandellas Town Council 1972 (2) SA 698 (R) 700; Lategan v Union Government 1937 CPD 
197 202; Van Heerden v Coetzee 1914 AD 167 171; Steyn v Zeeman (1903) 20 SC 221 224; London 
and SA Exploration Company v Rouliot (1890-1891) 8 SC 74 96; Retief v Louw (1874) 4 Buch 165 192. 
135 Hawkins v Munnik (1828-1849) 1 Menz 465. 
136 Retief v Louw (1874) 4 Buch 165 192. 
137 Steyn v Zeeman (1903) 20 SC 221 224. 
138 Hawkins v Munnik (1828-1849) 1 Menz 465 466. 
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fountain. In the case of West Witwatersrand Areas Ltd v Roos139 the court accepted 
an implied term to be read into the servitude agreement between the parties. In this 
case, the appellant contended for the acceptance of an implied right as ancillary to the 
main servitudal rights, but the court chose not to use that terminology in its judgement 
and decided the case on the grounds of an implied term in the contract between the 
servitude parties.140 In Bloemfontein Town Council v Richter141 a right was “conferred 
by necessary implication”, with no reference to its ancillary or supplementary nature, 
but based on the passage in Voet142 mentioned before.143 Other cases refer readily to 
ancillary144 or accesory145 rights, often with specific reference to Voet’s principle.  
From the wording it is expected that there would be some kind of distinction 
between implied and ancillary rights to servitudes. If this wording is compared to the 
distinction between tacit and implied terms in contract law, it might prove to be a very 
important distinction. As mentioned above, there is an important distinction between 
tacit and implied terms in contracts.146 Implied terms in contract law are terms implied 
ex lege as supplementary to the explicit contractual terms. The two varieties of implied 
terms include terms which are implied by law into all contracts and terms which are 
                                                          
 
139 West Witwatersrand Areas Ltd v Roos 1936 AD 62.  
140 West Witwatersrand Areas Ltd v Roos 1936 AD 62 75.  
141 Bloemfontein Town Council v Richter 1938 AD 195 227.  
142 Voet Commentarius 8 4 16. 
143 The case of Du Plessis Estates Ltd v SA Railways and Harbours (1933) EDL 140 167, likewise uses 
the term “by necessary implication” without reference to the ancillary or accessory nature of the rights.  
144 Low Water Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v Wahloo Sand CC 1999 (1) SA 655 (SE) 656; 
Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 (4) SA 510 (T) 511-512; Brink v Stadler 1963 (2) SA 
427 (C) 429; Molotlegi v Brummerhoff and Another 1955 (1) SA 592 (T) 594.  
145 Fourie v Marandellas Town Council 1972 (2) SA 698 (R) 700; Retief v Louw (1874) 4 Buch 165 190.  
146 S van der Merwe et al Contract: General principles 4 ed (2012) 241-245; RH Christie The law of 
contract in South Africa 6 ed (2011) 167-168. 
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implicit to a specific kind of contract and that form part of the naturalia of the said 
contract due to its nature. Tacit terms, on the other hand, are terms that have been 
actually, though tacitly, declared or indicated by the party or parties whose declared 
will constitutes the contract.147 Tacit terms must be found in the unexpressed intention 
of the parties;148 this includes not only those terms that the parties must actually have 
had in mind but did not trouble to express, but also terms that the parties, whether or 
not they actually had them in mind, would have expressed if the question, or the 
situation requiring the term, had been drawn to their attention.149 The test that is 
usually applied to determine the nature of these kinds of terms in a contract, the 
“officious bystander” test, was formulated in the case of Reigate v Union 
Manufacturing Co (“Reigate”)150 as follows:  
“You must only imply a term if it is necessary in the business sense to give 
efficacy to the contract; that is, if it is such a term that you can be confident that 
if at the time the contract was being negotiated someone had said to the 
parties: ‘What will happen in such a case?’ they would have both replied: ‘Of 
course, so-and-so. We did not trouble to say that; it is too clear.’” 
The second test used to shed light on the issue is that of business efficacy, which 
forms part of the bystander test to the degree set out in the first line of the above 
quotation. However, courts will not read into a contract a tacit term simply on the 
                                                          
 
147 Alfred McAlpine & Son (P) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) 526; 
Minister van Landbou-Tegniese Dienste v Scholtz 1971 (3) SA 188 (A) 197. 
148 Alfred McAlpine & Son (P) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) 532F-G. 
149 Alfred McAlpine & Son (P) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A) 532A. 
150 Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co 118 LT 479 483. The officious bystander test has been confirmed 
and applied in Consol Ltd t/a Consol Glass v Twee Jonge Gezellen (Pty) Ltd and Another 2005 (6) SA 
1 (SCA); Botha v Coopers & Lybrand 2002 (5) SA 347 (SCA); and Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v 
Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 (3) SA 506 (A).  
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ground that it would lend business efficacy to the contract. According to Van der Merwe 
et al151 courts seem to be stuck on the intention of the contracting parties as the 
foundation for a tacit term insofar as the alleged unexpressed term must be compatible 
with the actual expressed intention of the parties.  
Another important case dealing with the reading of tacit terms into written 
contracts is that of Wilkens v Voges,152 where the court said that it was reluctant to 
read a tacit term into the contract because the party relying on it had trouble 
formulating the exact term. The court stated in this regard that “a term so obvious as 
to occur as a matter of course would most likely be uncomplicated and capable of 
ready definition”.153 Furthermore, the court confirmed the notion that courts are 
generally “slow to import a tacit term into a written contract”. It stated that parties who 
choose to commit themselves to paper can be expected to cover all the aspects that 
matter.154 
In the case of Minister van Landbou-Tegniese Dienste v Scholtz155 (“Scholtz”) 
the court referred to a well-known contract law textbook,156 which stated that “the word 
‘implied’ is ambiguous and is frequently applied not only to terms implied in law but 
also to terms implied in fact, in other words, tacit terms”. 
From a property law point of view there are a few valuable points to be taken 
from the contractual principles set out above. Firstly, the use of terminology applied to 
                                                          
 
151 S van der Merwe et al Kontraktereg: Algemene beginsels 3 ed (2007) 301. 
152 Wilkins NO v Voges 1994 (3) SA 130 (A). 
153 Wilkins NO v Voges 1994 (3) SA 130 (A) 143D-F. 
154 Wilkins NO v Voges 1994 (3) SA 130 (A) 143G-H. 
155 Minister van Landbou-Tegniese Dienste v Scholtz 1971 (3) SA 188 (A) 197. 
156 JW Salmond Principles of the law of contracts 2 ed (1945) 36. 
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rights that arise as a result of the principle that a servitude includes all the rights 
necessary for its effective exercise, is unclear and inconsistent. However, unlike the 
confusion in contract law between the terms “tacit” and “implied”, there does not seem 
to be any difference between the rights that have been labelled “implied” in some 
cases and “ancillary” or accessory (or even auxillary) in other cases. In all instances, 
these terms applied to the rights accepted in terms of Voet’s maxim. From the cases 
considered above, the reference to “implied terms” suggests that the rights are 
accepted based not on their ancillary nature, but on the grounds that they are a result 
of the a term that was omitted from the agreement and that such term should be “read 
in” to the servitude deed. Although this reasoning is based on Voet’s principle, it does 
not give effect to it, as the foundation for the existence of the rights is supposed to be 
an implied term of a contract, in other words, a creation of contract law and not of 
property.  
Secondly, it is important to consider that the creation of a servitude, whether by 
agreement or otherwise, does not always include an extensive and precise description 
of the rights that are meant to be conveyed. The agreement between the parties is not 
always available to be interpreted and the words used in the endorsement on the title 
deed are simplistic and contain no detailed terms of the servitude.157 Parties seem to 
rely on the assumption that the servitude, as it is described in a few sentences, 
automatically carries with it a certain set of rights. Accordingly, they do not necessarily 
apply the same level of care as they would with any other contract where the contract 
                                                          
 
157 Kruger v Downer 1976 (3) SA 172 (W) 175F.  
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alone determines the extent of their relationship. In this sense, they rely to a certain 
degree on the principles of property law to regulate their relationship.  
By way of summary, it appears that the rigidity that apparently makes it difficult 
for courts to find suitable solutions in cases where the holders of servitudes require 
new or additional entitlements for the efficient enjoyment of their servitudal rights 
results, at least as far as reliance on the common law is concerned, from two related 
causes. On the one hand, the common law principle that a servitudes includes all 
entitlements that are reasonably necessary for its effective use remains largely 
undeveloped, particularly insofar as there is little or no clarity regarding the nature and 
scope of these additional or ancillary entitlements. On the other hand, continued 
reliance on and reference to consensual considerations, such as the wording of the 
originating document and the supposed or actual intention of the parties, prevents the 
courts from developing the property principles that arguably should frame the issue, 
and apparently also restricts the scope for greater flexibility in interpreting or 
determining the contents and scope of a particular servitude. Consequently, when the 
courts do strive for more flexibility as was the case in the Jersey Lane Properties 
decision, the common law principles are not considered and applied to their full 
potential. In Jersey Lane Properties, this was arguably the reason why the court failed 
to balance the flexibility it was looking for in ensuring efficient use of the servitude with 
the reasonable use requirement, which might have weighed against allowing the 
building of permanent structures on the servient land without the consent or 
permission of the servient property owner.  
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2 7  Conclusion 
Servitudes are regulated in South African law by the principles of common law. 
These principles regulate servitudes mainly in an ex ante manner by limiting the 
creation of limited real rights that burden land to ensure the security and stability of 
property rights to encourage investment in land. The strict enforcement of the 
requirements for the valid establishment and registration of servitudes and the 
subtraction from the dominium test guide the system of servitude law in the direction 
of rigidity. 
However, there are also signs of flexibility within the common law principles that 
govern servitudes. The relationship between the parties to a servitude is regulated by 
two main principles that protect the interests of the servient and dominant proprietors 
respectively - the principle of civiliter modo exercise of the rights, and Voet’s principle 
that a dominant owner can do all that is necessary for the effective exercise of his 
servitudal rights. Because servitudes exist for long periods of time, these principles 
are aimed at regulating the exercise of the servitude ex post, to ensure their value as 
tools for the effective use of land. However, the discussion of case law in this chapter 
suggests that courts have trouble solving the problems that arise during the existence 
of servitudes by applying these principles. 
 As a result, there is a tendency to scrutinise the grant or originating agreement 
between the parties in order to reconcile the desired outcome with the content and 
scope of the rights, based on an interpretation of the terms used by the parties at the 
time of creation of the servitude. In doing so, courts apply the rules of contractual 
interpretation which are ill-suited when applied to real rights. The rule holds that 
servitudes are to be interpreted strictly, but with reference to what will this strict 
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interpretation be determined? If only the interests of the servient proprietor is 
considered in determining the contents of the rights, changed circumstances could 
have the effect that the dominant proprietor is left with very little protection. Moreover, 
the protection that he does enjoy is diminished further by the current approach of 
looking to the contract and original intentions of the parties. 
Servitudes are not always created by agreement, and even if they are, this 
agreement is not always available after a long period of time has passed. The 
contractual approach involves determining the intention of the original parties at 
creation of the servitude. Applied to longstanding real rights as servitudes, this is 
impractical as the parties and the circumstances surrounding the servitude might have 
changed in ways that the original contracting parties were not able to foresee.  
When courts state that they have no discretion to derogate from the wording in 
the agreement between the original parties, even if this may have an unreasonable 
outcome, they are deliberately denying the principle of civiliter modo in favour of the 
parties’ freedom of contract, despite all the obstacles to the interpretation of the 
contract. An analysis of case law suggests that parties actually rely on the protection 
provided by the principles of property law when they conclude servitude agreements.  
Accordingly, I argue in this chapter that “interpreting” or rather determining the 
content of a servitude is not the same as interpreting or giving content to the servitude 
agreement from which the rights originated. The servitude deed and originating 
agreement are valuable factors to take into account when determining the rights of the 
parties to the servitude, but apart from the interpretation of the intention held and the 
words used at creation, there are various other factors that should also be taken into 
account. 
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Courts have, in limited instances, shown their willingness to view the exercise of 
a servitude more flexibly. The statement by Van Joosten J in Jersey Lane 
Properties,158 that “a progressive interpretation of the servitude is called for, having 
regard to modern day urban developments” is a good example of this. Although this 
suggestion was never applied in the case, it indicates a possible departure from the 
rigid traditional approach towards servitudes. Linvestment159 is another example 
where the court engaged with the issue and determined that servitude rights should 
not be enforced strictly based on the original terms of the grant where the 
circumstances prevailing at the time of the original agreement have changed.160 This 
case is a good example of how courts can incorporate flexibility into servitude law by 
way of an ex post consideration of servitudes when disputes arise.  
It is an established principle of South African law that a servitude holder also 
enjoys all the rights necessary for the effective exercise of his servitude.161 However, 
inconsistent terminology is used to refer to rights which are not registered but are due 
to a servitude holder on the basis of this principle. The reasoning that their existence 
                                                          
 
158 Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa v Hodgson and Another 
(A5030/11) [2012] ZAGPJHC 86 (7 May 2012) para 9.  
159 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA). 
160 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA) para 32.  
161 D 8 3 3 3; Voet Commentarius 8 2 18, 8 4 16; Huber HR 2 43 16; Retief v Louw (1874) 4 Buch 
165 190; Johl and Another v Nobre and Others (23841/2010) [2012] ZAWCHC 20 (20 March 2012) 
para 14; Low Water Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v Wahloo Sand CC 1999 (1) SA 655 (SE); Fourie 
v Marandellas Town Council 1972 (2) SA 698 (R) 700; Brink v Stadler 1963 (2) SA 427 (C) 429; 
Molotlegi v Brummerhoff and another 1955 (1) SA 592 (T) 594; Lategan v Union Government 1937 
CPD 197 202; Van Tonder v S.A.Railways 1936 OPD 9 18; Du Plessis Estates Ltd v SA Railways & 
Harbours 1933 EDL 140 154; Van Heerden Appellant v Coetzee and Others Respondents 1914 AD 
167 171; Rubidge v McCabe & Sons 1913 AD 433 441; Steyn v Zeeman (1903) 20 SC 221 224; CG 
van der Merwe & MJ de Waal “Servitudes” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The law of South Africa vol 
24 2 ed (2010) para 544.   
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is a result of an implied term of the servitude agreement is a result of the contractual 
approach that is followed to determine the scope of servitudes. In reality, these rights 
are obtained based on their ancillary or accessory nature and they should be viewed 
as ancillary rights. Their existence is supplementary to and thus dependent on the 
existence of the main servitudal rights.162 The acceptance of ancillary rights that are 
due to a servitude holder should also allow for the recognition of entitlements that 
become necessary at some later point during the existence of the servitude, where the 
circumstances relating to it has changed. Because the principle that a servitude 
includes all necessary entitlements is weighed against the principle that requires 
reasonable or civiliter exercise of servitudes, additional entitlements should be allowed 
only to the extent that they do not conflict with the principle of reasonable use.  
Currently, it seems as though the available common law principles of servitude 
law do not always provide sufficient solutions to the problems that arise during the 
existence of servitudes. If a strict interpretation of the available principles leads to 
unsatisfactory outcomes, it might be necessary for courts to follow a different 
approach. The incorporation of some flexibility into the rigid application of common law 
principles might provide better outcomes in servitude disputes.  
Considering the lack of legal certainty and the inconsistencies apparent in case 
law, statutory intervention might be a plausible manner of introducing effective 
regulatory controls and clarifying this area of law.163 However, in South African law, 
                                                          
 
162 Molotlegi v Brummerhoff and another 1955 (1) SA 592 (T) 594F-G.  
163 Although there is no legislative instrument regulating servitudes is general, there are certain 
provisions that provide for specific situations. See S 133 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 for an 
example of ex post intervention by way of application to court to cancel a servitude of aqueduct, 
abutement or submersion in certain instances.  
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there are no statutory instruments regulating the exercise of servitudes and it is not 
likely that statutory measures will be implemented in this area in future. Accordingly, 
a consideration of statutory and other interventions in foreign jurisdictions might shed 
some light on possible solutions to the problems that arise during the existence of 
servitudes and especially in situations of changed circumstances.
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3 1  Introduction 
This chapter contains a comparative overview of instances of implied and ancillary 
rights to servitudes recognised in different jurisdictions. The jurisdictions considered 
in this regard are Dutch, English and Scots law as well as the law of the State of 
Louisiana. These jurisdictions were chosen specifically because of the occurrence of 
recent reforms to the law of servitudes,1 mostly by introducing some form of ex post 
regulatory measures that render the law of servitudes somewhat more flexible. 
Because of the wide-ranging differences between these jurisdictions, the classification 
and broad terminology applicable to the same basic notions is a complicated matter. 
For this reason, and for ease of reference, I simplify the terminology by providing a 
general frame of reference. Collectively, the notions used to refer to rights are 
comparable to servitudes in the South African sense2 are classified, for purposes of 
this introduction, under the broad concept of land burdens, although this is not a 
technically precise term.  
Each jurisdiction considered here is relevant to the discussion in its own way. 
Dutch law, for instance, is considered because of the close correlation between Dutch 
and South African property law as a result of their shared Roman-Dutch heritage. 
However, the codified nature of Dutch servitude law lends it a dimension of certainty 
                                                          
 
1 Not all reforms are equally recent. In Louisiana, the amendment of the Civil Code took place in 1977; 
the Dutch Civil Code was reformed in 1992; in Scots law the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 came 
into force in November of 2004, while English law is currently considering a reform of the law pertaining 
to easements, covenants and profits à prendre.   
2 This includes easements, covenants and profits à prendre in English law, servitudes (or 
erfdienstbaarhede) in Dutch law, servitudes and some forms of land burdens in Scots law and 
servitudes in the law of Louisiana.   
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that is not present in the current South African system, and this difference is a valuable 
attribute in the comparative process. Servitude law in the Netherlands is regulated in 
Book V of the Dutch Civil Code, which contains some of the most recent European 
civil code provisions relating to servitudes and provides a relatively flexible approach 
towards the ex post amendment and termination of existing servitudes.3  
The relevance of English law is based on the fact that there has recently been 
much research and discussion surrounding the reform of English law relating to land 
burdens. The discussion paper on easements, covenants and profits à prendre, 
published by the English Law Commission,4 provides extensive information on the 
problems experienced with land burdens and also explores a wide range of solutions 
to these problems before making particular recommendations for the most efficient 
means of reform. This in itself offers valuable insights into what may be effective and 
less effective means of dealing with land burdens, both in general and also specifically 
in regard to implied and ancillary rights.  
Scots law provides an interesting comparison with South African law, partly 
because it is also a mixed jurisdiction and the process of development in the two 
systems over the decades is comparable. However, the implementation of the Title 
Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 brought about valuable changes to the common law 
pertaining to servitudes. Although the Act only had limited impact on the law of 
servitudes, it introduced some elements of certainty which were previously lacking. 
                                                          
 
3 Book V of the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek (“BW”) entered into force in the early 1990s. Compare other 
more recent codes  
4 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report (accessed 
13/03/2013). 
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There is often confusion regarding the overlap between the English law of easements 
and the Scots law of servitudes. Although the two systems differ substantially in regard 
to the structure, classification, contents and origin of the different rights, the legal rules 
relating to specific issues are often similar and are accepted and applied by courts as 
precedent.5  
In the State of Louisiana, servitude law is regulated entirely by the provisions of 
the Civil Code. As Reid explains, the law relating to servitudes arrived ready-made 
from the French Code Civil, and was accordingly already well-established and well 
tested law, albeit in a different jurisdiction.6 Although some reforms took place in 1977, 
the foundation had been firmly laid and the effect is evident in the clear and confident 
manner in which servitudes are approached by Louisiana courts.  
When comparing these four jurisdictions, it is important to keep in mind that they 
have very different roots and doctrinal backdrops. Servitude law in the Dutch system 
and in Louisiana is firmly based in civil law. Both these jurisdictions have civil codes 
prescribing the rules that regulate the creation, functioning and possible termination of 
servitudes. The benefit of a codified servitude system is that courts are provided with 
more or less clear guidelines by which to approach servitudes, determine their 
contents and adjudicate cases. On the other side of the coin, the servitude system in 
Scotland, much like in South Africa, has developed slowly on a case-by-case basis, 
leaving many gaps and uncertainties. Scots servitude law is based on civil law 
foundations, but has been influenced and developed by a predominantly common law 
                                                          
 
5 Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42 para 45 per Lord Scott of Foscote, para 111 per Lord Neuberger 
of Abbotsbury; Ewart v Cochrane (1861) 23 D (HL) 3 4 per Lord Chancellor Campbell.  
6 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 29. 
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methodology under the influence of English law.7 The English common law system 
has its own methodology for treating servitudes. English servitude law is ancient and 
although there has been some reform over the centuries, there are still large areas 
that remain largely outdated and irrelevant.8 The effects of judge-made law, without a 
codified source of rules to draw on, are visible here in the slow development and lack 
of clarity regarding easements and covenants. 
Apart from evaluating the scope of implied or ancillary servitudal rights in the 
abovementioned jurisdictions, consideration will also be lent to the different methods 
of determining the contents and scope of servitudes more generally. The aim of this 
assessment will be to ascertain how servitudal rights are determined and what the 
effect of changed circumstances would be on such determination. Are there 
circumstances in which servitudes are capable of variation after the rights have been 
determined and after a certain length of time? These questions are relevant to the 
main issue of implied and ancillary rights to servitudes in that the implication or addition 
of rights may be a productive means of variation where a change in circumstances 
may necessitate an adjustment in the legal rules regulating the use of a landowner’s 
property. For purposes of this discussion servitudes created by way of acquisitive 
prescription are considered to a limited degree. These servitudes provide an additional 
dimension to the general view of the practice of interpretation of servitudes, since they 
are not created by terms in documents that can be interpreted literally.  
                                                          
 
7 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 29. 
8 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 2 para 1.5.  
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The considerations that form the centre of the analysis of the different 
jurisdictions are the different manners of creation of servitudes; how they are given 
content; how flexible that content is once determined; and what the effects would be if 
surrounding circumstances change.  
The basic principle in most jurisdictions, as in South African law, is that all rights 
that are necessary for the effective utilisation of a servitude are granted along with it 
at creation. However, what if “what is necessary” changes over time? In Louisiana it 
does not seem as if there is scope for any alteration of servitudal rights or additions of 
ancillary rights in such circumstances, while in Dutch law the parties have the option 
to apply for the amendment of a servitude where there has been unforeseen 
circumstances effecting a change in the use of the servitude.9 Other jurisdictions adopt 
a variety of solutions to the same problem. 
Furthermore, the aim of this chapter is to determine the meaning and scope of 
the notions of “implied terms” and “ancillary rights” as they are used in South African 
law, through considering the different approaches advanced by each jurisdiction. 
 
 
                                                          
 
9 The application for amendment is subject to certain requirements. Refer to the discussion in section 
3 2 3 below.  
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3 2  Dutch servitude law  
3 2 1  Nature and establishment of servitudes10 
In Dutch law a servitude can be created in two ways – either by agreement or through 
prescription.11 Servitudes established through prescription may be officially recorded 
in the public registers,12 but an omission to do so would not influence the third party 
effect of the servitude. A distinction is drawn between bona fide and mala fide 
possession in order to determine the prescriptive period. If a dominant owner has bona 
fide possession of a servitude, the period for prescriptive acquisition is 10 years, while 
mala fide possession requires 20 years uninterrupted possession. In Dutch law, 
servitudes cannot be created by implied means.13 
                                                          
 
10 Dutch servitude law, which is thought to be quite similar – in origin at least – to South African law, is 
one of the many European systems that have undergone a certain degree of reform in the area of land 
burdens in recent years. In 1992 the new Dutch Civil Code or Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek entered into 
force and brought about a substantial reform of Dutch private law in general. Book 5 of the BW now 
provides extensively for the regulation of servitudes. 
11 Under the old Civil Code, the creation of servitudes was also possible through revival or destination 
(better known as the doctrine of destination du père de famille, imported into Dutch law by way of the 
French Code Civil). Destination is based on a relationship between two properties that would have been 
seen as a servitude, if the two properties were not owned by the same person. The doctrine provides 
for the automatic creation of a servitude upon severance of the two properties to allow the previous 
benefit provided by one property to another to continue. The 1992 Civil Code no longer allows these 
ways of creating servitudes, following German and Swiss law. However, the servitudes created under 
the 1838 Civil Code remain valid. The reason for the removal of the article allowing the creation of 
servitudes by way of destination was that the reform commission preferred to have legal certainty above 
reasonableness. See CJ Van Zeben, JW Du Pon & MM Olthof Parlementaire geschiedenis van het 
Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 5: Zakelijke rechten (1981) 262.  
12 BW 3:17(1)(a). 
13 The prior exercise of rights of a servitudal nature will not at subdivision of the two relevant parts of 
the property be deemed to create a servitude over one part in favour of the other through destination. 
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There is a numerus clausus of property rights in Dutch law. Accordingly, 
servitudal rights are confined within the boundaries of the list of accepted property 
rights.14 Servitudes are defined rather widely in the BW and are distinguished from 
other rights of enjoyment15 in that the parties themselves determine the contents and 
manner of exercise of these rights.16  
The requirements for the valid establishment of servitudes are set out very 
simply.17 Firstly, the burden on the servient tenement must be for the benefit of the 
dominant property. Secondly, the servient and dominant properties may not be owned 
by the same person, and thirdly, the servitude must, in principle, involve an obligation 
to tolerate or not to do something.18 In the new BW the utility requirement has been 
relaxed to the extent that the servitude is now simply required to provide benefit to19 
the dominant tenement, and this requirement is satisfied if it can be shown that the 
dominant proprietor regards the servitude as an advantage because of the increase in 
                                                          
 
Furthermore, the fact that a servient proprietor allows a certain manner of exercise of a servitude does 
not in itself bring about an amendment of the servitude. See fn 11, above.   
14 B Akkermans “The new Dutch Civil Code: the borderline between property and contract” in Van Erp 
S & Akkermans B (eds) Towards a unified system of land burdens (2006) 163-183 167. 
15 These rights of enjoyment include servitudes, quitrent and superficies. 
16 BW 5:73. 
17 It is important to note that Dutch law only knows praedial servitudes, and does not recognise personal 
servitudes as in South African law. Usufruct is seen as a separate category of limited real rights and 
thus does not fall under the heading of servitudes.   
18 CC van Dam, FHJ Mijnssen & AA van Velten Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht Vol 3 Goederenrecht: Deel II Zakelijke rechten 14 ed (2002) 198. The 
previous Burgerlijk Wetboek18 included the requirement of utility, which held that the servitude must be 
of utility to the dominant tenement. This had the effect of the further requirement of vicinity. 
19 Een erfdienstbaarheid is een last, waarmede een onroerende zaak - het dienende erf - ten behoeve 
van een andere onroerende zaak - het heersende erf - is bezwaard.  
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personal enjoyment that it provides for his property.20 The contents of a servitude are 
further required to have a factual nature.21 This means that a servitude may not consist 
of the tolerance or prohibition of an act by the servient proprietor (such as a prohibition 
on lease or alienation of the property). Furthermore, a servitude may not consist of an 
obligation on the servient proprietor to perform a positive act.22 However, there are 
some exceptions to this rule.23  
The first exception to the rule prohibiting positive duties to be the subject of a 
servitude holds that the parties may, in the deed of creation, provide for the burden to 
include an obligation to erect buildings, works or vegetation that are necessary for the 
exercise of the servitude, provided that the building, work or vegetation is situated 
entirely on the servient tenement.24 Such a provision will only be possible where the 
structure is necessary for the exercise of the servitude. It is important to note the 
wording, namely that this obligation may be provided for also or in addition to 
                                                          
 
20 CC van Dam, FHJ Mijnssen & AA van Velten Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht Vol 3 Goederenrecht: Deel II Zakelijke rechten 14 ed (2002) 199. 
21 CC van Dam, FHJ Mijnssen & AA van Velten Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht Vol 3 Goederenrecht: Deel II Zakelijke rechten 14 ed (2002) 200-201 state: 
“De inhoud van de erfdienstbaarheid dient steeds iets feitelijks te zijn”.   
22 These prohibitive rules regulating the contents of servitudes are a result of the rule of the numerus 
clausus.  
23 CC van Dam, FHJ Mijnssen & AA van Velten Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht Vol 3 Goederenrecht: Deel II Zakelijke rechten 14 ed (2002) 201. 
24 BW 5:71; FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van 
het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten 15 ed (2008) 228-229. ; 
B Akkermans “The new Dutch Civil Code: the borderline between property and contract” in S Van Erp 
& B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of land burdens (2006) 163-183,167; JAJ Peter 
“Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten (supplement 25, 2002) 
71-11. The default position (if there is no express provision in terms of BW 5:71) is that the owner of 
the dominant property will do everything possible to exercise his rights, including erecting the necessary 
structures on the servient property.  
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(“bovendien”),25 indicating that it cannot be the main burden, but will simply be a 
supplementary obligation (“nevenverplichting”).26 This ties in with the notion that the 
servient owner is obliged (without the deed stating anything in this regard) to do 
everything that is necessary for the unobstructed exercise of the servitude by the 
dominant owner. In other words, he must ensure that the exercise of the servitude is 
possible.27 This includes the duty to remove (or prevent the placement of) any 
obstacles that could hinder the exercise of the servitudal rights by the dominant owner. 
The second exception to the prohibition of positive duties holds that the burden on the 
servient tenement may consist of a duty to maintain buildings, works and vegetation if 
these are situated partly or completely on the servient tenement. This part of the 
section was included to satisfy a specific need that has arisen in practice.28 According 
to this section it is possible for a servitude to consist exclusively of an obligation (on 
the servient land owner) to do something.29 However, the section limits the obligations 
that can be imposed on the servient owner to maintenance obligations – whether of 
the servient land itself or of buildings, works or vegetation on the land.30  
                                                          
 
25 BW 5:71. 
26 CC van Dam, FHJ Mijnssen & AA van Velten Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht Vol 3 Goederenrecht: Deel II Zakelijke rechten 14 ed (2002) 201. 
27 JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten 
(supplement 27, 2003) 71-2-10.  
28 BW 5:71(2). An example which often arises in practice, is where a municipality, as owner of a public 
road, wants to oblige the owners of neighbouring houses to ‘properly’ maintain their gardens: FHJ 
Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands 
burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten 15 ed (2008) 228.  
29 JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten 
(supplement 25, 2002) 71-11. Subsection (2) reads: “De last die een erfdienstbaarheid op het dienende 
erf legt, kan ook bestaan in een verplichting…” compare the wording of BW 5:78(1) discussed above.  
30 FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten 15 ed (2008) 228; JAJ Peter 
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Another mechanism used in Dutch law to achieve the goal of allowing for positive 
duties (with third party effect) on land-owners, is chain clauses. Chain clauses 
(“kettingbedingen”) are a creation of contract law.31 These clauses are inserted in a 
contract to impose positive duties on a contracting party and in addition, require the 
party to impose the same positive duty on his successor in title, also obliging him to 
once more carry over his duties to all subsequent successors.32 This obligation is 
made subject to a penalty clause to pay a large amount of damages if the duty of 
carrying over the rights is not performed. In this way, it is ensured that all subsequent 
owners will be “bound” by the agreement, although a real right is not actually created.33 
 
                                                          
 
“Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6)  in WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten (supplement 25, 2002) 
71-11).  
31 JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten 
(supplement 27, 2003) states that the question whether to use a servitude or a chain clause in a certain 
situation will be determined by the question of whether the parties want to assign the rights to the right 
holder personally or qualitatively. 
32 EB Berenschot, HM Hoekstra & JB Vegter Eigendom en beperkte rechten naar BW en NBW (1986) 
9; CC van Dam, FHJ Mijnssen & AA van Velten Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht Vol 3 Goederenrecht: Deel II Zakelijke rechten 14 ed (2002) 197; B 
Akkermans “The new Dutch Civil Code: The borderline between property and contract” in S Van Erp & 
B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of land burdens (2006) 163-183 168. 
33 The weakness of chain clauses is illustrated in situations where a servient owner is declared insolvent 
and the land is sold in execution, or where expropriation of the land takes place. In these instances, the 
“obligation” is terminated automatically.  
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3 2 2  Content and interpretation of servitudes  
As mentioned above, the legislature deliberately defined servitudes widely so as to 
allow parties themselves to give content to the rights they aim to convey.34 In this 
regard BW 5:73 states the following: 
“The content of the servitude and the manner of exercise are determined by the deed 
and insofar as the deed does not regulate matters, by local custom. If a servitude is 
exercised in a certain manner for a reasonable period without objection then, in case 
of doubt, this manner of exercise will be decisive.”35 
According to this section, a servitude is interpreted with reference to the wording 
of the deed,36 local custom and the manner of exercise established over time,37 
carrying weight in this order. If the wording of the deed is clear and unambiguous, the 
other measures mentioned in the section will not carry any weight.38 If the wording of 
                                                          
 
34 WHM Reehuis & AHT Heisterkamp with GE van Maanen & GT de Jong Pitlo Het Nederlands 
burgerlijk recht Vol 3 Goederenrecht 13 ed (2012); B Akkermans “The new Dutch Civil Code: The 
borderline between property and contract” in S Van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system 
of land burdens (2006) 163-183 169. 
35 My translation. (De inhoud van de erfdienstbaarheid en de wijze van uitoefening worden bepaald 
door de akte van vestiging en, voor zover in die akte regelen daaromtrent ontbreken, door de 
plaatselijke gewoonte. Is een erfdienstbaarheid te goeder trouw geruime tijd zonder tegenspraak op 
een bepaalde wijze uitgeoefend, dan is in geval van twijfel deze wijze van uitoefening beslissend). 
36 In the case of HR 24 Mei 2002 ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AD9593 it was confirmed that the deed of servitude 
is the primary source determining the contents and manner of exercise of a servitude and that the court 
will only make reference to other factors where the wording of the deed leaves room for uncertainty.  
37 JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten 
(supplement 30, 2004) explains that where the parties to the dispute before a court are the parties to 
the original servitude (i.e. the creators of the deed of servitude) a court will allow more subjective factors 
relating to the manner of exercise of the servitude to influence its interpretation of the servitude. 
However, if the parties to a certain dispute were not original parties to the servitude agreement and 
process of creation, this measure will be observed more objectively. See in this regard HR 24 Mei 2002 
ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AD9593. 
38 JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten 
(supplement 25, 2002) 73-1. 
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the deed is unclear, the content and manner of exercise is determined by the custom 
of the local community, and only where there is uncertainty regarding the local custom, 
will the manner in which the servitude has been exercised in good faith for a 
considerable time without objection, be decisive. For servitudes created by 
prescription, the manner of exercise during the prescriptive period is the first resort in 
determining the content of the rights, and subsidiary to this, local custom is 
consulted.39 The principle of reasonableness and fairness always plays an important 
role in determining the contents of a servitude and establishing what the fair and 
effective exercise of the rights would entail.40 
 
3 2 3  Effective exercise and variation of servitudes 
Governing the relationship between the parties to a servitude, the general principle 
applies that the servitude must be exercised in the manner that proves least 
burdensome to the servient owner.41 The principle that the dominant proprietor may 
do all that is necessary for the exercise of his servitude is also embodied in the BW.42 
                                                          
 
39 HR 25 November 2005, LJN AU2403 para 29; FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C 
Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en 
beperkte rechten 15 ed (2008) 233; JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA Velten 
(eds) Zakelijke rechten (supplement 25, 2002) 73-2-10. 
40 HR 2 December 2005, LJN AU2397, NJ 2007 5;  JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM 
Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten (supplement 27, 2003) 70-27.  
41 BW 5:74; FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van 
het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten 15 ed (2008) 233; JAJ 
Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten (supplement 22, 
2001) 74-2.  
42 BW 5:75(1); compare with the obligation of maintenance in BW 5:71(2) which holds that the servient 
owner must do all that is necessary to enable the effective (unobstructed) exercise of the servitude by 
the dominant owner. The Belgian BW contains more or less the same provision in art. 696. According 
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The owner of a dominant property is permitted to construct the necessary buildings, 
vegetation or works on the servient tenement. The construction of these necessary 
elements carries with it the obligation to maintain the structure insofar as it is 
necessary in the interest of the servient tenement.43 However, as discussed above, it 
is possible for the parties to agree to a deviation from these terms.44  
In the drafting of the new BW it was acknowledged that the need often arises in 
practice to amend existing servitudes.45 One reason for this is that the purpose for 
which the property is used may change, be it under the control of the current owner or 
his successor. Furthermore, one of the parties to the servitude may choose to use his 
property in a different way or the area surrounding the properties may change over 
time.46 Under the current BW specific mechanisms provide effective relief in situations 
of changed circumstances.   
The first of these mechanisms allocates to the servient proprietor the right to 
relocate a servitude on the condition that the relocation does not infringe on the 
                                                          
 
to V Sagaert Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht 5: Goederenrecht (2014) 486-487 this includes the 
condition that necessity may not have been caused by the owner of the dominant tenement himself.  
43 The dominant owner is permitted to remove the structure BW 5:75(3), on the condition that the 
servient land is restored to its previous condition.  
44 BW 5:71(1) & 5:75(5). Under the old BW (1838 BW 738(2)) there was a rule to the effect that the 
servient proprietor may not effect a change in the condition of his property that would bring about a 
change in the exercise of the servitude. However, this rule no longer exists. 
45 AC Van Schaick “Erfdienstbaarheden: Het verleggingsrecht van die eigenaar van het dienende erf” 
(1999) 10 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 347-350 348; FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & 
SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 
Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten 15 ed (2008) 234-235.  
46 AC Van Schaick “Erfdienstbaarheden: Het verleggingsrecht van die eigenaar van het dienende erf” 
(1999) 10 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 347-350 348.  
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dominant proprietor’s right of enjoyment of his property.47 In terms of this section, the 
servient proprietor is not required to obtain the consent of either the dominant 
proprietor or a court in this matter, but may simply give notice to the dominant 
proprietor regarding the new location for the exercise of his rights.48 The onus is on 
the servient owner to prove that the relocation will not cause any loss of enjoyment for 
the dominant owner.49 He will also be responsible for the costs of such relocation.50 
The measure to determine the “loss of enjoyment” is not set out clearly. The Hoge 
Raad51 stated that not every loss of enjoyment will necessarily prevent the relocation 
                                                          
 
47 BW 5:73(2); JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten 
(supplement 27, 2003) 73-2-10 points out the important distinction between two situations in regard to 
the relocation right. Where there is no indication in the deed of the area in which the servitude is to be 
exercised (such as a right of way for which the route was not determined), the servient owner may 
allocate the area (or the route) and may relocate it at any time after such initial allocation. As long as 
the new route still satisfies the requirements of the servitude, as interpreted from the deed according to 
BW 5:73(1), subsection (2) will not be applicable and the servient owner may relocate the servitude 
even if it does have an adverse effect on the enjoyment of the servitude by the dominant owner. 
48 AC Van Schaick “Erfdienstbaarheden: Het verleggingsrecht van die eigenaar van het dienende erf” 
(1999) 10 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 347-350 348; JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” 
(Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten (supplement 25, 2002) 73-2-10; FHJ Mijnssen, 
AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk 
recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten 15 ed (2008) 235. There is a similar provision in 
Belgian law, although it only requires that the new location must be equally convenient for the dominant 
owner: BW art 701.  
49 Where there is no indication of the area in which the servitude is to be exercised (such as a right of 
way for which the route was not determined in the deed), the servient owner may allocate the area (or 
the route) and may relocate it after such initial allocation. As long as the new route still satisfies the 
requirements of the servitude as interpreted from the deed according to BW 5:73(1), subsection (2) will 
not be applicable. The servient owner may relocate the servitude even if it does have an adverse effect 
on the enjoyment of the servitude by the dominant owner.  
50 JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten 
(supplement 27, 2003) 73-11. 
51 HR 24 September 1999, NJ 1999, 754. 
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of a servitude.52 According to Van Schaick,53 the court in this decision followed the 
opinion of expressed in Pitlo Het Nederlands burgerlijk recht,54 that the enjoyment of 
the dominant party may not be significantly reduced.55 
The new BW also introduced a more general possibility for the amendment of 
servitudes. Where circumstances surrounding a servitude change, causing an 
increase in the burden on the servient property, it can in principle be expected of the 
servient landowner to tolerate such increase in the burden.56 However, both the 
dominant57 and servient58 landowners may apply for judicial amendment of a 
servitude. Amendment will always be subject to compliance with the conditions 
imposed by the Code,59 of which the most important is the occurrence of unforeseen 
                                                          
 
52 In this case, a right of way which was initially 345m long was increased by 20m as a result of a 
relocation. It was decided that this could not reasonably be said to constitute a loss of enjoyment as 
envisaged in BW 5:73(2).    
53 AC Van Schaick “Erfdienstbaarheden: Het verleggingsrecht van die eigenaar van het dienende erf” 
(1999) 10 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht 347-350 349. 
54 WHM Reehuis “Goederenrecht” in AHT Heisterkamp, WHM Reehuis, GE van Maanen & GT de Jong 
(eds) Pitlo Het Nederlands burgerlijk recht Vol 3 (1994) nr 625 435–564.  
55 The Dutch wording is ‘wezenlijk afnemen’. In the most recent edition of the Pitlo book (WHM Reehuis 
& AHT Heisterkamp with GE van Maanen & GT de Jong Pitlo Het Nederlands burgerlijk recht Vol 3 
Goederenrecht 13 ed (2012) 460-461) it is simply stated that the servient owner must choose the 
alternative route in such a manner that the enjoyment of the dominant owner is not reduced, but that 
any loss of enjoyment will not necessarily prevent relocation.  
56 CC van Dam, FHJ Mijnssen & AA van Velten Mr C Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht Vol 3 Goederenrecht: Deel II Zakelijke rechten 14 ed (2002) para 185 206; 
EB Berenschot, HM Hoekstra & JB Vegter Eigendom en beperkte rechten naar BW en NBW (1986) 97-
98. 
57 BW 5:80. 
58 BW 5:78. 
59 FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten 15 ed (2008) 243-245; EB 
Berenschot, HM Hoekstra & JB Vegter Eigendom en beperkte rechten naar BW en NBW (1986) 97-98; 
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circumstances.60 A judge is authorised to grant the relevant application under any 
conditions he sees fit,61 including the payment of monetary compensation or an 
instruction to amend the factual circumstances relating to the servitude.62  
The servient proprietor can lodge an application for amendment or termination of 
a servitude.63 There are two instances in which a judge can exercise his discretion to 
grant either amendment or termination of the rights: firstly, where unforeseen 
circumstances have arisen which are of such a nature that continued maintenance of 
                                                          
 
JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten (supplement 
27, 2003) 78-1.  
60 See JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten 
(supplement 27, 2003) 78-2 where it is explained that “unforeseen circumstances” refers to 
circumstances that were not actually foreseen by the parties to the servitude at creation. It is irrelevant 
whether the circumstances were objectively foreseeable. Furthermore, parties are able to influence the 
judicial discretion by clarifying in the deed the circumstances that were in fact considered by them at 
creation of the rights, whereby these circumstances can no longer be categorised as unforeseen. 
Examples of changed circumstances would include an increase in the burden on the servient property 
by subdivision of the dominant property; a change in the nature of the dominant property or changed 
use or increased activity on the dominant property. Regarding the possibility of unforeseen 
circumstances in cases of servitudes created by acquisitive prescription, it would depend firstly on 
whether the parties had drawn up a deed of servitude at the time the rights were actually created, and 
secondly, on the measure to which they had considered the relevant circumstances.   
61 BW 5:81; FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van 
het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten 15 ed (2008) 244.  
62 Another possible remedy would be an order to effect a change in the factual situation surrounding 
the servitude such as the mandatory erection of a gate and access to a new or different road. 
63 BW 5:78. In Belgian law, the only option for amendment of a servitude is the provision in BW art. 
684 which applies only to rights of way of necessity and enables a judge to terminate or amend the 
servitude by changing the location (and the servient property) over which it is to be exercised. According 
to this section, if it is possible that the right of way can be exercised over a different roadway, which 
causes less damage than the current location. Furthermore, if a servitude is terminated, a judge will 
have the authority to order payment of the full or partial compensation for the “damage” caused by the 
right of way, taking into account the duration and damage caused thereby.    
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the servitude cannot reasonably64 be expected of the owner of the servient 
tenement;65 or where the continued existence of the servitude is against the general 
(public) interest.66 However, to maintain the stability that is desired in property law 
relationships, no judicial intervention is permitted within the first 20 years67 after 
creation of the servitude, unless an increase in the burden on the servient property 
was created by the actions of the dominant proprietor or by subdivision of the land.68 
These requirements suggest that changed circumstances play a crucial role in the 
granting of an amendment.  
                                                          
 
64 The wording used in the BW is: “naar maatstaven van redelijkheid en billikheid”.  
65 The question in deciding to allow the amendment or termination will not be whether prejudice to the 
servient tenement was foreseen, but rather whether the unforeseen circumstances that occurred, 
placed a too heavy burden on the servient property. If the change in circumstances was in fact foreseen 
and accordingly discredited in the conditions to the servitude at creation, the amendment or termination 
cannot be granted. The mere fact that the circumstances were (objectively) foreseeable does not 
preclude the application of section 78.  
66  The reason for this ground, according to the Parlementaire geschiedenis (CJ Van Zeben, JW Du 
Pon & MM Olthof Parlementaire geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 5: Zakelijke 
rechten (1981) 278), relates especially to the increased urbanisation of previous agricultural areas. An 
example of a relevant servitude would be a right of way allocated to be used by a horse and cart, which 
should be widened to allow cars to use the road as well. The continued existence of the mentioned 
servitude is said to contravene the general interest.  
67 The reason for the required existence of 20 years is said to be a result of the important objective of 
stability in legal relationships pertaining to real rights. According to JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” 
(Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten (supplement 27, 2003) 78-1, one of the ways 
in which variation of the rules in BW 5:78-80 can be effected in the deed, is by shortening this period.  
68 BW 5:78; CJ Van Zeben, JW Du Pon & MM Olthof Parlementaire geschiedenis van het Nieuwe 
Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 5: Zakelijke rechten (1981) 275;  FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels 
Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom 
en beperkte rechten 15 ed (2008) 243-244; JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA 
Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten (supplement 27, 2003) 78-1 – 78-2-10.  
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A servient proprietor may apply directly for termination of a servitude69 where 
exercise of the servitude has become impossible70 or the owner of the dominant 
property no longer has a reasonable interest71 in the exercise of the rights and it is not 
likely that the possibility of exercise or the reasonable interest of the dominant 
proprietor will be restored.72  
The owner of a dominant tenement may also apply for amendment of a servitude. 
Where unforeseen circumstances have rendered a servitude permanently or 
temporarily impossible, or have diminished the interest of the dominant owner in such 
servitude, an order may be granted to amend the servitude in such a manner that the 
possibility of exercise or the initial interest of the dominant owner is restored.73 The 
                                                          
 
69 BW 5:79. The Belgian Burgerlijk Wetboek contains a provision with the same effect: BW art. 710. The 
wording of the provision is different in that it states that an application will be possible only where a 
servitude no longer has any value for the dominant proprietor. Impossibility or the loss of any reasonable 
interest would of course amount to exactly such a loss of value. See further V Sagaert “The fragmented 
system of land burdens in French and Belgian law” in S Van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a 
unified system of land burdens (2006) 31-52 50-51. 
70 An example of impossibility of exercise would be where the servient land over which a right of way 
exists, is permanently flooded with water.   
71 According to FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening 
van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten 15 ed (2008) 246 the 
question whether a reasonable interest exists will be determined by a weighing up of the interests of 
the dominant property against that of the servient property. The possibility of a reasonable alternative 
for the dominant property will also be relevant. An example of a loss of interest would be where a public 
road was built subsequent to the creation of a servitude of right of way, with the result that the dominant 
owner no longer needs to use the servitude.  
72 FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten 15 ed (2008) 247.  
73 BW 5:80. Where the owner of the servient property applied for termination of the servitude in terms 
of BW 5:79, and the owner of the dominant property responds with an application for amendment in 
terms of BW 5:80, the judge must first decide on the last mentioned matter. If the amendment is granted 
in terms of BW 5:80, there will be no grounds of impossibility on which the servient proprietor can base 
his application in terms of BW 5:79; FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
84 
 
proviso to the section holds that the amendment must be one that can reasonably be 
expected of the owner of the servient tenement.74 Although it is not apparent from the 
wording of the article, the authority of a court to grant an amendment in terms of this 
article is rather limited and only minor expansions of the entitlements of the servitude 
holder are allowed. 75 The amendments can take the form of a different (wider) content 
of the existing rights, or the adding of a particular entitlement to the existing servitudal 
rights.76 However, amendment is only possible in cases where it can be assumed that 
the parties, if they had envisaged the future change in circumstances, would have 
agreed to the wider scope of the servitude.77  
As mentioned above, the parties to a servitude can extend the provisions of these 
articles dealing with amendment and termination in the deed of registration, but it is 
not possible for them to limit these rules or exclude them altogether. They could agree 
to limit the provisions factually by including in the deed certain circumstances that were 
foreseen at creation and thus excluding these as unforeseen circumstances.78 
                                                          
 
tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten 15 
ed (2008) 247. 
74 Once again, a judge granting the amendment may attach to it conditions as he sees fit, including the 
payment of compensation to the servient tenement: BW 5:81. 
75 CJ Van Zeben, JW Du Pon & MM Olthof Parlementaire geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk 
Wetboek Boek 5: Zakelijke rechten (1981) 285. See also JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in 
WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten (supplement 11, 1997) 80-1. 
76 CJ Van Zeben, JW Du Pon & MM Olthof Parlementaire geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk 
Wetboek Boek 5: Zakelijke rechten (1981) 285; JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn 
& AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten (supplement 11, 1997) 80-1. 
77 CJ Van Zeben, JW Du Pon & MM Olthof Parlementaire geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk 
Wetboek Boek 5: Zakelijke rechten (1981) 285; JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn 
& AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten (supplement 11, 1997) 80-1. 
78 FHJ Mijnssen, AA van Velten & SE Bartels Mr C Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het 
Nederlands burgerlijk recht 5 Zakenrecht: eigendom en beperkte rechten 15 ed (2008) 244. See also 
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However, in principle, if unforeseen circumstances cannot be shown, and there were 
no specific determinations made in the deed, amendment or termination of a servitude 
will not be possible.  
From the wide range of options provided in the BW for amendment of servitudes 
and for termination in a more limited capacity, the balance between the ex post and 
ex ante regulation of servitudes in Dutch law becomes apparent. BW 5:78-80 was 
specifically introduced to eliminate (or provide relief for) the unfair outcomes often 
resulting from the strict enforcement of longstanding legal relationships.79 Although 
servitudes are required to fall within the strict numerus clausus of permissible property 
rights, the content of any specific servitude is to a large extent up to the parties to 
determine. The ex post control measures available to regulate servitudes after creation 
are extensively formulated to ensure that the rights remain effective or are otherwise 
terminated. These ex post controls introduce a measure of flexibility into the regulation 
of servitudes. However, the strict rules regulating the allowable amendments to 
existing rights suggest that the stability of property law remains a high priority. 
Moreover, the discretion given to a judge in determining the most suitable remedy in 
a certain situation is an extremely valuable tool to ensure the fair outcome of 
applications for amendment or termination. Providing a judge with the discretion to 
                                                          
 
JTH Smalbraak “Die erfdienstbaarheden in het gewijzigd ontwerp boek 5 NBW” (1975) 106 Weekblad 
voor Privaatrecht Notariaat en Registratie 721-726 724-725 stating that the parties can provide in the 
deed of creation, for the possibility of amendment or termination of the servitude not only in instances 
of unforeseen circumstances, but also where the circumstances were actually foreseen. 
79 CJ Van Zeben, JW Du Pon & MM Olthof Parlementaire geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk 
Wetboek Boek 5: Zakelijke rechten (1981) 274-275; AC Van Schaick “Erfdienstbaarheden: Het 
verleggingsrecht van die eigenaar van het dienende erf” (1999) 10 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk 
Recht 347-350 348.  
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create a remedy suitable to the specific facts of each case is a perfect example of the 
interest-outcome model in property disputes which will be discussed in further detail 
in Chapter 4. In conclusion, the flexibility provided in the Dutch servitude system not 
only advances the effective use of property, but also provides realistically for the needs 
of property owners to regulate their ownership entitlements according to their needs. 
  
3 3 English law  
3 3 1  Nature and establishment of rights 
The English system has three kinds of third party rights in land, being easements, 
covenants and profits à prendre.80 Easements are rights of a dominant landowner to 
make use of or derive benefit from another’s land by either doing something on the 
servient land or preventing the servient owner from doing something on his own land.81 
Profits à prendre (“profits”) are rights to take natural produce (like minerals or turf that 
are capable of being owned at the time of removal) from the servient land.82 The most 
                                                          
 
80 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report para 2.16. 
81 It is important to note that easements are not defined in any source of English law. The description 
given here is thought to be the best functional description of what easements entail: The Law 
Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à prendre (2011) 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 13 para 2.18; EH Burn & J 
Cartwright Cheshire & Burn’s Modern law of real property 18 ed (2011) 634-635.  
82 Like easements, profits are not clearly defined in any source of English law. This is a general definition 
as it has developed through case law and literature and is often applied in different forms. S van Erp & 
B Akkermans (eds) Cases, materials and text on property law (2012) 319-329; K Gray & SF Gray 
Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 596 para 5.1.4; C Harpum, S Bridge & M Dixon Megarry & Wade The 
law of real property 8 ed (2012) 1269-1270; The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land 
work: Easements, covenants and profits à prendre (2011) 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 17 para 2.31. 
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general examples include hunting, fishing and grazing rights. These rights are not 
required to be connected to a dominant tenement. Covenants are contractual 
obligations relating to the use of land and can be either positive or negative. Because 
of their contractual nature covenants do not naturally run with the land.83 The focus of 
this chapter will be on easements because they are comparable to the South African 
praedial servitudes considered in light of the topic of implied terms and ancillary rights.  
In English law, easements can be created by statute, by deed (with an agreement 
in the form of a grant or reservation as its source), by implication or through 
prescription.84 The most general means of creation is by way of express terms in a 
deed (or contract). An easement or profit created in a deed will be formulated either 
as a grant or a reservation. A grant will entail a situation where the servient tenement 
grants certain rights in favour of the dominant owner (most probably on request from 
him). The reservation of an easement or profit occurs when a property owner 
                                                          
 
83 Negative covenants, preventing some kind of act on the servient land, are known as restrictive 
covenants and may acquire proprietary effect and be enforceable against subsequent owners if they 
meet the requirements laid down in Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774; 41 ER 1143. Positive covenants, 
requiring something to be done on the servient land, are simply contractual rights and cannot be binding 
on subsequent property owners to oblige them to perform some positive act on their property. 
Restrictive covenants are something similar to restrictive conditions in South African planning law (and 
are not considered in this sense as servitudes).The focus in the discussion of English law will be on 
easements, as they are most similar to the South African concept of servitudes.  
84 The Law Commission has proposed that in future, profits should not be allowed to be created by 
implication or prescription, but only through express grant or reservation or by operation of statute. The 
reason for this reform is that the creation of profits through implication or prescription is seen as being 
particularly oppressive to servient owners because these rights are of a more commercial nature, since 
they involve something being taken from the land. Furthermore, it was stated in the Law Commission 
report that it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which a profit will be essential to make land usable. 
See The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 28 paras 3.7-
3.9.  
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subdivides and sells off a part of his property, but reserves for himself some rights in 
the deed of sale upon transfer of the property. Ultimately, the difference between grant 
and reservation “turns on the identity of the party in whose favour the easement or 
profit is created”.85 In English law the “means of creation” are classified differently. 
English texts describing the creation of easements and profits divide them into the 
categories of expressly created easements and those created by implication or 
prescription.86 The discussion that follows also considers easements in these 
categories. 
Gray and Gray state that:  
“In view of the proprietary character of the easement, the courts have severely 
circumscribed the class of rights which may be asserted [as easements].”87 
This statement is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, it indicates the strict manner 
in which the content of easements is regulated in the English legal system, and 
secondly because it provides some insight into the source of this regulation. In contrast 
to the Dutch law discussed above, the rules stipulating the acceptable criteria for 
establishment of easements are not codified, but are a result of English case law. The 
locus classicus on the topic is the case of Re Ellenborough Park.88 In this case 
Danckwerts J established the four essential characteristics of easements: (1) there 
must be a dominant and a servient tenement;89 (2) the easement must accommodate 
                                                          
 
85 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 628. 
86 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 643-686. 
87 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009 613. 
88 Re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131 140.  
89 An easement can thus not belong to a person without being appurtenant to land. The Law 
Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à prendre 
(2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 15 paras 2.23 - 2.24. 
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the dominant tenement;90 (3) the dominant and servient owners must be different 
persons; and (4) the right claimed must be capable of forming the subject-matter of a 
grant.91  
Apart from statutory easements, all easements are seen as originating in some 
way from a grant – be it express, implied or presumed.92 Accordingly, the fourth 
characteristic has a few sub-elements, including: (a) that the right must be sufficiently 
definite;93 (b) there must be a capable grantor and a capable grantee (in other words, 
the parties must be lawfully entitled to grant or be subject to the rigths granted); (c) the 
right must be within the general nature of the rights traditionally recognised as 
                                                          
 
See K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed 2009 606, where it is said that this rule is currently 
subject to dispute due to the conflicts between commercial efficiency and ecological value. Gray & Gray 
explain that the rule against easements in gross (that is easements appurtenant to a person or persons, 
rather than a property) is already relaxed in case of statutory easements that confer rights of use and 
inspection upon public bodies in relation to electricity, gas and water services. See further MF Sturley 
“The land obligation: An English proposal for reform” (1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 1417-
1448. Compare C Sweet “The ‘easement’ of tunnelling” (1916) 32 Law Quarterly Review 70 79-82.  
90 This is explained to mean that the easement must be connected with the enjoyment of the dominant 
land and provide it with some kind of benefit (also as opposed to the benefit simply befalling the right-
holder as an individual). The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, 
covenants and profits à prendre (2011) 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 15 para 2.25. 
91 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009 613-627; EH Burn & J Cartwright Cheshire & 
Burn’s Modern law of real property 18 ed (2011) 639. For clarity of the grant see Pwllbach Colliery Co. 
Ltd. v Woodman (1915) AC 634; Mulvaney v Jackson (2002) EWCA Civ 1078. 
92 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009 613-627; EH Burn & J Cartwright Cheshire & 
Burn’s Modern law of real property 18 ed (2011) 640-641. 
93 EH Burn & J Cartwright use the terminology “certainty of description”. See EH Burn & J Cartwright 
Cheshire & Burn’s Modern law of real property 18 ed (2011) 640. 
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easements; (d) it may not deprive the servient owner of all beneficial proprietorship;94 
and (e) it must not impose a positive duty on the servient owner.95  
There seems to be some confusion in English law regarding the notion of a 
closed list of easements.96 However, there is no limitation on the kind of rights which 
can constitute an easement.97 The principle holds that a new type of land burden 
                                                          
 
94 The general principle in relation to easements (and to some extent also applicable to profits) holds 
that these rights can never provide exclusive possession of the land over which they are to be exercised. 
This principle has been subject to a number of different interpretations and has created some confusion 
in this regard. The question is whether the use is “exclusive to” the holder of the rights or “exclusive of” 
all others (including the grantor). The English Law Commission clarified this in its 2011 report on 
easements covenants and profits à prendre by stating that the correct interpretation of the principle is 
that easements or profits can never enable the right-holder to exclude all others from the land at all 
times para 2.3 fn 3). However, in part 3 of the report the Law Commission reconsiders this principle and 
proposes that a right to use another’s land in a way that prevents that other from making any reasonable 
use of it should not, in itself, preclude the right from being an easement (para 3.209). See The Law 
Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à prendre (2011) 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 10 para 2.3 and 3.188-3.211; 
EH Burn & J Cartwright Cheshire & Burn’s Modern law of real property 18 ed (2011) 635; K Gray & SF 
Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009 621. 
95 The prohibition of positive duties as the subject of easements extends also to maintenance duties. 
The owner of a servient tenement is under no obligation to maintain a right of way or a building in 
respect of which an easement of support exists: C Sara Boundaries and easements 5 ed (2011) 206-
207. This element of easements has created particular problems in the area of fencing, since the rules 
regulating the fencing of property have all the necessary characteristics of easements, but place a 
positive obligation on the servient property. They have previously been described as spurious 
easements or quasi-easements because they did not actually qualify as easements: C Sara Boundaries 
and easements 5 ed (2011) 457-458. The Law Commission recommended the abolition of fencing 
easements in their 2011 report (Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, 
covenants and profits à prendre (2011) 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 13 para 2.18) in favour of land 
obligations  
96 EH Burn & J Cartwright Cheshire & Burn’s Modern law of real property 18 ed (2011) 635; K Gray & 
SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009 602; Keppel v Bailey (1834) 2 My & K 517; Riley v Penttila 
(1974) VR 547 560.  
97 EH Burn & J Cartwright Cheshire & Burn’s Modern law of real property 18 ed (2011) 641. 
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cannot be created and awarded the same status and legal (third party) effect as 
easements.98 But, if there is compliance with the requirements set out in Re 
Ellenborough Park, any right or combination of rights may constitute an easement and 
will accordingly enjoy third party effect after creation.99 It is generally accepted in 
English law that new types of easements are created as a result of the dynamic nature 
of property law.100   
 
3 3 2  Content and interpretation 
Expressly created easements arise by way of express grant or reservation in a 
deed.101 An express grant in this sense includes not only the use of express words in 
a deed, but also express creation by perfection of an equity of estoppel or by virtue of 
statute. Grants comprising of express words in deeds are by far the most general way 
of creation of easements and profits. The scope of these easements depends on the 
construction of the words used in the relevant grant in light of the circumstances 
existing at the time and known to the parties or within their reasonable 
                                                          
 
98 EH Burn & J Cartwright Cheshire & Burn’s Modern law of real property 18 ed (2011) 641 
99 The recognition and creation of new easements are still subject to the discretion of the Land Registry 
or a judge.   
100  In Commonwealth v Registrar of Titles (1918) HCA 17; (1918) 24 CLR 348, Chief Justice Griffith 
referred to the statement of Lord St. Leonards in Dyce v Hay (1852) 1 Macq HL 312 that “The category 
of servitudes and easements must alter and expand with the changes that take place in the 
circumstances of mankind”.  
101 These easements must be registered in order to operate as legal interests in land: section 27(1) and 
27(2)(d) of the Land Registration Act 2002, in conjunction with section 1(2)(a) of the Law of Property 
Act 1925. See also C Harpum, S Bridge & M Dixon Megarry & Wade The law of real property 8 ed 
(2012) 1279 where it is explained that the registration requirement does not apply to easements created 
by implied grant or reservation, prescription or by operation of section 62 of the Law of Property Act 
1925.  
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contemplation.102 The express reservation of an easement works in much the same 
way. The transferor of land who wishes (upon subdivision of his land) to retain an 
easement or profit in respect of the land being transferred, may do so expressly in the 
transfer deed. Once again the scope of the easement will depend on the words used 
in the reservation, in line with the general principle that in cases of doubt or ambiguity, 
the terms of a grant are to be construed against the grantor.103  
Furthermore, if there is nothing pointing towards a contrary intention, it is 
accepted that an easement also includes certain incidental rights.104 All rights which 
are reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the principal easement are deemed to 
have been granted along with the easement and thus form part of it because of their 
ancillary nature.105 The principles laid down in the Scottish case of Moncrieff v 
Jamieson also form part of English law.106 The main asset of ancillary rights is the 
                                                          
 
102 Todrick v Western National Omnibus Co Ltd [1934] Ch 190 at 206 per Farwell J; K Gray & SF Gray 
Elements of land law 5 ed (2009 679.  
103 This rule has proven problematic and has undergone a few shifts in interpretation since the early 
1900s, but K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009 679 point out that case law strangely 
still seems to favour the proposition that an express reservation of an easement or profit is construed 
against the servient owner and in favour of the dominant owner. 
104 Jones v Pritchard (1908) Ch 630 638; Moncrieff v Jamieson (2007) UKHL 42 29, 52, 110; K Gray & 
SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009 602. 
105 Rights which are merely convenient would thus not be seen as ancillary. The English Law 
Commission also refers to ancillary rights (rights that are necessary in order to exercise an easement 
itself) as “ancillary easements”. This might create the idea of a separate (and individual) easement 
being created, but this is not the case. Ancillary easements are accessory in nature and can thus not 
exist as anything separate from the principal easement it was created to support. See The Law 
Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à prendre 
(2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 37 para 3.51  
106 C Sara Boundaries and easements 5 ed (2011) 205; Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42. In 
paragraph 45 Lord Scott states the following “[T]here seems to me no difference relevant to any issue 
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manner in which they are able to overcome some of the restrictions of easements.107 
Because ancillary rights arise from the construction of the grant, they cannot be 
expressly excluded.108 Moreover, these rights do not survive the extinguishment of the 
main easement and are best analysed as a matter of interpreting the scope of the 
easement itself.109  
In contrast with the position in South Africa, English law provides explicitly (and 
in much detail) for the possibility of creating easements110 by implication. Where one 
part of a property is transferred and the full extent of the rights benefitting or burdening 
the property are not set out in the agreement to transfer or lease the property, certain 
                                                          
 
that arises in this case between the common law in England and Wales relating to easements and the 
common law in Scotland relating to servitudes. 
107 C Sara Boundaries and easements 5 ed (2011) 205. The right to park, for instance, was a 
controversial issue in that it was not certain whether a parking right could qualify as an easement on its 
own (this is also debated in the case of Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42); including it as an 
ancillary right as in the Moncrieff case where it was necessary in the specific circumstances, provided 
an efficient solution that met the needs of the parties without having to fit the mould of the requirements 
for establishment of a valid easement.   
108 An example of an attempt to express exclusion would be where parties include a term in a grant to 
the effect that no ancillary rights are granted along with the easement. According to the Law 
Commission the best mechanism to exclude the possibility of ancillary rights emerging, is through tighter 
drafting of easements. An example would be a right of way with, expressly, no right to park. See The 
Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à prendre 
(2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 37 fn 49. 
109 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 37 para 3.51.  
110 It is important to note the wording here. The implication discussed in the following paragraphs is of 
a distinct nature in that it relates to the implication of wholly independent easements. In other words, it 
is not the implication of limited rights which might be incidental to an existing easement, but in fact the 
creation of a completely new easement.  
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rights or easements may be implied.111 There are a few instances in which easements 
or profits may be implied. Again, a distinction must be drawn between grants and 
reservations.  
Implied grants are inferred in favour of the purchaser of land in a number of 
specific instances. The four forms of implied grant are discussed below and are all 
said to be aimed at giving expression, in different ways, to the principle of non-
derogation from grant.112  
Easements of necessity arise by implication, upon subdivision of land, where the 
rights are essential for the use of the land. It requires absolute necessity and therefore 
an easement will only be implied where it would be totally impossible to use the land 
without the desired easement. It is also essential that the necessity existed at the time 
of transfer of the land (subject to the exception where, at the time of the grant, the 
owner of the servient land knew that a necessity would arise at a later date).113 The 
best example of this kind of easement is a right of way of necessity which arises when 
subdivided property is landlocked and in need of access to a public road.  
                                                          
 
111 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 29 para 3.11. 
112 The rule states that in absence of contrary intention, a grantor may not derogate from his grant by 
including terms that effectively counteracts the operation thereof. In Birmingham, Dudley and District 
Banking Co v Ross (1888) LR 38 Ch D 295 313 it was said that the one who grants the right to do 
something with one hand cannot take away the means of exercising the right with the other. See also 
K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009 648; The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: 
Making land work:)Easements, covenants and profits à prendre (2011) 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 32 paras 3.22-3.23. 
113 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009 650; The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: 
Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à prendre (2011) 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 29-30 paras 3.12-3.14. 
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Easements of common intention arise where they are necessary to give effect to 
the manner in which both parties intended the property to be used at the time of the 
grant.114 It is crucial that the parties had a shared intention, either express or implied, 
regarding the use of the transferred land. Courts, in deciding to find an easement 
implied by common intention, will consider a range of factors, including the terms of 
the conveyance, the position on the ground and the comments passing between the 
parties before execution of the conveyance. These easements may overlap with the 
category mentioned above, since a common intention to grant an easement will be 
found mostly in cases where there is necessity.115 An easement of common intention 
can arise (or the common intention becomes apparent) because the right is necessary 
for the enjoyment of some other right that has been expressly granted – thus, where 
the right is of an ancillary nature; or from the circumstances under which the grant was 
made.116 According to Lord Parker in Pwllbach Colliery v Woodman117 the law will 
imply such easements as may be necessary to give effect to the common intention of 
the parties, with reference to the manner or purpose in and for which the land is to be 
used.118 However, it is essential to the success of a claim in this class that “the parties 
should intend that the subject of the grant or the land retained by the grantor should 
be used in some definite and particular manner”. 
                                                          
 
114 These easements are also called easements of intended use.   
115 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009 653.  
116 Pwllbach Colliery v Woodman (1915) AC 634 646 per Lord Parker.  
117 Pwllbach Colliery v Woodman (1915) AC 634 646. 
118 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 30 paras 3.15-
3.17. 
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Quasi-easements are granted in terms of the Wheeldon v Burrows principle.119 
In terms of this principle, when part of a property, owned by S, is transferred to P, all 
quasi-easements used by S at the time of transfer for the benefit of the transferred 
land are converted into easements in favour of P. The term “quasi-easement” is used 
to describe the situation where the owner of land uses one part of his land for the 
benefit of another part, as in the case of an easement, but the use cannot be 
recognised as an easement because both properties are owned by a single owner. In 
his capacity as owner of the transferred land, P will enjoy such rights over the land 
retained by S as was previously necessary for the proper enjoyment and use of the 
transferred land. The requirements for the application of the Wheeldon v Burrows 
principle include that the rights exercised must be continuous and apparent; necessary 
for the reasonable enjoyment of the property transferred; and used at the time of 
transfer by the common owner for the benefit of the part transferred.120 If S does not 
retain part of the property for himself but transfers both parts to P and R respectively, 
the same effect will occur, giving them both the rights that would have entered into 
effect in the situation above where S retained part of the land.  
 Easements can also arise under section 62 of the Law of Property Act 1925,121 
which is known as a “word-saving” provision. It contains general words that, in the 
                                                          
 
119 Wheeldon v Burrows (1879) 12 Ch D 31. The principle is applied in most common law countries and 
forms part of American law (see in this regard United States v Thompson 272 F Supp 774 785-785 
(1967)). 
120 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 31 para 321. 
121 It seems that this form of easement is seen by some authors as an implied easement (K Gray & SF 
Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 659) and by others as an easement created by express means 
(The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) para 3.11.   
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absence of any contrary intention expressed in the conveyance, imply into any 
conveyance of a legal estate in land a number of rights subsequently to be enjoyed by 
the transferee of the estate.122 
Apart from the four instances set out above, implied easements may be created 
by way of implied reservation. Since a reservation involves the retention of rights by 
the dominant proprietor (or transferor of land) upon transfer, there is a general rule 
that such rights can and must be reserved expressly in clear and unambiguous 
terms.123 For this reason, the law is much more inclined to imply easements or profits 
in favour of the transferee of land than in favour of the transferor.124 There are two 
exceptions to this rule. It is possible in rare circumstances that both an easement of 
necessity and an easement of common intention may be implied in a reservation. 
Firstly, an easement of necessity may be implied where a transferor disposes of all 
the property adjacent to or surrounding the land he retains, with the consequence that 
the only possible access to his landlocked property lies across the transferred land. 
The easement of way is then implied in the reservation, since without it the land will 
be completely useless. Necessity is determined strictly, and there must be no other 
                                                          
 
122 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009 659. Section 62(1) reads as follows: “A 
conveyance of land shall be deemed to include and shall […] convey, with the land, all buildings […] 
easements, rights, and advantages whatsoever, appertaining or reputed to appertain to the land, or any 
part thereof, or, at the time of conveyance, demised, occupied, or enjoyed with or reputed or known as 
part or parcel of or appurtenant to the land or any part thereof.” This provision overlaps to a certain 
extent with the Wheeldon v Burrows principle discussed above. The most obvious difference is that 
section 62 only operates in the case of a conveyance of a legal estate in land, while the rule in Wheeldon 
v Burrows will operate where there is only a contract, or where the quasi-easement was being enjoyed 
at the time of the contract but not of the conveyance. 
123 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 679.  
124 Wheeldon v Burrows (1897) 12 Ch D 31. See section 3 3 4 below for a discussion on the proposed 
reforms of this matter. 
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means of access125 to the property.126 In unusual circumstances an easement of 
common intention may also be implied in a reservation to give effect to a common 
intention that was not expressed in the agreement to transfer land. The onus of proof 
will be on the transferor who alleges that the reservation was mutually intended and 
he must be able to show the precise nature and extent of the right. The implied 
easement will only be accepted if the facts are not reasonably consistent with any 
explanation other than that of an implied reservation.127 It would not suffice to contend 
that the transferee of land knew that the transferor retains the adjoining land and would 
probably wish to use it in the same way as before.128 
In English law, as in South Africa, easements may be created by way of 
prescription. However, the law relating to prescriptive acquisition has become 
extremely complex; according to Gray and Gray129 it is marked by much unnecessary 
complication and confusion. The English Law Reform Committee has recommended 
the abolition of the current system of prescription since 1966.130 However, in the most 
recent Law Commission Report131 the Commission proposed that, although the 
complete abolition of prescription might not be necessary, simplification will be 
                                                          
 
125 This includes access by water.  
126 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009 680; The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: 
Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à prendre (2011) 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 29-30 paras 3.12-3.14. 
127 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009 680. 
128 Peckham v Ellison (2000) 79 P&CR 276 291. 
129 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 665. 
130 14th report of the English Law Reform Committee (Cmnd 3100, 1966) para 32.  
131 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 41-63. 
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required in order to retain it.132 For this reason I will not discuss this area in much 
detail, but simply point out the elements that I find helpful.  
Easements created by way of prescription, like implied easements, originate from 
deemed grants of which the nature and scope depend on the circumstances existing 
at the date of grant.133 The prescriptive rights are based on a “deemed acquiescence” 
of a right of a certain and uniform kind.134 For a claim of prescriptive acquisition to 
succeed, a claimant must prove continuous use, as if he had possessed a right, while 
the servient owner had the necessary degree of knowledge but failed to object to the 
exercise of rights by the dominant owner.135 
 
3 3 3  Effective exercise and variation 
Gray and Gray136 state that:  
“In view of the tight definitional characteristics of a valid easement in English 
law, difficult questions are raised by changes which, some time after the 
creation of an easement, affect the use or extent of the dominant tenement or 
the nature or the intensity of the activity authorised by the easement.” 
The circumstances surrounding an easement affect the exercise and enjoyment of the 
rights, and changes in these circumstances thus play an important role in determining 
                                                          
 
132 A statutory scheme for prescription is set out in the draft Law of Property Bill that forms part of the 
2011 report. See section 3 3 4 below where the reform recommended by the Commission is discussed 
in further detail. 
133 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 628. 
134 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 628 fn 1; Scott-Whitehead v National Coal 
Board (1987) 53 P & CR 263 273.  
135 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 667. 
136 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 627. 
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the continued effective exercise of an easement. English courts tend to scrutinise 
changes in purpose or “quantum” of easements more carefully than changes that only 
affect the form of exercise of the rights.137 The principle in English law is that the 
servient tenement should be protected from the risk of a significantly heavier burden 
being imposed on it than was foreseen at the time of creation of a particular 
easement.138 In the following discussion of the effects of changes to the exercise of 
easements, a distinction is once again drawn between expressly created easements 
and those created by implication or prescription.  
With regard to expressly created easements, the general principle is that an 
easement may not be used subsequent to its creation for a purpose “wholly different 
from that originally envisaged by the grantor or grantee”.139 Gray and Gray mention a 
few examples from case law to illustrate the effect of this principle. Firstly, a right of 
way granted in respect of an open space could not be invoked when that open space 
was later built upon.140 On the other hand, a right of way granted for general purposes 
in respect of a house could survive the conversion of that house into a hotel, subject 
to the possibility that excessive use of the easement could qualify as a situation 
actionable by tort. Another example is that of Jelbert v Davis,141 where a right of way 
was granted “for access and egress at all times and for all purposes” in favour of a 
dominant tenement that at the time was used for agricultural purposes. Subsequent to 
the grant of the easement, the land was converted into a holiday resort and the Court 
                                                          
 
137 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 627. 
138 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 627. 
139 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 627; Gallagher v Rainbow (1994) 179 CLR 
624 640.  
140 Allen v Gomme (1840) 11 A & E 795 772, 774; 113 ER 602 607-608.  
141 Jelbert v Davis (1968) 1 WLR 589 596. 
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of Appeal decided that the volume of the proposed use was likely to be outside the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of the grant.142 The question is 
thus always whether the change in use creates an excessive burden on the servient 
property, and the measure of excessiveness will be scrutinised according to the 
intention of the parties at creation of the easement. 
Because easements created by implication and prescription receive their content 
from the circumstances existing at the time of grant, changes in the exercise of the 
easement are approached much more strictly and the rights are always limited to the 
category and quantum that existed at the time of creation. A dominant owner may be 
deprived of his right to enjoy an implied or prescriptive easement when it can be shown 
that he brought about a radical alteration of the purpose underlying the easement 
(meaning the use of the dominant property has undergone a change in character) and 
a substantial increase in the burden on the servient land.143 It will be immaterial if it is 
only the form of exercise of the easement that is altered. However, where repairs are 
effected to a road or way that is subject to a prescriptive right of way, the rule is that 
only repairs and no improvements to the way are allowed. The reason is that 
improvements (such as the construction of a tarred road) are likely to have the effect 
of increasing the burden on the servient tenement.144 It is not clear how strictly this 
“rule” will be enforced, but the clear difference in treatment of expressly created 
easements and prescriptive easements creates the idea that it does carry some 
                                                          
 
142 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 627-628; Jelbert v Davis (1968) 1 WLR 589 596. 
143 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 629. 
144 K Gray & SF Gray Elements of land law 5 ed (2009) 636. There is an important distinction between 
this rule and the rule applicable to expressly created easements. In relation to expressly created 
easements, not only repairs, but also development or improvement of the way is allowed, in order to 
render it suitable for the reasonable enjoyment of the dominant tenement. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
102 
 
weight. However, it seems rather a stringent requirement that repairs may not involve 
improvements, especially where the object is something as permanent and long-
standing as an easement.  
 
3 3 4  Proposed reform 
The English Law Commission published a report in 2011, considering the reform of 
the current system of easements, covenants and profits à prendre.145 The report 
recommends a wide range of amendments to the current law, of which the reform of 
the current law of covenants146 is far more extensive than that relating to easements 
and profits.147 The most noteworthy changes to the law relating to easements include 
                                                          
 
145 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf. The report also 
incorporated the Draft Law of Property Bill, which the Law Commission hoped to introduce into 
parliament, although to date there has not been parliamentary time to do so. As such, it is hard to 
determine when the findings of the report will be incorporated as legislation and whether the resulting 
legislation will be in the same form as the draft Bill proposed by the Commission: UK parliamentary 
website (http://www.parliament.uk/business/bills-and-legislation/) (accessed November 2014). See 
further C Sara Boundaries and easements 5 ed (2011) 203. 
146 The law commission recommends the replacement of positive and negative covenants with a new 
legal interest in land, which will be known as land obligations (these interests will run with the benefitted 
land and bind successors in title to the burdened land). The following will all fall under the heading of 
land obligations: (1) a promise not to do something on the covenantor’s land; (2) a promise to do 
something on one’s own land or on a boundary structure; and (3) a promise to make a reciprocal 
payment, provided that the benefit of the promise touches and concerns the land of the covenantee, 
and that the promise is not expressed to be personal to the promisor or the promisee. There will 
sometimes be an overlap between negative easements and land obligations (for example an easement 
of support which could be framed as an obligation not to undermine or a right to light framed as an 
obligation not to obstruct).  
147 C Sara Boundaries and easements 5 ed (2011) 203; J Stevens & R Pearce Land law 5 ed (2013) 
488. 
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replacing the current methods for prescriptive acquisition by a single statutory scheme 
to obtain easements through prescription;148 abolition of the distinction between 
implied grant and implied reservation;149 the introduction of presumptive abandonment 
of easements after a period of 20 years of non-use,150 and the possibility of judicial 
amendment or termination of easements.151  
Furthermore, the report proposes to replace the current complex law of 
implication, as discussed above, with a single statutory principle that easements will 
be implied where they are necessary for the reasonable use of the land at the time of 
                                                          
 
148 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 52 para 3.123. 
Clauses 16(1) and 17(1) recommend that easements may arise through prescription after a period of 
20 years of continuous use without force, without stealth and without permission. The use may further 
not be in conflict with criminal law.  
149 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 33 para 3.30. 
See section 3 3 2 above where this is discussed in more detail. 
150 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 74 para 3.230. 
Clause 27 of the draft Bill gives effect to this recommendation.  
151 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf para 7.35 164; 
Clause 30-31 (and Schedule 2) of the draft Law of Property Bill 2011. Although the report only 
recommends the possibility of amendment or termination for easements created after implementation 
of the reforms proposed by the Commission, the 2014 Law Commission Report on rights to light (in 
para 1.26) stated that the Commission had reconsidered and now recommend that all easements, 
including rights to light, created before or after reform, should be brought within the Lands Chamber’s 
proposed jurisdiction to discharge or modify easements, and that the 2011 Easements Bill be amended 
to achieve this change before its introduction into Parliament. As far as existing interests are concerned, 
the reform recommended for the abandonment of easements and profits is aimed at providing an easier 
route to termination of obsolete interests. 
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the transaction.152 The question of what is reasonable is determined by considering 
the relevant circumstances with reference to a prescribed list of factors including (i) 
the use of the land at the time of the grant; (ii) the physical features of the land; (iii) the 
intentions for future use of the land known to both parties; (iv) the possible routes 
available for the easement (where this is relevant); and (v) the potential interference 
with the servient land or inconvenience to the servient owner.153 This approach was 
inspired by the American Restatement relating to servitudes154 and was chosen 
deliberately as an alternative to a test based on the intention of the parties upon 
creation of the servitude, since it provides an objective measure of determining what 
is practically necessary for the effective use of the land. Furthermore, it is important to 
note the time of application of this test. What is necessary for the reasonable use of 
the land will be considered at the time of the transaction155 and any right or easement 
that becomes necessary after the land was transferred, for reasons that were not 
contemplated by the parties, will be irrelevant.  
                                                          
 
152 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf 33-36 paras 
3.45, 3.32, 3.35. J Stevens & R Pearce Land law 5 ed (2013) 488 state that although these proposals 
present some clarification, most of the considerations are reflected in the current law and accordingly 
will result in “little appreciable change”. Clause 20 of the draft Bill provides for the new rules on 
implication.  
153 The Law Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à 
prendre (2011) http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf paras 1.15 & 
3.45; Clause 20 of the draft Law of Property Bill, 2011; B McFarlane, N Hopkins & S Nield Land law: 
Text, cases, and materials 2 ed (2012) 927.  
154 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes: Volume 1 (2000) 202. 
155 This requirement is subject to an exception where, at the time of the grant, the owner of the servient 
land knew that a necessity would arise at a later date. 
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The report includes proposals for the amendment or termination of easements. 
Clause 30 of the draft Bill contains a provision enabling the Lands Chamber of the 
Upper Tribunal (“Tribunal”)156 to “discharge or modify” easements upon application of 
a person interested in any land affected by such rights.157 In considering a discharge 
or modification under this provision the Tribunal must take into account a range of 
different factors,158 and it will only be able to grant the order if it is satisfied that the 
modified easement will not be materially less convenient to the holder of the rights and 
will not be more burdensome to the land affected.159 Schedule 2 to the draft Bill 
contains the grounds which would justify orders under clause 30. The first general 
ground160 that may lead to the discharge or modification161 is the obsoleteness of an 
                                                          
 
156 This is the Lands Chamber of the Upper Tribunal, as established in terms of the Tribunals, Courts 
and Enforcement Act, 2007.  
157 See fn 151 above explaining that this clause will apply to all easements, and not only those created 
after enactment of the Bill.  
158 Clause 31(1) and (2) provide that the Tribunal must take into account factors such as the 
development plan for the land, patterns in grants or refusals of building permissions in the relevant 
areas, as well as the period and context in which the rights were created in making its decision in terms 
of clause 30. Furthermore, the tribunal may only make an order in terms of clause 30 if it has considered 
the effects of the order on each of the persons entitled to the benefit of the interest. Sections 3-6 of 
Schedule 2 to the Bill contains a list of specific considerations that must be taken into account, including 
the impediment caused by the continued existence of the rights without alteration and the adequateness 
of money as compensation for loss or disadvantage suffered by any party as a result of the discharge 
or modification of the rights.  
159 Clause 31 (3).  
160 Schedule 2 is divided into two parts. Part 1 relates to all interests in land and is thus applicable to 
easements and profits. Part 2 applies only to positive obligations as imposed under clause 1 of the draft 
Law of Property Bill. These positive obligations will fall under the wider category of land obligations as 
imposed by the draft Bill and are accordingly not included in this discussion relating to easements and 
profits. 
161 The wording used in clause 30 as well as in the draft Bill to refer to all the rights that may be 
discharged or modified is “interests in land”. This includes easements and profits, which are the 
exclusive subjects of the discussion at hand. In other sections of clause 30, and the draft Bill in general, 
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easement or profit. Where the Tribunal is satisfied that the interests ought to be 
deemed obsolete because of changes in the character of the property or 
neighbourhood or other material circumstances, it may order a discharge or 
modification of the rights.162 The second ground that would justify discharge or 
modification of an easement or profit is the consent (by implied or express agreement) 
of the parties entitled to the benefit of the interest.163 The third ground is slightly more 
extensively formulated.164 It holds that the Tribunal may make an order under clause 
30 if it is satisfied, in relation to each person entitled to benefit from the profit or interest, 
that one of the following situations are applicable: (i) that the continued (or unmodified) 
existence of the interest will impede some reasonable use of the land which either 
holds no practical benefit to the person or is contrary to the public interest, and 
furthermore that the loss or disadvantage the person suffers can be adequately 
compensated by a monetary award;165 (ii) that the person has agreed by act or 
omission (either expressly or impliedly) to the proposed discharge or modification;166 
or (iii) that the Tribunal is satisfied that the proposed discharge or modification will not 
injure the person.167  
Although subject to a number of restrictions, the possibilities presented by the 
recommendations for modification and termination of easements signify 
                                                          
 
reference is made specifically to land obligations or positive obligations. Where these sections become 
relevant, it will be stated specifically.  
162 Article 1, Schedule 2 to the draft Law of Property Bill 2011.   
163 Article 1, Schedule 2 to the draft Law of Property Bill 2011. 
164 Articles 3-6, Schedule 2 to the draft Law of Property Bill 2011.  
165 Article 4, Schedule 2 to the draft Law of Property Bill 2011. 
166  Article 5, Schedule 2 to the draft Law of Property Bill 2011. 
167 Article 6, Schedule 2 to the draft Law of Property Bill 2011. 
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acknowledgement by the Law Commission of the need for flexibility in relation to 
limited real rights.168 Furthermore, the grounds for a successful application to have an 
easement modified are aimed at eliminating burdens which are clearly obsolete, 
unnecessary or otherwise provide some impediment to the effective use of property. 
It is not clear to what extent the reform will take place as proposed, but statements 
such as those made by Lightman J in Greenwich Healthcare NHS Trust v London and 
Quadrant Housing Trust,169 that “there is (unfortunately) no statutory equivalent in 
case of easements to the jurisdiction vested by statute in the Lands Tribunal in case 
of restrictive covenants to modify the covenant to enable servient land to be put to a 
proper use”, as well as the wide number of jurisdictions considered by the Commission 
that have in fact implemented a similar option for judicial intervention in dealing with 
the same problem, can provide some incentive for implementing change in this area.    
 
                                                          
 
168 See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on this issue.   
169 Greenwich Healthcare NHS Trust v London and Quadrant Housing Trust [1998] 1 WLR 1749, 1755. 
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3 4  Scots law170 
3 4 1  Nature and establishment of servitudes  
The Scots law of servitude is both similar to and different from the English law relating 
to easements.171 Cusine and Paisley explain:  
“To describe servitudes as the Scottish version of easements is the reverse of 
the truth. It would be truer to say that easements are the English version of 
servitudes. Servitudes originate in Roman law and Scots law has followed and 
developed this concept. The English law of easements also owes much to the 
Roman law of servitudes.”172 
One of the differences between the English law of easements and the Scots law of 
servitudes used to be evident in their respective perceptions of a closed list of rights. 
As discussed in section 3 3 1 above, English law allows for the creation of new types 
of easements, subject only to compliance with the requirements laid down in Re 
                                                          
 
170 The focus in this part will be on conventional servitudes. These are servitudes created by express 
grant or reservation in a deed or by implication from the terms of a deed and are to be distinguished 
from servitudes created by other means not related to deeds, such as natural or legal servitudes. The 
term “conventional servitude” is used in Scotland (and by Cusine and Paisley in their book) but is not 
accepted universally. Refer to section 3 5 1 below, where it is explained how these servitudes function 
in the law of Louisiana. 
171 Lord Neuberger made the following statement in Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42 para 111: 
“While some aspects of the juridical nature, origin and incidents of servitudes in Scotland are different 
from those of easements in England and Wales, there are main aspects of similarity, as can be 
appreciated even from a quick perusal both of Cusine and Paisley and of Gale on Easements (17th 
edition, 2002). Servitudes and easements are inherently very similar, and there is very little difference 
between life-styles and standards north and south of the Cheviots. Further, courts in both jurisdictions 
have expressly and beneficially relied on each other's analyses and developments in this area of law.” 
However, it is important to note that there are scholars who differ on this point. See in this regard KGC 
Reid & GL Gretton Conveyancing (2007) 108. 
172 DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) 3, referring to J Mackintosh Roman 
law in modern practice (1934) 141. 
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Ellenborough Park.173  In Scots law only a number of servitudes were historically 
known and generally created in law.174 However, in Patrick v Napier175 Lord Ardmilian 
held that it was possible to create new servitudes where necessary, subject to the 
requirements that they must be praedial176 and similar in nature and quality to the 
existing servitudes.177 When the right to park was accepted as a servitude in 2007,178 
this was the first new servitude to be recognised in more than 200 years.179 As a result, 
the notion of a closed list of servitudes should rather be seen as a fixed list, since it is 
now clear that there can be specific additions to the list if they are justified and explicitly 
recognised by a court. The principle that new rights must be similar to one of the 
                                                          
 
173 DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 1.30 36-37; Re Ellenborough 
Park [1956] Ch 131. 
174 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 7.  
175 Patrick v Napier (1867) 5 M 683 709. 
176 This means that they must regulate the burdened property for the benefit of the benefitted property 
and not simply provide personal benefit to the owner of the dominant property: KGC Reid “Modernising 
land burdens: The new law in Scotland” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system 
of land burdens (2006) 63-108 65; WM Gordon & MJ De Waal “Servitudes and real burdens” in R 
Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid (eds) Mixed legal systems in comparative perspective: Property and 
obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 738. 
177 DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 1.30 37. 
178 Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42. The case concerned the question of a right to park as a 
necessary ancillary to a servitude of right of way. However, the House of Lords felt it necessary to 
decide whether a right to park could be established as a servitude in its own right. See Moncrieff v 
Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42 paras 22-24 (Lord Hope), 47 (Lord Scott), 72, 75-76 (Lord Rodger), 102 
(Lord Mance) and 137 (Lord Neuberger).  
179 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 8. 
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existing forms of servitudes was confirmed as recently as 2008.180 However, it needs 
some clarification.  
The reason for the reluctance in Scots law to accept new servitudes was the 
fact that there was no publicity requirement up until 2004,181 because registration was 
not formally required.182 For that reason it was essential that the limited real rights that 
could attach to land and burden property were limited, in order to protect third parties 
who could not easily establish whether or not a property was subject to a burden. By 
only recognising a limited number of rights to burden property, a prudent purchaser 
could more easily establish whether a property was in fact burdened by one of these 
rights.183  
However, the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 introduced a change to the 
position of servitudes in Scots law. Section 76 of the Act provides that any servitude 
created by a deed (and accordingly registered in terms of section 75(1))184 will no 
longer be required to be of a type known to the law. This provision has no retrospective 
effect and thus only applies to servitudes created after 28 November 2004, when the 
Act came into force. Furthermore, the explicit reference to expressly created 
                                                          
 
180 Romano v Standard Commercial Property Securities Limited and Atlas Investments Limited [2008] 
CSOH 105. See also WM Gordon “The struggle for recognition of new servitudes” (2009) 13 Edinburgh 
Law Review 139-143 142.  
181 The Title Conditions (Scotland) Act entered into force on 28 November 2004. Servitudes were in 
practice always registered against one of the properties, although this was not necessarily the servient 
land. I am grateful to Prof Kenneth Reid for this insight.  
182  KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 8. 
183 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 8; GL Gretton & AJM Steven Property, trusts and succession 
2ed (2013) 171.   
184 See the following paragraph for a discussion of s 75 of the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003.  
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servitudes means that the provision does not apply to servitudes created by implication 
or prescription.185 Accordingly, rights created before that date, and all servitudes 
created by prescriptive or implied means must still be of a known type or otherwise 
akin to one of the known types of servitudes.186 It is not hard to determine that the 
reason for this deviation is the protection of third parties who might not be able to 
ascertain the existence of unregistered burdens over a property.  
The Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 also brought about a number of other 
changes to servitude law as it stood at the time. The first of these was the abolition of 
negative servitudes.187 All servitudes are now required to be of a positive nature. 188
 Another change implemented by the Act is the registration requirement, which 
did not previously form part of Scots law.189 A deed of servitude does not effectively 
                                                          
 
185 GL Gretton & AJM Steven Property, trusts and succession 2ed (2013) 171.   
186 GL Gretton & AJM Steven Property, trusts and succession 2ed (2013) 168, 171; TG Guthrie Scottish 
property law (2005) 171 expresses the opinion that the Sheriff court decision of Moncrieff v Jamieson 
2004 SCLR 135 confirms the possibility that new types of servitudes can be created through implication 
or prescription. The Sheriff in this case made an obiter statement to the effect that a servitude of parking 
could have been created in the case and would thus be added to the list of “known” servitudes.  
187 The distinction between positive and negative in this regard refers only to the right of the dominant 
proprietor. A positive servitude provides him with a right to do some positive act on the servient 
tenement which he would not otherwise be lawfully able to do. A negative servitude allows him to 
prevent the owner of the servient tenement to do something on his own land which he (the servient 
owner) would otherwise be lawfully permitted to do. See WM Gordon Scottish land law (1989) para 
24.17 756. 
188 Section 79 Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003. All negative servitudes (ie. all obligations not to do 
something on your own land) were to be converted (in terms of s 80 of the Act) into real burdens. The 
reason for this change, according to the Scottish Law Commission (Discussion Paper No 106 (1998) 
para 2.42-43), was that the same function could be achieved by real burdens and it was therefore 
unnecessary to retain the category of negative servitudes.  
189 S 75 Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003. This requirement does not apply to servitudes to lead 
pipes, cables, wires or other such enclosed units over or under land: s 75(3)(b).  
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create a positive servitude (by express provision) unless it is registered against the 
titles of both the dominant and servient properties.190 The imposition of this 
requirement reduces the need for the strict regulation of the types of servitudes which 
are allowed since it provides protection to third parties by way of the publicity provided 
by registration.   
Before the Act was implemented in 2004, the development of servitude law in 
Scotland had been a slow, incremental process. One of the reasons proposed to 
explain this, is that the creation of real burdens in the nineteenth century replaced 
much of the use that servitudes had before that time.191 During the late eighteenth 
century, in response to increasing urbanisation, servitudes were no longer adequate 
to effectively regulate property rights, and real burdens were introduced to provide a 
more flexible mechanism of obtaining much the same effect as servitudes, but “without 
the limitations that had made servitudes unsuited to the task of urban regulation”.192 
These real burdens provided everything that servitudes could and more, in that they 
were not limited by the notion of numerus clausus and they were practically 
unrestricted regarding content – even allowing the imposition of positive obligations 
on the servient property owner.193 
                                                          
 
190 Section 75(1) Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003. 
191 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 8-9; KGC Reid “Modernising land burdens: The new law in 
Scotland” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of land burdens (2006) 63-108 
65.  
192 KGC Reid “Modernising land burdens: The new law in Scotland” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) 
Towards a unified system of land burdens (2006) 63-108 65.  
193 KGC Reid “Modernising land burdens: The new law in Scotland” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) 
Towards a unified system of land burdens (2006) 63-108 65. 
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The main goal of the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 was to reform and 
restate the law of real burdens, but it also effected some minor changes in respect of 
other title conditions such as servitudes.194 What is now seen under the collective term 
“title condition” includes three kinds of rights comparable to the servitude type iura in 
re aliena in English and South African law, namely: 
(1) affirmative burdens: obligations on the burdened property owner to do 
something (such as maintain a wall or structure); 
(2)  negative burdens: obligations to refrain from doing something (not to build on 
the property or not to use it for commercial or other specified purposes); and 
(3) servitudes: an obligation to allow a person limited use of the property (to walk 
or drive over part of the property).  
As explained briefly before, the last two categories previously comprised servitudes in 
Scotland.  For purposes of this discussion, real burdens will not be considered and the 
focus will be solely on servitudes as described in (3) above.  
Servitudes are created in Scots law expressly (through grant or reservation), 
impliedly and by way of prescription. For the valid establishment of a servitude the 
right must be enforceable and controllable in law; there must be two properties in 
separate ownership (one will be the servient and the other the dominant property195); 
the rights involved must be praedial in nature196 and must provide a benefit to the one 
                                                          
 
194 Steven AJM “Reform of real burdens” (2001) 5 Edinburgh Law Review 235-242 235-237.  
195 The new terminology implemented by the 2003 Act is “burdened” and “benefitted”. This change is a 
result of the objective to get rid of any connotations with the old feudal system of land law.  
196 According to the principle of praediality, the rights must be connected to the relevant land and not to 
a person. Another form of this is the principle of “touch and concern” (requiring the rights to touch and 
concern the land), mainly used in US law. 
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property while burdening the other; and the obligation imposed on the servient 
proprietor must not be positive, but simply in patiendo (permitting or allowing).197 
Expressly created servitudes are mostly198 established by way of express grant 
or reservation in a deed.199 All deeds creating a servitude must be registered against 
the titles of both the dominant and servient properties to have effect.200 The express 
creation of a servitude through grant will either be in the form of an independent 
agreement, or may form part of the transfer documents for a property at subdivision.201 
An express reservation of a servitude will always be the result of a subdivision of land. 
The seller reserves for himself servitudal rights over the land being sold, to benefit the 
property he retains.202   
Implied servitudes203 can be created in Scots law through implied grant or implied 
reservation.204 Servitudes will be implied only as part of the conveyance of a property, 
in situations where there has been a subdivision of land and a part of that subdivided 
                                                          
 
197 DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) 81.  
198 The creation of servitudes by statutory means is also classified by some authors as expressly created 
easements: WM Gordon Scottish land law (1989) para 24.26 761.  
199 DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) 261. 
200 S 75 (1) Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2013.  Cable and pipeline servitudes are exempt from this 
requirement because of the cumbersome effect it could have where the servitude covers long distances: 
GL Gretton & AJM Steven Property, trusts and succession 2ed (2013) 172. See s 75(3) read with 77(1) 
of the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2013.  
201 TG Guthrie Scottish property law (2005) 174; GL Gretton & AJM Steven Property, trusts and 
succession 2ed (2013) 172.    
202 TG Guthrie Scottish property law (2005) 175; GL Gretton & AJM Steven Property, trusts and 
succession 2ed (2013) 172-173. 
203 Implied servitudes, which are independent servitudes created by way of implication, should be 
distinguished from implied rights to servitudes (mentioned below), which do not in effect lead to the 
creation of an independent servitude 
204 TG Guthrie Scottish property law (2005) 174.  
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land is sold off.205 Implied grant will arise where the subdivided land was sold off 
without the express creation of a servitude, which is necessary for the reasonable 
enjoyment of the property. The servitudal rights are deemed to have been granted by 
the seller of the land on the basis that they are incidental to the comfortable use and 
enjoyment of the purchased property.206  
Implied reservations, on the other hand, arise where the seller of a subdivided 
parcel of land wants to argue that certain servitudal rights have been impliedly created 
in his favour at the time the property was sold.207 Implied reservations are much less 
favoured than implied grants208 because the seller of the subdivided parcel is expected 
to reserve for himself expressly those rights that he claims over the property he 
sells.209 However, it is not impossible for a servitude to be created by this method and 
it will depend whether there are enough favourable circumstances and a sufficient 
degree of necessity to outweigh the effect of the rule of non-derogation from the 
grant.210  
                                                          
 
205 GL Gretton & AJM Steven Property, trusts and succession 2ed (2013) 173.   
206 TG Guthrie Scottish property law (2005) 174; A McAllister & TG Guthrie Scottish property law: An 
introduction (1992) 91-92. GL Gretton & AJM Steven Property, trusts and succession 2ed (2013) 173.  
207 TG Guthrie Scottish property law (2005) 175. 
208 DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 8.04 287; WM Gordon Scottish 
land law (1989) para 24.40 768. 
209 WM Gordon Scottish land law (1989) para 24.40 768. See A McAllister & TG Guthrie Scottish 
property law: An introduction (1992) 92-93 (explaining that implied reservations have the effect of the 
seller telling the purchaser of the subdivided part of property, after the event, that he has sold him less 
than he (the purchaser) had thought because the property that he obtained is now subject to a servitude 
that has the effect of reducing his title; the result is a derogation from the original grant of the property.  
210 Murray v Medley 1973 SLT (Sh Ct) 75; DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way 
(1998) para 8.19 297; TG Guthrie Scottish property law (2005) 175-176. 
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The tendency in practice seems to be that courts attribute much weight to the 
consideration of prior use as part of the test to establish the existence of implied 
servitudes.211 However, the need for a servitude may sometimes only arise after 
severance and the doctrine will be unnecessarily narrowed if implied servitudes were 
only allowed in cases where the servitudal rights were already enjoyed before the 
severance.212 Furthermore, evidence of prior use might not always be available and 
thus this cannot be an absolute requirement for establishment. Reid argues that 
servitudes should not be created by the fact of prior use, either by itself or in 
combination with other factors.213 As real rights and burdens on land, servitudes 
require a public act and the consent of the landowner.214 However, the possibility of 
creating servitudes on the grounds of prior use or exercise of rights has been 
incorporated in Scots law215 and it is now implemented by balancing the interest of the 
                                                          
 
211 In the case of Harton Homes Ltd v Durk [2012] SCLR 554 paras 46 & 54 the court found that prior 
use was, in this case, a critical component to the constitution of an implied servitude and that there are 
very limited circumstances where prior use would not be required for the establishment of a servitude 
by implied grant. See also L Gretton & AJM Steven Property, trusts and succession 2ed (2013) 173; B 
Bolton, E Piggot & S Higgins “The life of a servitude: Creation, use, enforcement and termination” 
(October 2013) Enhance with Tods <https://enhancecpd.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/the-life-of-a-
servitude-creation-use-enforcement-and-termination/> (accessed 19-11-2014). 
212 WM Gordon Scottish land law (1989) para 24.39 768.  
213 Servitudes created solely by prior use are in effect servitudes created by destination (or by the 
doctrine of destination du père de famille) as discussed in 3 2 relating to Dutch law.  
214 Reid supplements this argument with reference to various countries that reject the possibility of 
servitudes of prior use, such as Germany, Switzerland, Greece, and the Netherlands.  
215 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 20-23 explains how the incorporation came about by a 
reception form English law.  
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putative dominant property in acquiring the servitude against the need to protect the 
present and future owners of the putative servient property.216 
Servitudes can also be created by acquisitive prescription (if they are possessed 
openly, peaceably and without judicial interruption for a period of 20 years217) or by 
Act of Parliament.218 
 
3 4 2  Content and interpretation of servitudes 
The content of servitudes is determined according to different rules, depending on the 
manner of creation of the rights. 
The contents of expressly created servitudes will always be determined by the 
terms of the deed.219 Paisley states:  
“The terms of the deed govern the matter entirely, subject always to the 
implication by law of such ancillary rights as are required to make the servitude 
exercisable in a proper and safe way.”220 
Furthermore, the general rules of servitude law are taken into account during the 
process of determining the scope of the rights. Burdens may only be imposed in clear 
                                                          
 
216 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 23. 
217 S 3 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973.  
218 DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 11.02 353; WM Gordon Scottish 
land law 2 ed (1999) 736.  
219 Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42 para 7 per Lord Hope; DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes 
and rights of way (1998) para 15.04 610; WM Gordon Scottish land law 2 ed (1999) 750.  
220 RRM Paisley “The demon drink and the straight and narrow way: The expansion and limitation of 
praedial servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 
193-237 221.  
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terms221 and servitudes are always to be interpreted in the manner least burdensome 
to the servient property.222 Therefore, courts will apply a reasonable interpretation of 
the deed, taking into account the interests the parties intended to protect and the 
principle that a servitude is deemed to include all the rights necessary for its effective 
exercise.223 
The main consideration by courts in these cases is the particularity of the 
description of the rights in the servitude grant. If the description is extensive and 
precise, the court has no power to interfere and allow any form of use outside of those 
boundaries. Where the extent of the burden is unclear from the deed, courts refer to 
surrounding circumstances and the possession subsequent to grant to determine what 
is ordinary and reasonable.224 Courts establish what a “reasonable heritable 
proprietor” would have anticipated at the time of, and in the circumstances 
surrounding, the original grant or reservation.225 Such proprietor would only have been 
                                                          
 
221 Cronin v Sutherland (1899) 2 F 217 220 per Lord Trayner; RRM Paisley “The demon drink and the 
straight and narrow way: The expansion and limitation of praedial servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de 
Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 193-237 229; WM Gordon Scottish land law 
2 ed (1999) 750. 
222 Cronin v Sutherland (1899) 2 F 217 219 per Lord Justice Clerk Macdonald; DJ Cusine & RRM 
Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 14.35 584-587; WM Gordon Scottish land law 2 ed 
(1999) 750. In Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42 para 34, Lord Hope stated that “while a servitude 
right must be construed in such a way as to minimise the burden on the servient proprietor, it must not 
be construed so strictly as to defeat the right granted to the dominant proprietor.”  
223 Gretton GL & Reid KGC Conveyancing 4 ed (2011) 253 n 205; B Bolton, E Piggot & S Higgins “The 
life of a servitude: Creation, use, enforcement and termination” (October 2013) Enhance with Tods 
<https://enhancecpd.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/the-life-of-a-servitude-creation-use-enforcement-
and-termination/> (accessed 19-11-2014).  
224 WM Gordon Scottish land law (1989) para 24.65 779; DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and 
rights of way (1998) para 12.187 517, 15.10 615. 
225 DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 12.187 517. 
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able to anticipate that which was reasonably foreseeable.226 The subsequent 
“possession” or exercise of the servitude will give a good indication of what was 
intended by the parties and the possession need not extend over the whole of the 
prescriptive period to have effect. This instance of referring to possession of a 
servitude in order to establish the extent of the servitudal rights, should be 
distinguished from the reference made to possession of a servitude where it is used 
to prove the establishment of a prescriptive servitude. The servitude in this case is 
simply understood better by taking into account the subsequent use made thereof and 
is attached to the proviso that the effect of this insight may not result in the extension 
of the servitude beyond that which was expressly or impliedly contemplated or could 
have been within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time.227  
Determining the scope of implied servitudes requires a slightly stricter approach. 
As mentioned above, these servitudes exist because they are incidental to the 
comfortable use and enjoyment of the property.  The test for the determining the 
contents of implied rights was developed in the 1861 case of Ewart v Cochrane.228 
Lord Campbell held in this judgement that rights are only implied where they can be 
seen as necessary for the comfortable enjoyment at the time of the grant, but that they 
need not be so essentially necessary that the property cannot be used without them.229 
This test is still often referred to by courts, although some deem it to be quite a strict 
                                                          
 
226 DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 12.187 517. 
227 DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 15.10 615-616.  
228 Ewart v Cochrane (1861) 4 Macq 117; Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42 para 27.  
229 Ewart v Cochrane (1861) 4 Macq 117 122-123.  
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standard.230 To determine what is reasonably necessary for the comfortable 
enjoyment of the property courts look at extrinsic evidence to determine the 
circumstances surrounding the creation of the right.231 Provisions of the deed and 
terms of conveyance effecting the severance of the two properties may also influence 
the acceptance of an implied servitude.232 
When it comes to servitudes created by prescription, they will be given content 
by application of the maxim of tantum praescriptum quantum possessum, meaning 
that the right will be acquired as it was possessed and thus be interpreted to include 
only the rights which were enjoyed during the prescriptive period.233  
 
3 4 3  Effective exercise and variation of servitudes  
The same general principles apply in Scots law as in the two systems discussed 
above. A property owner who granted a servitude over her property may continue to 
                                                          
 
230 B Bolton, E Piggot & S Higgins “The life of a servitude: Creation, use, enforcement and termination” 
(October 2013) Enhance with Tods <https://enhancecpd.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/the-life-of-a-
servitude-creation-use-enforcement-and-termination/> (accessed 19-11-2014). 
231 DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 8.21 299-300. 
232 If the deed includes an express provision that excludes a servitudes, they cannot be implied from 
the facts or circumstances surrounding the conveyance; where a certain servitude is expressly created 
in a deed, it may be an indication that another servitude was not implied in the same document (based 
on the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius translated as “the expression of the one excludes 
the other”); and where a deed contains a reference to extrinsic facts and circumstances such as 
conveyance of subjects as presently possessed, this has been interpreted by courts to favour the 
implication of a servitude. See DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 8.26 
302-303. 
233  Cusine and Paisley argue that a servitude created through prescription can sometimes be “extended 
beyond former usage, if, without such extension, the right would be unprofitable”: DJ Cusine & RRM 
Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 15.27, 15.29 635-638.  
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use her property, but is generally prohibited from changing the conditions related to 
the servitude or from interfering in any way with the exercise of the servitude by the 
dominant proprietor.234 Servitudes must be exercised in a reasonable manner or 
civiliter modo. The dominant proprietor may do all that is necessary for the comfortable 
enjoyment of his servitude but, in line with the principle of reasonableness, he is not 
allowed to change his use of the servitude to the effect that it creates an increased 
burden on the servient land.235 As long as there is no such increase, ancillary rights 
can be grafted onto servitudes to render them more effective.  
In contrast to the jurisdictions discussed previously, the issue of ancillary rights 
to servitudes is discussed in some detail in Scottish legal literature. It is explained that 
ancillary rights can be either expressly or impliedly created to form part of or provide 
support to the main servitude.236  
                                                          
 
234 GL Gretton & AJM Steven Property, trusts and succession 2ed (2013) 180; DJ Cusine & RRM 
Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) 392-399; TG Guthrie Scottish property law (2005) 177.  
235 GL Gretton & AJM Steven Property, trusts and succession 2ed (2013) 176; TG Guthrie Scottish 
property law (2005) 176-177.  
236 These rights also sometimes look like separate servitudes (although they are dependent on and 
intricately connected to the parent servitude). However, an important distinction can be drawn between 
implied servitudes and ancillary rights which appear to be individual servitudes in that the former can 
only be created as a result of the subdivision (and subsequent selling off) of a property. Ancillary rights 
or ancillary servitudes are created where they are deemed sufficiently necessary for the exercise of the 
parent servitude. Paisley refers to “bespoke” servitudes where he explains that both South African and 
Scots law permit individualism in servitudes to a certain extent: 236 RRM Paisley “The demon drink and 
the straight and narrow way: The expansion and limitation of praedial servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de 
Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 193-237 227. 
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Express ancillary rights are used and accepted in Scotland without objection, 
although their doctrinal basis is not clear.237 In Robertson v Duke of Atholl238 a 
servitude grant, which included an express ancillary right of erecting huts for the 
temporary shelter of shepherds, was accepted without much ado.239 The problem in 
Scots law regarding express ancillary rights is that there is no clear indication of the 
scope of rights that are acceptable within this class.240 However, the accepted practice 
of allowing the implication of ancillary rights by law (on the basis of the implied intention 
of the parties) is said to lay a solid foundation for the recognition of ancillary rights in 
cases where the intention of the parties is clearly expressed.241 
Ancillary rights may also be implied. The principle that all rights necessary for the 
effective use of the servitude are implied by law also applies here.242 In the landmark 
case on ancillary rights in Scots law, Moncrieff v Jamieson,243 an ancillary right of 
                                                          
 
237 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 11; RRM Paisley “The demon drink and the straight and 
narrow way: The expansion and limitation of praedial servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) 
Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 193-237 234.  
238 Robertson v Duke of Atholl (1798) 4 Pat 54 55 56 and 61.  
239 According to Maecianus, this ancillary right was accepted in much the same way in classical Roman 
law, where the holder of a servitude of pasturage or watering was allowed to erect a hut on the servient 
tenement to provide him with shelter in times of storms. D 8 3 6.  
240 RRM Paisley “The demon drink and the straight and narrow way: The expansion and limitation of 
praedial servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 
193-237 234. 
241 RRM Paisley “The demon drink and the straight and narrow way: The expansion and limitation of 
praedial servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 
193-237 234. 
242 Gretton GL & Reid KGC Conveyancing 4 ed (2011) 253-254; GL Gretton & AJM Steven Property, 
trusts and succession 2ed (2013) 177; KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) 
Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 12.  
243 Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42.  
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parking was found to be implied in an expressly created servitude of access. The facts 
of the case were particularly important to the outcome of the decision as it concerned 
a unique geographical situation.244 The dominant land was bordered on one side by 
the sea and on the other by a cliff. The only access or egress that could be obtained 
by land was via a stairway that led to a gate at the top of the cliff. On these facts, it 
was found that the right of access enjoyed by the dominant landowners would be 
defeated if the vehicles used to obtain access to the buildings on the dominant property 
were not allowed to be left parked at or near the entrance gate until they were again 
needed. The test that was developed in this case was aimed at determining whether 
the claimed right was, firstly, reasonably necessary for the exercise and enjoyment of 
the main servitude and, secondly, whether it was within the contemplation of the 
parties at the time of the grant.245 This is thought to have established the doctrinal 
basis for the implication of ancillary rights into expressly created servitudes.246 Paisley 
highlights the uncertainty that arises with the implication of ancillary rights in that the 
detailed extent of the additional rights is never clear.247 Lord Neuberger states in the 
decision that the second requirement of the test is based on an implied term as it is 
                                                          
 
244 Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42 para 48. 
245 Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42 para 29-30; KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV 
Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 11; RRM 
Paisley “The demon drink and the straight and narrow way: The expansion and limitation of praedial 
servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 193-
237 233.  
246 RRM Paisley “The demon drink and the straight and narrow way: The expansion and limitation of 
praedial servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 
193-237 233-234. 
247 RRM Paisley “The demon drink and the straight and narrow way: The expansion and limitation of 
praedial servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 
193-237 234. 
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understood in contract law.248 The focus is accordingly on the presumed intention of 
the parties in the light of the surrounding circumstances.249  
However, this decision requires close scrutiny. Reid and Gretton state that the 
decision is “not entirely welcome” from a Scottish perspective. The reasons for this 
statement are based, firstly, on the poor portrayal of genuine Scots law in the case.250 
They point out that the test for the implication of ancillary rights has never been certain 
in Scots law, and they emphasise the different views of the Lords in this decision. 
According to Lord Roger, rights must be “essential” in order to be implied, while Lord 
Neuberger expresses the standard as relating to rights that are “reasonably 
necessary”. Lord Hope, on the other hand, is more lenient in viewing the test to be one 
of “what is necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the 
servitude”.251 Reid and Gretton express their opinion of the two-fold test developed in 
the case as follows: 
“On the whole the change is unwelcome. On the one hand, the justification for 
the test – that parties should not be signed up to things which they could not 
have predicted or wished – does not seem particularly strong in the case of 
                                                          
 
248 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 12. 
249 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 12; RRM Paisley “The demon drink and the straight and 
narrow way: The expansion and limitation of praedial servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) 
Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 193-237 233. 
250 See KGC Reid & GL Gretton Conveyancing (2007) 108 (explaining that only two of the 5 judges, 
Lords Hope and Roger base their views largely on Scottish authority, and that their views of the law are 
influenced very differently because of it). The authors further do not agree with the arguments in the 
case relating to the issue of the acceptance of the right to park as a servitude in Scots law, and on the 
principle that a servitude must not be repugnant with ownership. See KGC Reid & GL Gretton 
Conveyancing (2007) 108-111 in this regard.  
251 KGC Reid & GL Gretton Conveyancing (2007) 111-112. 
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rights  which are merely ancillary in nature. On the other hand, the test is 
undeniably awkward in practice. The older a servitude, the more difficult it will 
be to say what rights the parties might have had in contemplation, or to admit 
rights of a kind which are made necessary only by modern technological  
developments.”252 
Reid argues elsewhere that the fact that a right is “implied” does not require that it be 
implied as a term of a contract, and that this is a crucial distinction to make.253 A better 
approach would be one based not on the contractual notion of an implied term that is 
determined by the intention of the parties at creation, but rather on sound legal 
policy.254 Accordingly he proposes a freestanding rule that holds that a servitude will 
include all the rights which are reasonably necessary at any given point in time, for the 
effective exercise of the servitude.255  
There is a fine line between acceptable ancillary rights being grafted onto a 
servitude and an outcome that has the effect of increasing the burden on the servient 
property.256 Once the extent of the servitudal rights have been established, the type of 
servitude will have an impact in determining whether there has been an unwarranted 
increase in the burden.257 Depending on the servitude at hand, different factors can 
lead to an increase in the burden on the servient land, and the effects of the change 
                                                          
 
252 KGC Reid & GL Gretton Conveyancing (2007) 113.  
253 KGC Reid “Accessory rights in servitudes” (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 455-459 456.  
254 KGC Reid “Accessory rights in servitudes” (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 455-459 457. 
255 KGC Reid & GL Gretton Conveyancing (2007) 113; KGC Reid “Accessory rights in servitudes” (2008) 
12 Edinburgh Law Review 455-459 456; KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) 
Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 14.  
256 DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 12.187 517. 
257 DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 12.192 522.  
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in exercise will not always be equally distinctive.258 The dominant proprietor is entitled 
to exploit the burden and increase it only insofar as it is necessary to make the 
servitude effectual to the extent originally granted.259 Furthermore, although purely 
personal considerations must be excluded from determining the scope of the burden, 
a qualitative approach is followed, taking account of a wide range of factors that could 
result from a changed use of the rights.260 
Although any change of existing (allowed) use of a servitude is prima facie 
objectionable,261 it is possible to amend servitudes in Scots law. Variation of servitudes 
is generally sought by servient proprietors on the grounds that they want to change 
the layout or use of their land in a manner that might be hindered by the location or 
manner of exercise of the existing servitude. 
Historically, variation of a servitude was only possible by way of the common 
law.262 However, the Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 created 
the possibility for the servient proprietor to apply to the Lands Tribunal for a variation 
                                                          
 
258 It is much easier to establish an increase in the use of a right that involves the discharge or 
abstraction of a substance than it is to measure an increase in the use of a right that involves the 
exercise of certain entitlements such as access.  
259 Thus, if he is not using the rights to the maximum potential envisaged by the initial grant, he will be 
allowed to increase his use of the servitude as long as it remains within the boundaries of the initial 
grant. DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 12.186 516 with reference 
to GJ Bell Principles of the law of Scotland 10 ed by W Guthrie (ed) (1899).  
260 DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 12.192 522.  
261 WM Gordon Scottish land law 2ed (1999) para 24.65 753; DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and 
rights of way (1998) para 8.26 303. 
262 B Bolton, E Piggot & S Higgins “The life of a servitude: Creation, use, enforcement and termination” 
(October 2013) Enhance with Tods <https://enhancecpd.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/the-life-of-a-
servitude-creation-use-enforcement-and-termination/> (accessed 19-11-2014). 
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of a servitude. The Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 further enabled the Lands 
Tribunal to vary or discharge servitudes where it deems it reasonable.  
Under the common law the location of exercise of a servitude could be varied 
by way of agreement; 263 by unilateral alteration of the route of a servitude by the 
servient proprietor in certain instances;264 or by court order.265 However, in both the 
latter cases, variation was only possible where the details (the exact location for the 
exercise of the rights) were not set out clearly in the servitude deed. This view was 
based on the sanctity of contractual rights, and is aimed at avoiding a situation of 
derogation from grant.266 
Gordon questions this approach of strict enforcement by referring to the 
situation where a servitude was granted 100 years before between the original parties 
who no longer have any interest in the matter.267 He suggests that, instead of 
assuming that the interests of the original parties still exist, a unilateral relocation of a 
servitude should be permitted by the servient proprietor, but should be subject to the 
                                                          
 
263 WM Gordon Scottish land law (1989) para 24.65 779. 
264 This was only possible in limited instances and there is little clarity regarding the exact position on 
this matter in Scots law. The conclusion by most writers is that where the route (or other location) for 
the exercise of the servitude was not specified in the deed, the servient proprietor could alter these 
elements of the servitude that were not expressly fixed in the deed. See DJ Cusine & RRM Paisley 
Servitudes and rights of way (1998) para 12.61 421; WM Gordon Scottish land law (1989) para 24.65-
24.67 778-780. 
265 See WM Gordon Scottish land law (1989) para 24.65 778.  
266 WM Gordon Scottish land law 2 ed (1999) para 24.65 753-754.  
267 WM Gordon Scottish land law 2 ed (1999) para 24.66 754. 
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proviso that an objecting dominant proprietor may show an interest in objecting.268 
This issue was addressed by statutory intervention.269 
Since the commencement in 2004 of the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003, the 
Lands Tribunal has the power to vary or discharge servitudes on application of the 
servient proprietor in terms of section 90(1)(a)(i) of the Act. Where a servient proprietor 
applies for the variation or discharge of a servitude, the Tribunal will grant the 
application only if it is satisfied that it is reasonable with regard to the factors set out in 
section 100 of the Act.270 These factors include the following: (i) any change in 
circumstances since the creation of the servitude (including any change in the 
character of either one of the properties or the neighbourhood where they are 
situated); (ii) the extent to which the servitude confers benefit on the dominant 
property; (iii) the extent to which the servitude impedes enjoyment of the servient 
property; (iv) if the servitude is an obligation to do something, how practicable or costly 
it is to comply with the condition; (v) the length of time which has elapsed since creation 
of the servitude; (vi) the purpose of the servitude; (vii) whether in relation to the 
burdened property there is the consent, or deemed consent, of a planning authority, 
or the consent of some other regulatory authority for a use which the servitude 
prevents; (viii) whether the owner of the servient property is willing to pay 
                                                          
 
268  For example, by arguing that the new passage will be substantially more inconvenient or that there 
is no offer to constitute his right properly. See WM Gordon Scottish land law 2 ed (1999) para 24.66 
754.  
269 The Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970, and later replaced by the Title 
Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003.  
270 S 98 of the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003.  
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compensation; (ix) any other factor which the Lands Tribunal considers to be 
material.271 
The factors are not all equally important. In practice, the Tribunal often has regard 
to factors (ii) and (iii) above and balance the interests of the servient and dominant 
properties to resolve the matter at hand.272 The other factors are considered insofar 
as they inform the balancing.273 As becomes apparent from a consideration of the 
elements listed above, the decision of the court is based on the facts of each case274 
and accordingly previous cases are not very helpful in solving a particular issue. The 
approach of the Tribunal is said to have changed since the implementation of the 2003 
Act in that the role of the factor referring to the purpose of the provision no longer plays 
a key role in the considerations of the Tribunal.275 Previously, under the 1970 Act, the 
Lands Tribunal only considered the benefit conferred on the dominant property that 
resulted from the original purpose of the servitude. Now, under the 2003 Act, all benefit 
                                                          
 
271 S 100 of the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003. 
272 B Bolton, E Piggot & S Higgins “The life of a servitude: Creation, use, enforcement and termination” 
(October 2013) Enhance with Tods <https://enhancecpd.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/the-life-of-a-
servitude-creation-use-enforcement-and-termination/> (accessed 19-11-2014). 
273 B Bolton, E Piggot & S Higgins “The life of a servitude: Creation, use, enforcement and termination” 
(October 2013) Enhance with Tods <https://enhancecpd.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/the-life-of-a-
servitude-creation-use-enforcement-and-termination/> (accessed 19-11-2014). 
274 An important part of each case is the cite-visit done by the members of the Tribunal to get a clear 
picture of the facts at hand: B Bolton, E Piggot & S Higgins “The life of a servitude: Creation, use, 
enforcement and termination” (October 2013) Enhance with Tods 
<https://enhancecpd.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/the-life-of-a-servitude-creation-use-enforcement-
and-termination/> (accessed 19-11-2014). 
275 B Bolton, E Piggot & S Higgins “The life of a servitude: Creation, use, enforcement and termination” 
(October 2013) Enhance with Tods <https://enhancecpd.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/the-life-of-a-
servitude-creation-use-enforcement-and-termination/> (accessed 19-11-2014). 
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derived from the servitude will be relevant, irrespective of whether it was foreseen as 
a result of the original purpose.276 
In another attempt to counter the negative effects of changed circumstances, 
the Scottish system has introduced a presumptive sunset provision applicable to real 
burdens.277 All real burdens that reach the age of 100 years are presumptively 
discharged on the basis of their long existence. However, to protect right holders, the 
termination does not take place automatically. Before a notice of discharge can be 
registered, the burdened property owner must give notice to the benefitted owner, who 
is provided the opportunity to apply to the Lands Tribunal with reasons justifying the 
continued existence of the servitude. If the grounds required by the Tribunal278 can be 
proven, the servitude will not be extinguished. The introduction of similar temporal 
limits have also been proposed in American law with relation to servitudes.279 
The doctrinal establishment of ancillary rights to servitudes, and the willingness 
of Scottish courts to amend or terminate servitudes on application by the servient 
proprietor suggests that there has been acknowledgement of the impact of changed 
circumstances and the need for flexibility in servitude law. However, as far as ancillary 
                                                          
 
276 B Bolton, E Piggot & S Higgins “The life of a servitude: Creation, use, enforcement and termination” 
(October 2013) Enhance with Tods <https://enhancecpd.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/the-life-of-a-
servitude-creation-use-enforcement-and-termination/> (accessed 19-11-2014). 
277 The Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 sections 20-21; JA Lovett “Creating and controlling private 
land use restrictions in Scotland and Louisiana: A comparative mixed jurisdiction analysis” (2008) 19 
Stellenbosch Law Review 231-257 252.  
278 These grounds are set out in section 100 of the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003. 
279 CM Rose “Servitudes, Security and Assent: Some Comments on Professors French and Reichman” 
(1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 1403-1417 1413-1414; BWF Depoorter & F Parisi 
“Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of servitudes” (2003) 3 Global 
Jurist Frontiers 1-41 36. 
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rights are concerned, the current approach, as laid down in the Moncrieff case, is not 
generally supported.  
Reid mentions a number of reasons why the analysis in Moncrieff, based on 
contract law principles, is problematic when applied to real rights.280 Because 
servitudes are binding on third parties who were not necessarily involved in the 
creation of the rights, problems often occur in determining what the intended content 
of the servitude was at the time of creation. These problems are often amplified by a 
long passage of time. 281 Reid points out an important difference between the principles 
of servitude law and that of contract. The principle of non-derogation from grant does 
not form part of contract law and thus from a contract law perspective, there is no 
problem with implying certain rights in favour of the grantor of a servitude (where a 
servitude and its ancillary rights are created by reservation). However, in servitude law 
the principle of non-derogation from grant is aimed at ensuring that a grantor of a 
servitude cannot derogate from his grant by adding certain ancillary rights thereto and 
thus this counteracts the notion of implication.282 Furthermore, the parties who create 
the servitude can only intend that which they can foresee and this will most likely not 
incorporate future changes in society and technology.283 Finally, a theory built on the 
intention of the parties can only apply to servitudes created by juridical act and leaves 
                                                          
 
280 See KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: 
Private law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 14.  
281 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 14. 
282 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 14. 
283 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 14. 
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open the issue of prescriptive servitudes altogether, since they preclude an evaluation 
of the intention of the parties.284  
 
3 5  The state law of Louisiana 
3 5 1  Nature and establishment of servitudes  
Louisiana, like Scotland and South Africa, is a mixed jurisdiction, and its private law 
accordingly displays both common law and civil law characteristics. The law of 
servitudes forms part of the civil law and is based completely on the Louisiana Civil 
Code, which was influenced by the French Code Civil. The first Civil Code of Louisiana 
was promulgated in 1808,285 but was soon replaced by the Civil Code of 1825, which 
was revised again in 1870. This Code is still in force today, but has undergone 
particular reforms, including an amendment in 1977, of the part relating to 
servitudes.286  
A praedial servitude is defined in article 646 of the Code as being “a charge on 
a servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate”. The same basic requirements 
and characteristics that were discussed in relation to the jurisdictions above apply to 
praedial servitudes in Louisiana. These include that a servitude must involve two 
                                                          
 
284 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 15. 
285 The “Digest of the civil laws now in force in the Territory of Orleans”. 
286 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 3-4. 
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tenements;287 must provide benefit for a dominant tenement;288 must be interpreted in 
a manner least burdensome to the servient tenement;289 “runs with the land”; and may 
not impose positive duties290 or be contrary to public policy.291 No prescribed form is 
necessary to establish a servitude. It is simply required that the parties express their 
intention to create a servitude clearly in the originating document.292 
Conventional servitudes are generally created by juridical act,293 acquisitive 
prescription or destination of the owner.294 However, a further classification is made 
between apparent and non-apparent servitudes.295 Apparent servitudes are those that 
                                                          
 
287 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 4; AN Yiannopoulos Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana 
Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 107 315.  
288 Article 647 of the Louisiana Civil Code. This article provides further that the benefit need not exist at 
the time the servitude is created and that a possible convenience or a future advantage suffices to 
support a servitude. 
289 Louisiana Civil Code Article 730. 
290 Louisiana Civil Code Article 651, 706. AN Yiannopoulos Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana 
Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 106 313-314 mentions that positive obligations may be imposed if they 
are merely incidental obligations that may be necessary for the exercise and preservation of a servitude.   
291 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 4. 
292 Noel Estate v Kansas City Southern & Gulf Ry Co 187 La 717, 175 So 468 (La 1937). 
293 Article 740 reads as follows: “Apparent servitudes may be acquired by title, by destination of the 
owner, or by acquisitive prescription.” Yiannopoulos states that the reference to “title” does not 
necessarily refer to a written agreement and that an oral grant might be sufficient to establish a servitude 
“provided that the servitude has in fact been used and that the grantor recognizes the grant when 
interrogated under oath”. However, to have third party effect, a servitude has to be registered. AN 
Yiannopoulos Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 112 328-330 
(fn 3) and § 125 358.  
294 Louisiana Civil Code article 739-740. Conventional servitudes can also be created by expropriation 
for public use, even though this is not mentioned or regulated in the Civil Code. See AN Yiannopoulos 
Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 147 411-416.  
295 Louisiana Civil Code article 707. 
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can be perceived by exterior signs such as a roadway or a window, while non-apparent 
servitudes have no exterior qualities to testify of their existence and are normally 
framed as prohibitions, such as a prohibition against building, or against building 
above a particular height. Because of their nature, non-apparent servitudes cannot be 
acquired by way of prescription.296 
The same rules governing acquisitive prescription of immovables also apply to 
apparent servitudes in Louisiana. Thus, a servitude can be acquired by uninterrupted 
possession for ten years if it is possessed in good faith and by just title; if the 
possession is without title or in bad faith, it must be uninterrupted for thirty years before 
acquisition will take effect.297 
As far as implied servitudes are concerned, servitudes can only be created in 
Louisiana law through the doctrine of destination, and no servitude will be implied if 
the prior relationship required for creation by destination of the owner cannot be 
shown.298 According to the doctrine, where a property is subdivided and one part of 
that property had previously made use of another part, this use will be allowed to 
continue after subdivision in the form of a servitude established over the one part in 
favour of the other.299 The servitude is created upon severance, not because the 
                                                          
 
296 AN Yiannopoulos Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 
134 388.  
297 Louisiana Civil Code article 742.  
298 Louisiana Civil Code article 741;KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) 
Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 123; AN Yiannopoulos 
Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 141 404. Creation of servitudes 
by way of destination is also found in Belgian Law: BW art. 692-694. See also section 3 2 1 above for 
a discussion of the doctrine of destination as it applied in Dutch law under the previous BW.   
299 Louisiana Civil Code article 741 reads as follows:  
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owner of the properties intends for it to be created, but simply because he does not 
express a different intention. The servitude is accordingly not a result of an “implied 
term of the deed of transfer” as it would be in Scots (and English) law.300 This doctrine 
takes into account the balance of interests between, on the one hand, the potential 
dominant property in the acquisition of a servitude and, on the other, the protection of 
the present and future owners of the potential servient land. 301  
 
3 5 2  Content and interpretation of servitudes  
According to article 697 of the Code, the extent and manner of use of conventional 
servitudes are regulated by the title by which they are created.302 This is interpreted to 
mean that the intention of the parties, as expressed in the title, will determine the 
                                                          
 
“Destination of the owner is a relationship established between two estates owned by the same 
owner that would be a predial servitude if the estates belonged to different owners. 
When the two estates cease to belong to the same owner, unless there is express provision to 
the contrary, an apparent servitude comes into existence of right and a nonapparent servitude 
comes into existence if the owner has previously filed for registry in the conveyance records of 
the parish in which the immovable is located a formal declaration establishing the destination.” 
300 This was also the case in Dutch law under the old BW.  
301 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 23. 
302 Louisiana Civil Code article 697; AN Yiannopoulos Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law 
Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 149 418-420. Art 686 of the Belgian Burgerlijk Wetboek contains the same 
provision. The similarities between Belgian law and the law of Louisiana are mainly due to the reception 
of the French Code Civil in both these jurisdictions. Servitudes created by prescription are given content 
based on the application of the maxim tantum prescriptum quantum possessum (so much is acquired 
as has been possessed); and the extent and manner of use of servitudes created by destination will 
depend on the intention of the party who established the servitude, in light of the facts that he created 
or maintained at subdivision of the relevant properties. See AN Yiannopoulos Predial servitudes: 
Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 149 419-420.  
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contents and manner of exercise of a servitude.303 To the extent that the title does not 
provide specifically for the extent and manner of exercise, the intention of the parties 
is determined in light of the purpose of the servitude.304 In case of doubt regarding the 
existence, extent or manner of exercise of a praedial servitude, the most favourable 
(least burdensome) outcome for the servient proprietor is sought.305 Ambiguities in the 
title are resolved with reference to provisions of the Code, the situation surrounding 
the servitude and the manner in which the servitude was exercised previously.306 
However, the originating document is not the only factor taken into consideration 
because the dominant proprietor may have acquired additional rights by prescription 
or the servitude may have been modified by verbal agreement.307  
The emphasis on the intention of the parties creates the impression that courts 
determine the content and scope of a servitude with reference to what exactly the 
parties had in mind at the time of creation. However, this requires further 
consideration. In the case of Palace Properties, LLC v Sizeler Hammond Square Ltd 
Partnership308 the court considered the servitude in light of the current circumstances, 
and came to the conclusion that although the initial parties had not envisaged the 
                                                          
 
303 AN Yiannopoulos Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 
149 418. 
304 AN Yiannopoulos Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 
149 418. 
305 Louisiana Civil Code article 730; Tournillon v Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans 692 So 
2d 1091 (La 1997); Tilley v Lowery 511 So 2d 1245 (La 1987) 1247; AN Yiannopoulos Predial 
servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 128 372. 
306 AN Yiannopoulos Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 
149 418-419.  
307 AN Yiannopoulos Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 149 419. 
308 Palace Properties, LLC v Sizeler Hammond Square Ltd Partnership, 839 So 2d 82 (La 2002). 
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ancillary right309 the servitude would be “virtually unusable” without it, and that that 
could not have been the intention of the parties who created it. The court held that:  
“Although these rights and limitations seem irreconcilable at first glance, under 
the facts of this case, we conclude that one of the ‘works necessary for the 
use’ of the servitude of passage is the installation of drainage.”310 
This suggests that in considering the intention of the parties to determine the extent of 
the servitude courts will focus on the purpose the parties had wished the servitude to 
fulfil, and not on the exact manner of use they had foreseen at the time.311 This seems 
a fairly more flexible approach.  
The Code provides specifically for ancillary rights312 to servitudes.313 Two 
separate provisions in the Code provide dominant proprietors with access to all the 
rights (and works) necessary to use and maintain their servitudes:  
“Article 743: Rights that are necessary for the use of a servitude are acquired at 
the time the servitude is established. They are to be exercised in a way least 
inconvenient for the servient estate.” 
“Article 744: The owner of the dominant estate has the right to make at his expense 
all the works that are necessary for the use and preservation of the servitude.” 
                                                          
 
309 The dominant property in this case wanted to pave a part of the road subject to a servitude of right 
of way, and the court found that this would require certain levelling and fill work, which would require 
drainage. The installation of the drainage system was thus one of the works necessary for the full 
enjoyment of the servitude.  
310 Palace Properties, LLC v Sizeler Hammond Square Ltd Partnership, 839 So 2d 82 (La 2002) 102-
103.  
311 This contention is based on the manner in which the court considered the purpose of the servitude 
in the current circumstances (thus, after circumstances have changed), even though the intention of 
the parties was clearly expressed in the title.  
312 In Louisiana law the term “accessory” is used.  
313 AN Yiannopoulos Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 150 420-
422.  
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Reid remarks that the making of works would most likely be the very accessory right 
that a servitude holder would want to exercise, and that article 744 does not leave 
much content to the general rule in article 743.314 In Barnes v Dixie Elec Membership 
Corp315 the court held that there must be a balancing between that which is necessary 
in order for a servitude holder to use his servitude and that which a servient landowner 
must suffer as a result of a servitude. 
Reid points out that the article that provided for ancillary rights under the Code 
before the 1977 amendments had been titled “What grant to implies”, and the wording 
was that everything necessary “is supposed to be granted at the same time with the 
servitude”.316 He draws an insightful conclusion from the amendment that ensued in 
that the deliberate departure from the idea of an implied grant was to establish a 
freestanding rule for the acceptance of ancillary rights that is independent from the 
terms (or intention) of the original grant.317 He contends that the wording of article 771 
in the previous version of the Code invited consideration of the intention of the parties 
– presumably on the basis that what is “supposed to be granted” is inferred from the 
manner in which the parties expressed their intention, but that the amendment 
introduced the notion of ancillary rights created by operation of law.318 He explains in 
                                                          
 
314 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 13.  
315 Barnes v Dixie Elec Membership Corp 323 So 2d 247 (La 1975) 249. 
316 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: 
Private law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 13. 
317 KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: 
Private law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 13. 
318 KGC Reid “Accessory rights in servitudes” (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 455-459 456; KGC 
Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private law in 
Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 13. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
139 
 
more than one of his articles319 that an ancillary right can be characterised either as 
an implied term or as a freestanding rule of law. The ancillary right in the former 
instance is part of the juridical act that brings about the servitude and this is, at least 
in theory, a creation of the parties. In the second instance, the ancillary right is a 
consequence of the creation of the servitude and thus arises by operation of law, and 
it is applicable to all servitudes. As was mentioned earlier with reference to the 
Moncrieff case in Scots law, Reid argues, that a freestanding rule is better suited to 
the context of ancillary rights. He is of the opinion that the change in the provisions of 
the Louisiana Code had the effect of changing the approach in Louisiana law to one 
based on a freestanding rule.320 However, as appears from the next section below, 
this interpretation of the effects of the revision of the Code is not straightforward or 
self-evident.  
 
3 5 3  Effective exercise and variation of servitudes 
Article 778 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provided that a dominant proprietor 
must use a servitude according to the terms of the deed (or “title”) and that he may not 
change his use of the servitude in a way that creates an increased burden on the 
servient property. No similar provision was included after the 1977 amendments, but 
                                                          
 
KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private 
law in Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 16. 
319 KGC Reid “Accessory rights in servitudes” (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 455-459 456; KGC 
Reid “Praedial servitudes” in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private law in 
Louisiana and Scotland (2009) 1-29 13. 
320 See the discussion in section 3 4 4 above. This issue is also discussed in sections 5 3 and 5 4 
below.  
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Yiannopoulos stresses that this does not indicate a change in the law, as the 
prohibition on increasing the burden on the servient property is self-evident.321  
The strong reference to the intention of the parties to determine the content and 
scope of a servitude creates the impression that the focus is to a great extent on the 
originating document rather than on the current circumstances relevant to the 
servitude. This is indicative of strong ex ante limits and weak ex post controls over 
servitudes.322 Even though it is possible for a servitude to be modified by verbal 
agreement,323 the enforceability of the modified use against third parties is not certain. 
If one considers the wording of article 743, relating to ancillary rights, it is confined to 
rights acquired at the time the servitude is established, and thus seems to only 
encompass that which the parties have thought about at that time. The principle that 
the contents of a servitude is determined by the intention of the parties is also 
repeatedly stated in case law.324 However, the case of Palace Properties, LLC v 
Sizeler Hammond Square Ltd Partnership325 suggests that courts are willing to 
approach the question of what is necessary for the use of the servitude flexibly in some 
instances. This shows that the seemingly rigid ex ante approach described by the 
                                                          
 
321 AN Yiannopoulos Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 
152 426.  
322 JA Lovett “Creating and controlling private land use restrictions in Scotland and Louisiana: A 
comparative mixed jurisdiction analysis” (2008) 19 Stellenbosch Law Review 231-257 252. 
323 AN Yiannopoulos Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 149 419.   
324 Burgess-Blanchard v SCIACCA 818 So 2d 786 (La 2002), 819 So 2d 352 (La 2002) 358; Harris v 
Darinn Corp 431 So 2d 441 (La 1983) 443; McGuire v Central Louisiana Electric Company Inc 337 So 
2d 1070 (La 1976) 1072.  
325 Palace Properties, LLC v Sizeler Hammond Square Ltd Partnership, 839 So 2d 82 (La 2002). 
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provisions of the Code is not enforced too strictly and that servitudes can adapt to 
changed circumstances when necessary.326 
If a dominant proprietor uses his servitude in a manner that is more extensive 
than what was provided for in the originating document, he will not acquire additional 
rights, unless he exercises these additional rights for the period required for 
prescription.327 However, it is important to note that additional rights cannot be “but an 
extension of the scope or manner of use of an apparent servitude”; they must be rights 
that can independently form the object of an apparent praedial servitude.328  
Accordingly, it seems as though the general approach followed in Louisiana law 
is relatively rigid and does not easily allow an interpretation of existing rights with 
reference to the current context of the servitude. The strongest indication of the 
unwillingness of the law to accommodate changed circumstances is evident in article 
752 of the Code, which provides, in the case of changed circumstances, for the “re-
instatement” of a servitude that might have become redundant, if the initial conditions 
are re-established.329 However, with regard to ancillary rights, the Palace Properties 
case suggests that courts are sometimes willing to follow a flexible interpretation of 
what is necessary for the use of a servitude. Although an actual change in the existing 
use of a servitude as a result of changes in surrounding conditions will not easily be 
accepted, the Palace Properties decision suggests that a flexible approach might be 
                                                          
 
326 See sections 3 2 3, 3 3 4 and 3 4 4 above for various references to the effects of changed 
circumstances on the original contents of a servitude.  
327 Louisiana Civil Code article 760; AN Yiannopoulos Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law 
Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 136 395.   
328 AN Yiannopoulos Predial servitudes: Volume 4, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 3 ed (2004) § 136 396.  
329 Louisiana Civil Code article 752.  
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possible in suitable cases to allow the addition of ancillary rights. As appeared from 
the previous section above, Reid suggests that a flexible, ex post approach would 
assume the form of a freestanding rule rather than an extensive interpretation of the 
servitude creating agreement. It remains unclear whether, and if so to what extent, the 
courts will follow the approach suggested in Palace Properties and confirm Reid’s 
analysis.  
 
3 6  Considerations in comparative view  
3 6 1  Implied terms, ancillary rights and implied servitudes 
In Chapter 2 it was shown that there is much confusion in South African law regarding 
different kinds of rights and the terminology used to describe these rights which are 
not in essence part of a servitude because they have not been clearly expressed or 
because they simply play a supporting role. South African courts use the terms 
“ancillary rights”, “accessory rights” and “implied rights” or “implied terms” to refer to 
the same concept.  
 The comparative analysis in this chapter suggests that courts in foreign 
jurisdictions are more aware of the distinctions drawn between the different concepts 
based on the terminology used. Ancillary rights330 are accepted to be rights that attach 
to the main servitudal rights by way of their accessory nature to render the servitude 
effective. Ancillary rights are sometimes accepted by courts based on the reading in 
of an implied term in the servitude deed or originating agreement – thus, based on 
                                                          
 
330 In Louisiana law the word “accessory” is used in the Code, although case law also refers to ancillary 
rights.   
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principles of contract law. However, ancillary rights can also be created ex lege, not 
as a result of the agreement between the parties, but by operation of law, on the basis 
that they are necessary for the exercise of the main servitudal rights.  
Implied servitudes (or easements) on the other hand, are something completely 
different. These are independent servitudes, which are normally created at subdivision 
of a property based on the necessity of the servitudal rights to fully use and enjoy the 
separate parts of the subdivided land.  
 
3 6 2  General principles for the regulation of servitudes or easements 
From the comparative analysis in this chapter, several similarities and differences 
become apparent in the way servitudes are approached in different jurisdictions. 
Firstly, it is noteworthy how similar the basic principles that regulate the law of 
servitudes (or easements) are across the four jurisdictions. Because servitudes 
burden land, their establishment is strictly regulated by the same rules or principles 
aimed at the stability of property rights. It is evident that, although not all the 
jurisdictions discussed in this chapter have a strict numerus clausus of servitudes, the 
principle is enforced to different extents in all of them so that only certain types of rights 
may be established as servitudes. Furthermore, other ex ante controls that limit the 
creation of servitudes, such as the general requirements for their valid establishment, 
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are also present in all four jurisdictions.331 This ex ante approach reinforces the values 
of security and stability in property law.  
 In Chapter two, it was suggested that the principles that regulate the 
relationship between the parties to a servitude are aimed at incorporating some ex 
post controls into the regulatory framework applicable to servitudes. These same 
principles are also present in the foreign jurisdictions considered here. The principle 
that the dominant proprietor may do all that is necessary for the reasonable enjoyment 
of his servitude is present in all four jurisdictions, and is subject to the requirement of 
reasonable or civiliter modo exercise of the rights, with due regard to the interests of 
the servient proprietor. Despite the value of these principles to add a measure of 
flexibility to the regulation of servitudes, courts in most jurisdictions332 approach 
servitudes from a predominantly ex ante perspective, focussing on the numerus 
clausus principle and traditional requirements and considering the moment of creation 
of the rights to determine their contents and decide what the effective exercise of the 
rights would entail. Dutch law seems to be more flexible in that courts pay more 
attention to the current context of servitudes in applying regulatory measures. The 
traditional requirements are still enforced, but the options for flexible ex post regulation 
are available and accessible. 
                                                          
 
331 The requirement of two properties owned by different parties; the need for one property to provide 
some benefit or utility to the other and the general prohibition of positive duties on the servient 
landowner.  
332 Dutch law is the exception, as it does not follow the tendency to view servitudes exclusively as at 
the moment of creation. 
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The ex ante approach is also followed in American law. However, the American 
Restatement333 has proposed a departure from this rigid approach toward servitudes. 
Although the American position does not form part of the comparative analysis and is 
not discussed in detail, it is necessary to pay some attention to the extensive reform 
introduced by the Restatement. The aim of the Restatement was to adopt an approach 
toward servitudes in which landowners could freely create servitudes without the 
constraints posed by validity requirements or principles such as a numerus clausus of 
property rights. In doing so, the focus was shifted to the interpretation and 
implementation of existing, and still useful servitudes, and the modification and 
termination of servitudes that have become obsolete.334 Changed conditions and the 
effect they have on servitudes are embraced and provided for in much detail.335 French 
explains that this shift is aimed at a more productive use of legal and other resources 
in that landowners seeking to develop their land are no longer forced to spend 
unnecessary resources on getting around the restrictive rules of servitude law, but can 
rather focus on achieving the optimal development and use of land.336 Depoorter and 
Parisi consider some of the reasons advocated for this shift from ex ante to ex post337 
                                                          
 
333 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes: Volume 1 (2000); The Law 
Commission LAW COM No 327: Making land work: Easements, covenants and profits à prendre (2011) 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report pdf34 para 3.35. 
334 S French “The American Restatement of servitude law: Reforming doctrine by shifting from ex ante 
to ex post controls on the risks posed by servitudes” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a 
unified system of land burdens (2006) 109-118 112. 
335 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes: Volume 1 (2000) sections 7.10, 
7.11 and 7.13.  
336 S French “The American Restatement of servitude law: Reforming doctrine by shifting from ex ante 
to ex post controls on the risks posed by servitudes” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a 
unified system of land burdens (2006) 109-118 112. 
337 See section 2 2 1 above for an explanation of the concept of ex ante and ex post regulation.  
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regulation of servitudes that has taken place across civil and Anglo common law 
jurisdictions. One of the reasons is the opinion that there has simply been a gradual 
corrosion of traditional property doctrines and an increase in judicial pragmatism in 
finding new solutions to current problems.338 Another view was that the traditional 
validity requirements for servitudes and the enumerated approach towards real rights 
was formulated for the standard needs of rural and urban societies and no longer fits 
the profile of the modern economy and changing needs of society.339 The shift to a 
more flexible corrective approach is said to accommodate new property needs and 
minimise the risk of persisting property fragmentation.340 
Signs of this shift is apparent to different degrees in English, Scots, Dutch and 
Louisiana law. However, this shift has not taken place in South African law. It is 
suggested in the section that follows that most of the significant changes toward an ex 
post approach have been introduced by way of statutory reforms and intervention. 
 
3 6 3  Contents and scope of servitude rights  
The method followed for determining the scope of a servitude is similar in all the 
jurisdictions considered. Where a servitude is created by agreement, the words of the 
deed will be decisive in determining the content and scope of the rights, unless they 
are ambiguous or in some way unclear. Where there is uncertainty as to the extent of 
                                                          
 
338 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 36. 
339 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 37. 
340 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 37. 
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the rights, other factors must be considered. However, each jurisdiction approaches 
this issue in its own way. English and Scots law make reference to surrounding 
circumstances upon creation of the servitude,341 while Dutch law sees local custom or 
the manner of use that has been established over time as sources to clarify the terms 
of the deed.342 The rule in Louisiana holds that where the deed does not regulate the 
extent and manner of use, the intention of the parties is determined in the light of the 
purpose of the servitude.343 In cases where servitudes are established in a manner 
other than by deed, these secondary sources will determine the contents and scope 
of the rights.  
 The comparative analysis shows that English and Scots law focus on the 
circumstances existing at the time of creation of the rights to provide context to the 
words used in the deed. In Dutch law, reference is made rather to the manner in which 
the rights have been exercised for a certain period of time. This, along with a 
consideration of the local custom suggests that the content of the rights is determined 
with reference to current or recent and relevant circumstances. In Louisiana, the 
consideration of the purpose of the servitude seems to create the possibility to take 
account of the current circumstances in determining the scope of the servitude, but 
the reference to the intention of the (original) parties enforces the contractual approach 
followed in English and Scots law. The approach followed in Dutch law indicates a 
more flexible view of servitudes that is an improvement on the approach following a 
rigid interpretation of the contract in the context in which it was created. This addresses 
                                                          
 
341 See sections 3 3 2 and 3 4 3. 
342 BW 5:73. See section 3 2 2 above.  
343 Louisiana Civil Code article 697. See section 3 5 2 above.  
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Reid’s concerns about the analysis of servitudal rights based on principles of contract 
law.344 If a servitude is viewed within its current context (with consideration of how it 
has been exercised for a reasonable time or how it might be viewed in terms of local 
custom), factors such as changes in technology or a change in the land or needs of 
the parties over time can be taken into account. There is thus no need to superficially 
try to determine the intention of parties who might have created the rights in an entirely 
different context or in different circumstances. The guiding principle is then one of 
property law, namely effective use of the servitude.  
 
3 6 4  Statutory interventions and reforms   
In all four jurisdictions discussed here there has been some attempt at reforming the 
traditional law of servitudes (or easements). These reforms are aimed to a large extent 
at rendering the law more flexible by introducing measures of ex post regulation into 
the law of servitudes (or easements). There is a general shift from ex ante, categorical 
control measures over the creation of servitudes, to ex post measures that focus on 
the remedial control of servitudes by providing for judicial modification or termination 
of existing servitudes under certain circumstances.345 
 The various options for the variation of servitude rights indicate a general 
tendency toward greater flexibility and a departure from the traditional ex ante 
regulation of servitudes. In Scots law, the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 
                                                          
 
344 See section 3 4 4 above.  
345 S French “The American Restatement of servitude law: Reforming doctrine by shifting from ex ante 
to ex post controls on the risks posed by servitudes” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a 
unified system of land burdens (2006) 109-118 112. 
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provides for the variation of servitudes on application by the servient property owner. 
In Dutch law options for the amendment or termination of servitudes by either of the 
parties involved are relatively easily accessible. However, the authority of courts to 
amend servitude rights on application of the dominant proprietor is much more limited 
than the options for variation or termination on application of the servient proprietor. 
The reason for the reluctance to allow amendments on demand of the dominant 
proprietor is to uphold the stability and ensure the security of the system of property 
law, despite the incorporation of some measures of flexibility. In English law, the 
proposed Law of Property Bill 2011 also includes provisions to allow for the variation 
and termination of easements.346 It seems that the Bill provides for any interested 
person to apply for the variation or termination of rights, and it is not certain whether 
in balancing the interests of the parties, a variation (or termination) requested by a 
servient proprietor will be viewed more favourably than an application by the dominant 
proprietor. The American Restatement seems to be most favourable to the needs of 
dominant proprietors. According to the “changed conditions” doctrine incorporated in 
the Restatement, where conditions relating to a servitude have changed to the extent 
that it is “impossible as a practical matter to accomplish the purpose for which the 
servitude was created”, a court may modify the servitude to enable the 
                                                          
 
346 It is mentioned in section 3 3 4 (fn 151) above that the initial proposal was only to allow the variation 
of new easements, created after the implementation of the reforms proposed by the Commission, but 
that the Commission had reconsidered and now recommends that all easements, created before or 
after reform, should be brought within the Lands Chamber’s proposed jurisdiction to discharge or modify 
easements, and that the 2011 Easements Bill be amended to achieve this change before its introduction 
into Parliament. 
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accomplishment of the purpose.347 In cases where modification is not a feasible option, 
a court may terminate the servitude. If either of the parties might suffer harm as a 
result of the decision, compensation may be awarded as a condition of modifying or 
terminating the rights. Furthermore, if the purpose of the servitude can be 
accomplished, but changed circumstances have caused the servient property to no 
longer be suitable for the use permitted by the servitude, a court may modify the 
servitude to permit other uses “under conditions designed to preserve the benefits of 
the original servitude”.348 Apart from these specific rules, the authority granted to 
courts for the enforcement of servitudes also ensures flexibility. Section 8.3 (1) reads 
as follows:  
“A servitude may be enforced by any appropriate remedy or combination of 
remedies, which may include declaratory judgments, compensatory damages, 
punitive damages, nominal damages, injunctions, restitution, and imposition of 
liens. Factors that may be considered in determining the availability and 
appropriate choice of remedy include the nature and purpose of the servitude, 
the conduct of the parties, the fairness of the servitude and the transaction that 
created it, and the costs and benefits of enforcement to the parties, to third 
parties and to the public.” 
The Restatement is one of the most progressive reformative strategies that has been 
introduced in servitude law to date and its focus is explicitly on the shift from ex ante 
                                                          
 
347 S 7.10 (1) of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes (2000). See also S French “The 
American Restatement of servitude law: Reforming doctrine by shifting from ex ante to ex post controls 
on the risks posed by servitudes” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of land 
burdens (2006) 109-118 113. 
348 S 7.10 (2) of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes (2000). Conservation servitudes held 
by government bodies or conservation organisations are exceptions to s 7.10 (1) and (2) and cannot 
be modified or terminated because of changed circumstance. S 7.11 of the Restatement contains 
specific provisions regulating these servitudes.  
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controls over servitudes towards easily accessible ex post remedies to prevent the 
negative effects of inefficient servitudes.  
This overview suggests that there are various ways by which flexibility has been 
(or is in the process of being) introduced into servitude law, and it is obvious that no 
one system has the right answer to the problem. However, the most valuable 
conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that flexibility can be introduced into 
the regulatory framework of servitudes while at the same time protecting the 
underlying value of security so inherent in property law.  
 
3 6 5  Final remarks  
The statutory interventions that have taken place in servitude systems across different 
jurisdictions are indicative of the increased need for and accommodation of flexible 
control measures applicable to servitudes (and other limited real rights). However, 
these reforms have led to substantial theoretical debate and need to be considered 
within the wider framework of property law and property theory. This will be considered 
in the following Chapter.  
Furthermore, this analysis leads to certain questions regarding the appropriate 
approach of courts to ancillary rights. Should the law adopt a narrow view of ancillary 
rights to limit the rights that can be grafted onto servitudes in order to render them 
more effective, or should a more generous perspective of ancillary rights be enforced 
to consider what is at any given time necessary for the effective exercise of the 
servitude in question? Ultimately, should courts approach servitudes in an ex ante 
manner enforcing rigid categorical controls or should they be flexible and view 
servitudes after their creation (ex post) in light of the circumstances existing at the 
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relevant point in time?  A choice for either the narrow or rigid approach, or for more 
flexibility has theoretical implications and the relevant considerations in this regard are 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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Theoretical considerations 
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4 1  Introduction 
The main argument in this chapter is premised on the understanding that there are 
two broad approaches to servitudes. On the one hand, a narrow, rigid view of 
servitudes holds that they should be regulated to ensure the security of property rights 
and the stability of property law in general. On the other hand, there is a wider 
functional approach,1 aimed not at holding servitudes to the idea of what they should 
be according to a description in a deed or agreement, but to what they actually are in 
their current context and circumstances as tools to effect the efficient use of land. 
Different theoretical approaches toward servitudes are considered in this 
chapter, along with proposals that have been made by different scholars, to simplify 
and modernise the law pertaining to servitudes. The previous chapters, considering 
the occurrence of problems in the area of implied and ancillary rights, have highlighted 
the issue of changed circumstances as a significant problem in servitude law. This 
seems to be a result of the perpetual and largely static nature of servitudes and is 
amplified in modern systems of property law because of the constantly evolving nature 
of the economy, technology and life in general. The main question that this chapter 
addresses is whether it is justified to amend servitude law as it currently functions to 
allow for more flexibility.  
 From academic literature it becomes apparent that there are two very different 
answers to this question. On the one hand there are scholars who are of the opinion 
that servitudes should not be flexible and adaptable to circumstances. They hold that 
servitudes should continue to be created and to function as they currently do. On the 
                                                          
 
1 FS Cohen “Transcendental nonsense and the functional approach” (1935) 35 Columbia Law Review 
809-849 822.  
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other hand, the more flexible approach is based on the notion that the system of 
servitude law is in desperate need of modernisation and that the old rules governing 
servitudes are not suitable to 21st century property arrangements.2 From this 
perspective the amendment of the contents of a servitude or the termination of 
servitudes that no longer have real value is acceptable to the extent that it renders the 
land related to the servitude more efficient, thus enabling the efficient utilisation of land 
and, in the bigger picture, maximising the potential of servitudes to enhance property 
arrangements.  
 Both these approaches consider the fragmentation of property rights as an 
important underlying element of their arguments. However, they approach the issue 
from different ends.3 The security-focussed school approach fragmentation rigidly and 
are preventatively inclined.4 From this point of view, fragmentation can be easily 
limited by only allowing the creation of and protecting a specified number of servitudal 
rights. The more flexible view embraces the idea of ex post remedial solutions to 
fragmentation. From this perspective it is less important whether the rights created 
conform to a group of known servitudes. The focus is rather on creating mechanisms 
for the effective rebundling of rights that have been fragmented. This would include 
modification and termination mechanisms that could rid the system of ineffective or 
obsolete rights. The reasons for the shift from ex ante to ex post regulation of 
servitudes are much debated and are discussed in more detail below. However, the 
                                                          
 
2 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 37.  
3 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 35. 
4 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 36.  
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leading proposition is that ex ante regulation is viewed as old-fashioned and unsuitable 
to modern day property arrangements.5 
 
4 2  Focus on security in servitude law 
Servitudes are aimed at increased utility and productivity of land in order to enhance 
development and continued investment. However, to achieve this, potential investors 
must be able to rely on the stability of the rights in which they invest. The need for 
stability is one of the main reasons for the objections, not only against servitudes in 
general, but consequently also against the modification, termination or similar forms 
of flexibility of the contents of servitudes.  
There are different views on how to maintain stability. Some scholars argue that 
it could be achieved through stricter ex ante regulation of servitudes so as to minimise 
the dangers of idiosyncratic burdens on land.6 In this view, the traditional common law 
limitations on the establishment of servitudes ensure personal liberty7 and economic 
efficiency by only allowing objectively useful rights to be established as servitudes that 
run with the land.8  
                                                          
 
5 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 36-37; S French “The American Restatement of 
servitude law: Reforming doctrine by shifting from ex ante to ex post controls on the risks posed by 
servitudes” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of land burdens (2006) 109-
118 112.  
6 U Reichman “Toward a unified concept of servitudes” (1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 1177-
1260 125.  
7 AJ van der Walt “The continued relevance of servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 7.  
8 J Gordley “Private modification of the right to use property: Servitudes” in Foundations of private law: 
property, tort, contract, unjust enrichment (2006) 81-102 102. 
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Others see these regulatory measures as an infringement of the private 
autonomy of the parties to a servitude and argue from a contractarian perspective that 
stability results from absolute private autonomy.9 This view holds not only that parties 
should be allowed to contract for any agreement they wish, but that the consensus 
they reach to establish a servitude should create a binding and enforceable 
agreement. The stability of the rights are further ensured by the fact that they form part 
of a written agreement10 and are, at least in most instances, required to be registered 
against the relevant title deeds. The exact contents and scope of the agreed upon 
rights are thus set out clearly in the registered deed and the certainty so created 
ensures secure title.  
This approach holds that arguments for liberty or efficiency cannot justify the 
restriction of contractual freedom.11 As long as there is no infringement of the rights of 
third parties, parties who wish to create a servitude are free to impose any perpetual 
rights they wish to bind themselves and their successors in title. The original parties 
are thus bound to the agreement because they bargained for and contracted into the 
current conditions of the servitude. All subsequent purchasers are believed to have 
accepted the terms of this contract in that they had notice of the existence of the 
                                                          
 
9 RA Epstein “Notice and freedom of contract in the law of servitudes” (1982) 55 Southern California 
Law Review 1353-1368 1358; BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional 
interpretation of the law of servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 6; S Sterk “Freedom from 
freedom of contract: The enduring value of servitude restrictions” (1985) 70 Iowa Law Review 615-661 
616.  
10 Most jurisdictions require transactions pertaining to land to be in writing in order to be valid.  
11 S Sterk “Freedom from freedom of contract: The enduring value of servitude restrictions” (1985) 70 
Iowa Law Review 615-661 616; RA Epstein “Notice and freedom of contract in the law of servitudes” 
(1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 1353-1368 1358-1360.  
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servitudal rights at the time they acquired their entitlements.12 The binding force of a 
servitude is thus a result of an entirely consensual relationship. In this view, the only 
need for public regulation is to provide notice by way of registration of the rights 
created between the parties.13 Courts should only be involved in interpreting the terms 
of grants and supplementing these terms to a limited degree where they are uncertain, 
but should not intervene in the relationship created by the consensual agreement.14 
Ultimately, the different approaches toward ensuring the security of property 
rights have different views on the role and necessity of government intervention. While 
the traditional view of common law regulation of servitudes depends on public 
regulation and the enforcement of property rules to ensure the stability and security of 
rights, the contractarian view, at least in its extreme form, argues for complete private 
autonomy.  
However, both these approaches are inherently flawed. Firstly, the fact that 
preferences and circumstances change over time renders the stability or static nature 
of servitudes superficial in a sense.15 The goal of ensuring the objective and long-term 
utility-enhancing effect of servitudes is undermined if they cannot be regulated ex post 
                                                          
 
12 RA Epstein “Notice and freedom of contract in the law of servitudes” (1982) 55 Southern California 
Law Review 1353-1368 1358; See GS Alexander “Freedom, coercion, and the law of servitudes” (1988) 
73 Cornell Law Review 883-905 892-895 for criticism of Epstein’s view that notice is sufficient to derive 
consent. See further RA Epstein “A clear view of the cathedral: The dominance of property rules” (1997) 
106 Yale Law Journal 2091-2120.  
13 RA Epstein “Notice and freedom of contract in the law of servitudes” (1982) 55 Southern California 
Law Review 1353-1368 1354.  
14 RA Epstein “Notice and freedom of contract in the law of servitudes” (1982) 55 Southern California 
Law Review 1353-1368 1357.  
15 S Sterk “Freedom from freedom of contract: The enduring value of servitude restrictions” (1985) 70 
Iowa Law Review 615-661 632. 
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when the preferences of the property owners or the circumstances applicable to the 
rights change. Although the parties, at creation, may be able to take account of the full 
extent of the burden they create (including the difficulty of modification or termination 
thereof), and attempt to provide for future changes, they do not have perfect 
foresight.16 Just as parties cannot foresee the effects of changed circumstances on a 
current agreement, doctrine cannot account for all possible future events either.17 
Where circumstances change to an extent that parties have not provided for or 
foreseen, the argument for ex post government intervention is strengthened. 
Furthermore, Sterk raises the question of intergenerational fairness of an 
approach which allows current property owners to create rights “as they wish” as long 
as they do not infringe on the rights of third parties.18 The most obvious question that 
arises in this regard is who can be seen as these third parties and what rights are 
protected. The permissibility of imposing burdens on future generations should be 
based at least to some extent on the assumption that these burdens are freely 
removable. However, that is not generally the case with servitudes, and the very 
argument of stability of servitude rights based on binding perpetual agreements goes 
against the removal or modification of burdens.  
                                                          
 
16 S Sterk “Freedom from freedom of contract: The enduring value of servitude restrictions” (1985) 70 
Iowa Law Review 615-661 632; S Sterk “Foresight and the law of servitudes” (1988) 73 Cornell Law 
Review 956-970 961-963. 
17 See S Sterk “Foresight and the law of servitudes” (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 956-970 961-963 
for an explanation of this point with reference to the implementation and inevitable change effected after 
implementation of the US Constitution.  
18 S Sterk “Freedom from freedom of contract: The enduring value of servitude restrictions” (1985) 70 
Iowa Law Review 615-661 616. 
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Another flaw in the contractarian argument is that the parties to a servitude are 
bound to its terms based on their consent and that servitude law ultimately enhances 
private autonomy because it maximises individual preferences of land owners in how 
to use their land. However, Alexander argues that a choice between freedom of 
contract and public intervention is not equivalent to a choice between freedom and 
coercion, but that coercion is as prevalent in the private regulation of servitude 
agreements as it is in instances of public ordering.19 Ultimately, no contractual 
agreement is concluded without some element of coercion, as the bargaining power 
between contracting parties will only be equal in exceptional circumstances.  
Accordingly, the argument that the intention of the original parties to the servitude, 
along with the notice provided to future parties by way of registration, is sufficient to 
prove wilful consent to the terms and creation of a servitude cannot be upheld.  
 
4 3  Focus on flexibility  
4 3 1  The need for flexibility in servitude law 
The second general approach toward servitudes is aimed at a regulatory framework 
which focusses not so much on the potential negative effects of the burdens placed 
on land, but rather on maximising the positive function of servitudes as tools for 
increased utility and development of land as a resource. Under this approach, as under 
the security-focussed approach, there are varying views regarding the role of the 
traditional ex ante controls over servitudes, but the focus here is on creating flexibility 
                                                          
 
19 See GS Alexander “Freedom, coercion, and the law of servitudes” (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 
883-905 900-901; S Sterk “Foresight and the law of servitudes” (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 956-
970 965. 
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by acknowledging the need for servitudes to adapt to changed preferences or 
circumstances in order to remain effective.  
There are different ideas on how to go about implementing a measure of 
flexibility in modern systems of servitude law. The three ideas discussed below include 
firstly, the efficiency-focussed approach which is aimed at achieving optimal utility or 
economic efficiency from property arrangements;20 secondly, the pliability rule 
approach suggested by John Lovett21 and thirdly, the notion of property sharing as 
described by Rashmi Dyal-Chand.22 Each of these theoretical views is a valuable 
contribution to be considered in re-evaluating or reforming servitude law to something 
more appropriate and applicable to the current needs of property systems.  
Before considering the arguments for flexibility, a critical examination of the 
shortcomings of the contractarian view discussed in section 4 2 above already 
indicates the need for a more sensible approach toward the treatment of (limited) real 
rights in land. Sterk explains the three obvious responses that servitude doctrine can 
take toward the contractarian approach: to enforce no contractual arrangements, to 
enforce all contractual arrangements or, more sensibly, to enforce contractual 
arrangements subject to certain limitations.23 Opting for the third, more nuanced of 
these options, the result is a response that strikes a good balance between, on the 
                                                          
 
20 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41; TW Merrill & HE Smith “Optimal standardization in the 
law of property: The numerus clausus principle” (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 1-70; H Hansmann & R 
Kraakman “Property, contract and verification: The numerus clausus problem and the divisibility of 
rights” (2002) 31 The Journal of Legal Studies 373-420.  
21 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77.  
22 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723.  
23 S Sterk “Foresight and the law of servitudes” (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 956-970 964.  
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one hand, allowing private parties to organise their own property arrangements, and 
on the other hand, compensating for the inability of contracting parties to foresee and 
effectively accommodate future needs.24 This option is thus a more nuanced approach 
– a middle ground between complete freedom of contract and complete public 
regulation.25 There seems to be no such thing as a choice between freedom and 
coercion as mutually exclusive elements of an agreement.26 Similarly, Rose explains 
that as much as clear, crystalline rules, and muddy ambiguous rules are set up to be 
complete opposites, excluding each other, in reality the one always seems to include 
elements of the other.27 Consequently, it might be necessary to neither allow complete 
freedom of contract to regulate servitude law nor regulate these rights completely by 
public intervention, but to rather find an appropriate middle ground allowing 
intervention when the failures of private planning become apparent. Sterk correctly 
identifies the lack of foresight by contracting parties as the culprit for such failures in 
                                                          
 
24 S Sterk “Foresight and the law of servitudes” (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 956-970 965. See further 
RA Epstein “Covenants and constitutions” (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 906-927, 921-923. 
25 S Sterk “Foresight and the law of servitudes” (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 956-970 965. 
26 RL Hale “Coercion and distribution in a supposedly non-coercive state” (1923) 38 Political Science 
Quarterly 470-494 493. See also GS Alexander “Freedom, coercion, and the law of servitudes” (1988) 
73 Cornell Law Review 883-905 900-901 (arguing that the enforcement of freely created contracts can 
include in itself elements of coercion while regulation (coercion) at the same time contains elements 
protecting the freedoms of private parties). 
27 CM Rose “Crystals and mud in property law” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 577-610 609: “Just as 
there is a version of sociability and dialogue in crystal rules, there is a version of certainty and 
predictability in mud rules. These reversals occur just where crystals or mud move into a genuine social 
context, and it is no wonder that this is the locus of the reversal. Crystals and mud are rhetorical 
extractions from the practices of ongoing trading relationships where the participants are likely to enjoy 
both upstream security as well as downstream readjustment.”  
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private organising, but acknowledges that this is a natural and justifiable occurrence.28 
Just as parties cannot foresee the effects of changed circumstances on a current 
agreement, doctrine cannot account for all possible future events, but allowing 
flexibility in intervention might well provide a tenable solution.  
 
4 3 2  Efficient land use: utility and economic efficiency   
As has been mentioned above, servitudes are helpful and efficient tools to optimise 
the use of land. They allow property owners to gain valuable use rights in other 
properties in order to exploit the maximum potential of their own land. Their 
contributing value is thus clear. However, the nature of the value that can and should 
be drawn from servitude arrangements is viewed differently from different 
perspectives. Firstly, the utility-based view is aimed at obtaining optimal use from 
property and thus focusses on utilising neighbouring properties to the collective benefit 
of an efficient property system.29 The economic view is aimed at getting the best 
economic return from land arrangements and the markets,30 while other views may 
                                                          
 
28 See S Sterk “Foresight and the law of servitudes” (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 956-970 961-963 
for an explanation of this point with reference to the implementation and inevitable change effected after 
implementation of the US Constitution.  
29 GS Alexander & EM Peñalver An introduction to property theory (2012) 30; S French “The American 
Restatement of servitude law: Reforming doctrine by shifting from ex ante to ex post controls on the 
risks posed by servitudes” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of land burdens 
(2006) 109-118 112; CM Rose “Servitudes, security and assent: Some comments on Professors French 
and Reichman” (1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 1403-1417 
30 TW Merrill & HE Smith “Optimal standardization in the law of property: The numerus clausus principle”  
(2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 1-70; H Smith “Property and property rules” (2004) 79 New York University 
Law Review 1719-1798; TW Merrill “Trespass, nuisance, and the costs of determining property rights” 
(1985) 14 The Journal of Legal Studies13-48; G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, 
and inalienability: One view of the cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128; JE Krier & SJ 
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focus more on the social obligations between the parties to deal fairly with one another 
in all exchanges and agreements.31 Some commentators have concerns regarding the 
effects of fragmentation of property rights on markets and others simply want to 
remove regulatory restrictions and complications from the system of servitudes. I 
address these views in the discussion that follows.  
  From an economic point of view the main objective of legal rules is to promote 
an allocation of resources which will lead to the maximum productive exploitation of 
those resources.32 The natural assumption would be that to reach such efficient 
allocation of resources would depend to a great degree on the initial assignment of 
entitlements.33 However, Coase challenged this idea and came to the conclusion that, 
as long as transaction costs in a particular situation are sufficiently low, bargaining will 
lead to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial assignment of rights.34 From a 
utilitarian point of view, the eventual assignment of entitlements should favour the 
party who values the entitlement most, as this would determine the wealth distribution 
in a particular system.35 Following on Coase’s ideas, Calabresi and Melamed36 
                                                          
 
Schwab “Property rules and liability rules: The cathedral in another light” (1995) 70 Northwestern 
University Law Review 440-483 451. 
31 J Gordley “Private modification of the right to use property: Servitudes” in Foundations of private law: 
property, tort, contract, unjust enrichment (2006) 81-102 102.  
32 TJ Miceli “Property” in Backhaus G (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics (2005) 246-
260 247; JL Coleman Markets, morals and the law (2002) 71.  
33 JL Coleman Markets, morals and the law (2002) 71. 
34 TJ Miceli “Property” in Backhaus G (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics (2005) 246-
260 247 with reference to Coase R ‘The problem of social costs’ (1960) 3 The Journal of Law and 
Economics 1-44.  
35 GS Alexander & EM Peñalver An introduction to property theory (2012) 30; TJ Miceli “Property” in 
Backhaus G (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics (2005) 246-260 248.  
36 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128. 
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considered different reasons for a particular allocation of entitlements in a system and 
came to the conclusion that these reasons can be categorised under three headings, 
namely economic efficiency factors,37 distributional preferences38 and other justice39 
considerations.40 However, this notion was distorted to some degree by subsequent 
law and economics commentators. While “Calabresi and Melamed put the various 
considerations on equal footing, economic efficiency somehow eclipsed the two other 
values”.41 This is apparent in the bulk of economically inspired literature that followed 
the Cathedral ideas. 
                                                          
 
37 The authors state that economic efficiency urges us to choose the set of entitlements which would 
lead to that allocation of resources which provided such a favourable position for those who gained from 
it (thus in whose favour the entitlement was assigned) that they could compensate those who lost from 
it and still be better off than before. See G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and 
inalienability: One view of the cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 1093-1098. 
38 The distributional goals considered by the authors include the distribution of wealth and the 
distribution of merit goods. They argue that the particular assignment of entitlements chosen by a 
society will depend to a large degree on what they value. They will thus choose to assign an entitlement 
in the direction that best promotes the wealth distribution that they favour. See G Calabresi & AD 
Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard 
Law Review 1089-1128 1098-1101. 
39 Other justice reasons was explained by the authors as including all those considerations that could 
not be understood in terms only of efficiency and distributional reasons. However, they emphasise that 
justice notions follow efficiency and broad distributional preferences as well as other more idiosyncratic 
ones. See G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 1101-1105. 
40 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 1093.  
41 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 12-13.  
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Apart from considering the reasons for the initial assignment of entitlements, 
Calabresi and Melamed created the property and liability rule paradigm which provides 
an economic theory of rules for the transfer of rights.42  
According to this paradigm, the protection of property rights or entitlements 
(such as servitudal rights) can take place through property rules or liability rules.43 
Property rule protection entails that an entitlement is transferred, modified or 
terminated only through a voluntary transaction. The consent of the entitlement owner 
is always necessary and she will also be able to determine the value or price of the 
entitlement.44 Alexander and Peñalver argue that a specific entitlement should be 
protected by a property rule where it is relatively certain which party values that 
entitlement more or where markets can easily enable the transfer of the entitlement to 
that person. 45 Most private property rights are accordingly protected by property 
                                                          
 
42  TJ Miceli “Property” in Backhaus G (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics (2005) 246-
260 249. 
43 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 1089, 1093. The authors also included a 
discussion of inalienability rules as a third option for protecting entitlements. However, inalienability 
rules are different in the sense that they do not only protect entitlements but also limit or regulate the 
grant of a particular entitlement. According to these rules entitlements are inalienable (thus, they cannot 
be transferred) either under specific conditions or in general as the law prescribes. Since these rules 
were not really controversial in subsequent literature, they will not be discussed in much detail here.  
44 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 3; TJ Miceli 
“Property” in Backhaus G (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics (2005) 246-260 249; JA 
Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 9. 
45 GS Alexander & EM Peñalver An introduction to property theory (2012) 30. 
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rules.46 Generally, the remedies applied to enforce property rules are interdicts or 
restoration of rights.  
Liability rule protection, on the other hand, does not involve voluntary 
transactions and is characterised by compensatory remedies. In terms of a liability 
rule, a party wanting to acquire, modify or terminate a protected entitlement can pay a 
collectively determined price that is usually set by a court, legislator or an 
administrative agency, in order to acquire the entitlement without the consent of the 
entitlement owner.47 The value of the entitlement is thus determined ex post, by an 
authoritative body based on objective factors, rather than by the entitlement owner 
herself.48 Calabresi and Melamed explain that although a private property owner’s 
right is protected by a property rule, a nuisance that can be justified to the extent that 
it escapes an injunction49 might result in the private property right only being protected 
by a liability rule. A court may allow the nuisance to continue without the consent of 
the property owner against payment of compensation.50 
                                                          
 
46 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 1105.  
47 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 3; TJ Miceli 
“Property” in Backhaus G (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics (2005) 246-260 249; JA 
Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 9. 
48 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 9-10.  
49 A nuisance which holds sufficient public utility, for example, pollution caused by a factory which 
provides not only valuable products, but also provides a large number of valuable and much needed 
jobs to the surrounding community. See G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and 
inalienability: One view of the cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 1116-1120 and 
Boomer v Atlantic Cement Co Inc 256 NE 2d 870 (NY 1970). 
50 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 1105-1106.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
168 
 
The result of the consent requirement inherent in property rule protection is that 
on the one hand, consent guarantees an efficient outcome since the parties agree to 
(and are thus presumed to benefit from) the exchanges that occur.51 On the other 
hand, the transaction costs involved in obtaining consent may be so high that it can 
prevent the completion of these otherwise efficient exchanges.52 From this, the 
conventional wisdom is derived that property rules are the preferred remedy where 
transaction costs are low because they facilitate mutually beneficial bargaining 
between private parties.53 Liability rule protection, on the other hand, is deemed to be 
superior in situations where transaction costs are high54 because it allows a court (or 
                                                          
 
51 TJ Miceli “Property” in Backhaus G (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics (2005) 246-
260 249. 
52 TJ Miceli “Property” in Backhaus G (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics (2005) 246-
260 249. Transaction costs are assumed to be low where the parties involved are easily identifiable and 
negotiation, bargaining and transfer of entitlements can take place easily. Rose distinguishes between 
two types of transaction costs. Type I transaction costs are incurred before the onset of bargaining and 
involve the costs of identifying and approaching all interested parties, while Type II transaction costs 
are those that impede the bargaining process itself as a result of strategic bargaining and holdout-
situations. 
53 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 14. This conventional wisdom is widely 
disputed by other authors. See in this regard I Ayres & E Talley “Solomonic bargaining: Dividing a legal 
entitlement to facilitate Coasean trade” (1995) 104 Yale Law Journal 1027-1117; RA Epstein “A clear 
view of the cathedral: The dominance of property rules” (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2091-2120; H 
Smith “Property and property rules” (2004) 79 New York University Law Review 1719-1798.  
54 See JE Krier & SJ Schwab “Property rules and liability rules: The cathedral in another light” (1995) 
70 Northwestern University Law Review 440-483 454-455 questioning the assumption that liability rules 
are better applied in cases with high transaction costs. The authors contend that the assumption is 
based on the unsubstantiated view that courts assess damages accurately. According to them, in 
weighing the costs of private bargaining where transaction costs are high and the costs of judicial 
assessment of damages in the same situation, it cannot be assumed that judicial assessment costs will 
be less.  
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other authority) to force exchanges when bargaining is not possible.55 On this 
assumption, the increased tendency of courts to apply compensatory remedies in 
property disputes instead of injunctory relief, is justified by reasons of efficiency.56 
However, servitudes do not necessarily conform to this idea. Transaction costs are 
relatively low in most praedial servitude situations as a result of the parties being easily 
identifiable and the initial allocation of resources already favouring the owner of the 
servient land.57 On the other hand, the perpetual existence of servitudes and strategic 
bargaining as a result of the bilateral monopoly present in servitude situations can 
easily cause higher transaction costs.58 
Calabresi and Melamed state that efficiency is not the sole ground for the shift 
from property to liability rules but that the reason can rather be found in the tendency 
of society to doubt the market valuation implicit in (ex ante) property rules  because it 
                                                          
 
55 TJ Miceli “Property” in Backhaus G (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics (2005) 246-
260 249; A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 3; JA Lovett 
“A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of Property: 
Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 14; JE Krier & SJ Schwab “Property rules and 
liability rules: The cathedral in another light” (1995) 70 Northwestern University Law Review 440-
483 451.  
56 G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 1108-1110.  
57 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 13-15; AJ van der Walt “The continued 
relevance of servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 20-24. See also TW Merrill & HE Smith 
“Optimal standardization in the law of property: The numerus clausus principle” (2000) 110 Yale Law 
Journal 1-70 and H Hansmann & R Kraakman “Property, contract and verification: The numerus clausus 
problem and the divisibility of rights” (2002) 31 The Journal of Legal Studies 373-420.  
58 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 13.  
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is often either unavailable or too expensive.59 Instead, people prefer the collective 
valuation required by (ex post) liability rules which facilitate transactions because 
courts seem more efficient in establishing a fair price where parties are not willing to 
reveal information about their actual valuations to effectuate a transfer”.60 However, 
this shift in protection towards liability rules is strongly criticised by some scholars for 
creating instability in property law and for ultimately discouraging land development 
and investment.61 
Lovett62 emphasises the risks of a sudden shift in a system from property rule 
protection to liability rule protection and explains four examples of such risks. Firstly, 
the value assigned to entitlements by courts is superficial at best. In their evaluation 
of all the relevant objective factors, there is no account of the real value of property 
entitlements to the holder thereof.63 Secondly, there are significant risks of extra costs 
and errors in the process of enforcing liability rules.64 Just as there are obstacles to 
                                                          
 
59 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 14.  
60 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 14; G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property 
rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-
1128 1110; JE Krier & SJ Schwab “Property rules and liability rules: The cathedral in another light” 
(1995) 70 Northwestern University Law Review 440-483 452 n 43.  
61 CM Rose “Servitudes, security and assent: Some comments on Professors French and Reichman” 
(1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 1403-1417; JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement 
relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut 
Law Review 1-77 48-50.  
62 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 15-16.  
63 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 15-16.  
64 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 15-16.  
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bargaining in the property rule context, there are also impediments to obtaining, 
processing and calculating damages.65 Thirdly, some scholars are of the opinion that 
an easy resort to liability rules will discourage bargaining and long-term planning and 
ultimately increase transaction costs.66 Finally, when liability rules are applied to 
possessory interests (as opposed to regulating harmful externalities) they can lead to 
an infinite serious of takings and take-backs.67 This can attract third parties to try to 
buy out rights by taking advantage of liability rules, which in turn will lead to a 
destabilisation of property rights. From this, it becomes apparent that liability rules are 
not generally superior to property rules. 
 From the large body of Cathedral literature available there are many 
reconceptualisations of the ideas of Calabresi and Melamed relating to property and 
liability rules. Krier and Schwabb68 point out that most of the authors expanding on the 
initial Cathedral ideas have “gradually obliterated the nuanced, indeed the tentative, 
nature of the original analysis, substituting for it a simplistic conventional wisdom about 
how to assign and protect entitlements”. Nevertheless, it remains necessary and 
insightful to consider the different conceptions which built on the property and liability 
rule paradigm along with other theoretical arguments. 
                                                          
 
65 JE Krier & SJ Schwab “Property rules and liability rules: The cathedral in another light” (1995) 70 
Northwestern University Law Review 440-483 453.  
66 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 15-16; CM Rose ‘The shadow of the 
cathedral’ (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2175-2200 2184. 
67 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 15-16; CM Rose ‘The shadow of the 
cathedral’ (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2175-2200 2189.  
68 JE Krier & SJ Schwab “Property rules and liability rules: The cathedral in another light” (1995) 70 
Northwestern University Law Review 440-483 447.  
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Rose explains the view of certain economic scholars that muddy, liability-type 
rules, providing courts with a broad discretion to intervene in order to determine and 
protect entitlements, are inferior because of their lack of certainty and the effect they 
have of discouraging investment.69 However, in the real world, both crystal and mud 
rules contain an element of the other. Furthermore, “the history of property law” shows 
that even in instances where an active choice is made to implement one of these types 
of rules, a system will often sway toward the other. In her own words, “the blurring of 
clear and distinct property rules with the muddy doctrines of maybe or maybe not” is 
inevitable and so is the “reverse tendency to clear up the blur with new crystalline 
rules”.70 Relating this back to Merrill’s argument, the assumption is that even where 
transaction costs are low, there will sometimes be cases where the law reverts back 
to muddy doctrine.71 This is typically true in some servitude cases. Because there are 
generally only two parties involved, and the assignment of entitlements has been 
determined to favour the servient proprietor, transaction costs are expected to be low 
and clear property rules should apply. However, when outcomes in line with seemingly 
clear doctrinal rules seem unjust for social or policy reasons, these rules become 
instantly muddied.72  
In the servitude context crystal rules are exemplified by the traditional rules of 
servitude law which regulate servitudes ex ante, determining beforehand what the 
status of a servitude is to be and denying consideration of anything falling outside 
                                                          
 
69 CM Rose “Crystals and mud in property law” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 577-610 609.  
70 CM Rose “Crystals and mud in property law” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 577-610 580.  
71 CM Rose “Crystals and mud in property law” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 577-610 594.  
72 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 679; CM Rose 
“Crystals and mud in property law” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 577-610 594. 
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those boundaries or asking for an ex post (muddying) evaluation of the facts. In this 
regard, Susan French has taken the extreme view in proposing that no restrictive ex 
ante rules should regulate the creation of servitudes.73 In her view all that should be 
required for the creation of a servitude is that there is a valid contract which is aimed 
at the creation of a servitude that complies with the formal requirements for 
transactions involving land.74 French is of the view that instead of limiting the creation 
of idiosyncratic servitudes, the law should rather be focussed on fairly enforcing these 
rights created by parties while they do exist, and determining when they have outlived 
their usefulness and should no longer be allowed to burden property.75 Other authors 
have taken more nuanced approaches toward this issue.76 Sagaert for instance, 
asserts that the value of ex ante measures of regulation are found in the extent to 
which they ensure that burdens placed on land are objectively useful. 77 However, he 
agrees that a better way to realise the goal of continued usefulness of burdens on land 
would be to enable the abolishment of these rights when they become obsolete.78  
                                                          
 
73 S French ‘Servitudes, reform and the new Restatement of Property: Creation doctrines and structural 
simplification (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 928-955 948.  
74 S French “The American Restatement of servitude law: Reforming doctrine by shifting from ex ante 
to ex post controls on the risks posed by servitudes” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a 
unified system of land burdens (2006) 109-118 112. 
75 S French “Toward a modern law of servitudes: Reweaving the ancient strands” (1982) 55 Southern 
California Law Review 1261-1319 1319.  
76 V Sagaert “The fragmented system of land burdens in French and Belgian law” in S Van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of land burdens (2006) 31-52 51.  
77 V Sagaert “The fragmented system of land burdens in French and Belgian law” in S Van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of land burdens (2006) 31-52 51. 
78 V Sagaert “The fragmented system of land burdens in French and Belgian law” in S Van Erp & B 
Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of land burdens (2006) 31-52 51. 
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Depoorter and Parisi, with their concerns regarding the fragmentation of 
property rights, have also emphasised the valuable role that traditional rules of 
servitude law can play in the fight against the excessive fragmentation of property 
rights, but have also expressed the opinion that these rules no longer fit the profile of 
the dynamic modern land economy.79 According to the authors, servitudes by their 
very nature amplify the effects of fragmentation. Not only are servitudes inherently 
aimed at assigning different entitlements to the same property to different 
stakeholders, but this assignment is made upon the assumption that the rights will 
exist perpetually.80 Although there are different opinions on the acceptability of such a 
perpetual enforcement of rights without the clearly expressed consent of successive 
parties, this is the manner in which servitudes function.81 
The concerns regarding fragmentation are based on the reality that after the 
different sticks in the ownership bundle of rights have been assigned to different 
holders, it might sometimes be necessary to rebundle these rights in order to use the 
property effectively for a new or different purpose. However, if this rebundling is 
hindered by transaction costs, the land will be left underutilised and under-
developed.82 The argument is that the very aim of servitudes as tools for effective land-
                                                          
 
79 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 37. 
80 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 20. 
81 See RA Epstein “A clear view of the cathedral: The dominance of property rules” (1997) 106 Yale 
Law Journal 2091-2120; CM Rose “Servitudes, security and assent: Some comments on Professors 
French and Reichman” (1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 1403-1417 1406-1407. 
82 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 20; CM Rose “Servitudes, security and assent: Some 
comments on Professors French and Reichman” (1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 1403-1417 
1414.  
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use management is thus impeded by the perpetuity of their existence. It is for this 
reason that many scholars have suggested that the removal of obsolete burdens 
should be possible. The non-consensual removal of burdens has been shown to be a 
necessary objective in streamlining modern property law and property development, 
and as seen in Chapter 3 above, various jurisdictions have enabled exactly such 
removal in recent reforms.83  
The general shift that has taken place in the regulation of servitudes in an ex 
post manner84 should be seen as an effort to “accommodate new property needs, 
while minimising the risk of persisting property fragmentation”.85 Depoorter and Parisi 
explain that although the reason for the shift is often attributed to factors such as 
judicial pragmatism and the general decline of traditional legal dogmas, they believe 
that the rigid approach of ex ante regulation of servitudes, which was developed to fit 
the standard needs of rural and urban societies at the time, is simply no longer suitable 
to property regimes existing in the 21st century.86 They propose that parties should be 
provided with the freedom of contract to decide on the content of the property rights 
                                                          
 
83 S French “The American Restatement of servitude law: Reforming doctrine by shifting from ex ante 
to ex post controls on the risks posed by servitudes” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a 
unified system of land burdens (2006) 109-118 110-114 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement 
relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut 
Law Review 1-77 7, 55-56; BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional 
interpretation of the law of servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 33-34, 37-38.  
84 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 37-38 list the examples of these ex post regulatory 
measures as including time limits on servitudes, statutes of limitation, liberative prescription, and rules 
of extinction for non-use.  
85 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 37-38 
86 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 37.  
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involved and also on the remedial protection these rights will enjoy.87 Thus, parties 
should with the conclusion of every individual servitude agreement be able to choose 
their future remedies at the time of “creating, transferring or modifying” the servitude. 
This could mean one of two (equally problematic) things. Firstly, the original creators 
of the servitude will decide on the remedial protection the rights will enjoy in perpetuity, 
in which case subsequent parties will be bound by this. The problem with this outcome 
is obvious. The second possibility is that every subsequent owner, when receiving 
transfer of his rights, can renegotiate the remedial protection that will be enjoyed. 
However, this would have the same effect of increasing transaction costs (and possibly 
strategic bargaining) as would a total renegotiation of rights, which would ultimately 
defeat the purpose of the servitude’s running with the land. This is ultimately still ex 
ante regulation. It is deciding from the outset exactly what the needs of the parties (or 
other subsequent parties) will be over time and enabling them to only use limited 
remedial options to solve their problems. Because the freedom of contract is so wide 
it can be assumed to be enforced strictly and thus there are no options for remedies 
to rely on if circumstances change to a degree that was not foreseen at the time of 
creation of the rights. 
Another manner of ex post regulation often suggested (and already 
implemented in some jurisdictions to varying extents) is imposing time-limits on the 
existence of servitudes. The Scottish version of this was simply to introduce a 
presumptive 100 year lifetime for real burdens.88 Carol Rose has suggested that 
parties should be enabled to decide at the outset what the expected lifespan of the 
                                                          
 
87 BWF Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 38-39.  
88 See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion.  
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rights are that they aim to create, and after the lapse of this period the rights should 
be renegotiated.89 Alternatively she proposed that presumed life spans could be 
determined for different servitudes by the legislature. The possibility of limited duration 
servitudes is discussed in more detail in section 4 3 3 2 below.  
Ultimately, the conclusion of the scholars arguing for greater efficiency of 
servitudes is that it will be reached by way of flexible, ex post regulation of these rights. 
The aim is to create land-use arrangements which are “secure” and accordingly able 
to run with the land they pertain to, but at the same time to enable the removal or 
modification of burdens which serve no real purpose but lead to the fragmentation of 
property rights.  
 
4 3 3  The pliability rule approach   
4 3 3 1 Pliability rules  
Building on the property and liability rule paradigm discussed before, Bell and 
Parchomovsky came up with what they called a pliability rule analysis. As the word 
indicates, pliability rules are something in between property and liability rules and the 
ideas developed as a result of this analysis are aimed at addressing the inherent 
tensions within the system of property law.90 Lovett expanded on this analysis and 
applied it to the context of servitudes.91 It entails the protection of entitlements in a 
manner that allows the protection to shift from property rule protection to liability rule 
                                                          
 
89 CM Rose “Servitudes, security and assent: Some comments on Professors French and Reichman” 
(1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 1403-1417 1414.  
90 JW Singer Entitlement: The paradoxes of property (2000) 31-32, 55.  
91 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77. 
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protection where a certain trigger is present.92 This approach is a more nuanced 
option, choosing not to follow the extremes of either property or liability rules. It takes 
account of the ownership-model of property,93 but acknowledges that protecting the 
interests of both owners and non-owners requires property rights to be limited and 
regulated.94 
 
4 3 3 2 Bell and Parchomovky’s pliability rule approach   
As explained above, Calabresi and Melamed’s Cathedral article had a remarkable 
influence on academic thinking, especially in the area of law and economics. Thirty 
years later, Bell and Parchomovsky published an article in which they contend to add 
another level to the analysis of property, liability and inalienability rules set forth by 
Calabresi and Melamed. According to the authors, Calabresi and Melamed’s 
framework presents a solid understanding of legal entitlements, but their own more 
comprehensive analysis goes further than simply the superficial dichotomy between 
property and liability rules, in that their analysis includes room for what they describe 
as pliability rules.  
 Bell and Parchomovsky explain that Calabresi and Melamed’s paradigm 
depicted the law as a three-level structure, the ground level being inalienability rules, 
while property and liability rules symbolise the first and second floors respectively.95 
                                                          
 
92 This is simply an example to illustrate the working of pliability rules. The modes can also shift from 
liability rule protection to property rule protection or even from property rule protection for one party to 
property rule protection for the other, as will be explained later in this section.  
93 JW Singer Entitlement: The paradoxes of property (2000) 31-32, 55.  
94 JW Singer Entitlement: The paradoxes of property (2000) 19-55.  
95 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 25.  
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They contend that pliability rules are the stairways and corridors that fill the spaces 
between these floors to connect them and ultimately provide the functional elements 
to enable full enjoyment of the different floors.96 The trigger event which allows the 
protection mode to change from property rule to liability rule protection (or vice versa) 
has the effect that these rules are dynamic, changing and adapting according to the 
circumstances in which they function. The authors explain the application of pliability 
rules by way of the case of Boomer v Atlantic Cement97 (“Boomer”).98 The case was 
brought on the grounds of nuisance by homeowners complaining of pollution caused 
by a cement factory in their neighbourhood. The homeowners sought an injunction to 
close down the factory and further claimed damages for harm caused to their property 
by the dirt, smoke and vibrations emanating from the manufacturing plant.99 The court 
decided on the facts not to close down the factory but to allow it to operate, subject to 
the payment of permanent damages to the homeowners.100 Considering this in view 
of Calabresi and Melamed’s paradigm, it seems like the court was faced with a choice 
between property rule protection in granting the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs, 
and liability rule protection by way of the compensation order eventually decided on 
by the court.101 However, according to Bell and Parchomovsky, the court could have 
opted for a pliability rule, combining both options for protection into one meaningful 
                                                          
 
96 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 25. 
97 Boomer v Atlantic Cement Co Inc 256 NE 2d 870 (NY 1970). 
98 See G Calabresi & AD Melamed “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the 
cathedral” (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089-1128 1115-1124 where the Boomer case is used to 
illustrate the workings of property and liability rules. 
99 Boomer v Atlantic Cement Co Inc 256 NE 2d 870 (NY 1970). 
100 Boomer v Atlantic Cement Co Inc 256 NE 2d 870 (NY 1970); A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability 
rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 5.  
101 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 5. 
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remedy where both parties are provided partial protection. They propose that a more 
suitable remedy could be found in allowing the operation of the factory for five more 
years in order to address the concerns regarding the sudden loss of a large number 
of jobs. The continued functioning of the factory could be made subject to the payment 
of damages to the homeowners, until such time as the injunction would become 
absolute and force the plant to close down in order to provide relief from the pollution 
to the homeowners.102 In this example the pliability rule starts off with a limited-period 
liability protection, followed by indefinite property rule protection, with the lapse of the 
five-year period acting as the trigger event. According to the authors, this example is 
an illustration of the three common elements of all pliability rules: (1) the initial stage 
of entitlement protection, which can be either property or liability rule protection; (2) 
the triggering event; and (3) at least one more stage of entitlement protection.103    
  As normative justification for the use of pliability rules, Bell and Parchomovsky 
contend that there are specific conditions in which the dynamic nature of pliability rules 
render them superior to static property or liability rules in solving disputes.104 The first 
example is conditions where policymakers can foresee the possibility of changed 
circumstances.105 They state that:  
“Pliability rules allow policymakers to anticipate changed circumstances and 
incorporate them into a legal rule by identifying the change as the trigger that 
shifts protection modes.”106 
                                                          
 
102 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 5. 
103 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 65; JA Lovett “A 
bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of Property: 
Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 18.  
104 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 66. 
105 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 66. 
106 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 67.  
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They argue further that the application of either a property rule or a liability rule alone 
in situations of changed circumstances often leads to a loss in efficiency when the rule 
cannot accommodate the changed reality.107 However, pliability rules preserve the 
efficiency advantages of both rules, despite the change.108 Furthermore, where the 
original entitlement holder has a measure of control over the changed circumstances, 
as illustrated above, pliability rules have the further advantage of providing an 
incentive to the entitlement holder to maintain more desirable circumstances.109 This 
is because of the otherwise negative effects implemented by way of the pliability 
rule.110 This measure of self-regulation also adds to efficiency in economising on costs 
that might have been spent seeking regulatory or judicial relief.111 
The second scenario for which the authors deem pliability rules to be well suited 
is situations where there is a need to balance competing interests.112 The flexible 
nature of pliability rules allows for an option to satisfy opposing interests as seems 
most effective, without having to choose a winning and a losing interest.113 The fact 
that pliability rules operate sequentially rather than simultaneously might seem 
paradoxical. However, it is exactly this fact that promotes an equilibrium between 
                                                          
 
107 See A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 67 for an 
illustration of this as applicable to the essential facilities doctrine.  
108 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 67 
109 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 67. 
110 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 67. 
111 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 67. 
112 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 66. These 
competing interests can either be completely different objectives, such as justice and efficiency, or it 
could be that there are competing interests in the same land, as is often the case in servitude law or a 
situation such as adverse possession.  
113 This is also an important part of the property sharing perspective discussed below.  
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competing interests in that it creates the opportunity to consider competing interests 
and find a single rule best suited to strike a balance between them.  
Finally, pliability rules seem to operate at an advantage in situations where it is 
necessary to overcome the inherent limitations of property or liability rules.114 By 
employing the strong points of property rules to balance out the weaknesses of liability 
rules, and vice versa, the weak points of a singular approach can be overcome and a 
superior outcome is reached.  
The authors believe that these three scenarios also enable pliability rules to 
facilitate planning by entitlement holders and promote bargaining between entitlement 
holders and potential acquirers.115 It is further noteworthy that all three conditions 
mentioned can occur in servitude situations.  
The main contribution of pliability rules (as opposed to property or liability rules) 
thus far seems to be their flexibility and the dynamic way in which they can 
accommodate a wide range of complicated legal situations and take account of a wider 
scope of entitlements involved in a particular dispute. As Bell and Parchomovsky 
emphasise these rules are already being implemented in different areas of the law.116 
                                                          
 
114 An example of this is found in patent law. The baseline property protection rendered to original 
entitlement holders allows for the absolute exclusion of third parties (for a limited time) and accordingly 
promotes investment and creates the perfect setting for voluntary exchange and bargaining. However, 
such absolute protection could easily lead to a market monopoly effecting underproduction and 
overpricing of resources if it is not controlled.114 With the application of the pliability rule protection 
provided in patent law, this is avoided and a balance is struck by preserving the valuable investment 
incentive in the first stage of protection, while eliminating the possibility for monopoly in the second 
stage when zero-order liability kicks in. See A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 
Michigan Law Review 1-79 69. 
115 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 66. 
116 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 26.  
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However, they encourage a wider promotion of pliability rules and advocate for legal 
theory to be updated to include and expand on this concept in order to move 
forward.117 
 
4 3 3 3 Lovett’s application of pliability rules to the servitude context  
In view of the new American Restatement of Property law,118 Lovett considered the 
ideas of Bell and Parchomovsky and applied them to the law of servitudes – 
particularly in light of the rules proposed for regulating the relocation of an unspecified 
right of way.119 Contrary to the traditional common law rule which has always applied 
in US law, allowing no unilateral relocation of a servitude without the consent of the 
servitude holder, this section adopts the more flexible approach followed by most civil 
law jurisdictions.120 
 Lovett explains that the value of the newly proposed rule has created great 
controversy among property scholars, but adds that the debate is simply “another 
round in the ongoing debate about the value of property and liability rules as 
entitlement protection mechanisms”.121 Lovett is of the view that the change brought 
about by section 4.8 is demonstrative of the shift that has taken place in the approach 
of property rights from property rule protection to liability rule protection. He 
                                                          
 
117 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 78. 
118 Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes (2000).  
119 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77. 
120 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 2. 
121 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 77.  
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acknowledges that this shift not only creates uncertainty, but also holds other, more 
significant dangers and might in the long run discourage investment and effective land-
use planning.122 However, he argues that the particular shift brought about by this rule 
can be seen positively as enforcing a valuable change in the way servitudes are 
viewed.123 
 Although the assumption is that the new rule on relocation is aimed at shifting 
the protection mode from property rule protection in the direction of a liability rule, 
Lovett states that what the rule actually achieves is to create a pliability rule whereby 
the servitude holder’s initial property rule protection is replaced by a liability rule which 
entails “compensation” in the form of the new (relocated) easement.124 
He holds that the different reconceptualisations of Calabresi and Melamed’s 
property and liability rule paradigm share the basic view of property rules as involving 
an element of voluntary action by an entitlement holder, while liability rules on the other 
end, entail the forceful separation of a holder from his entitlements – in other words, 
                                                          
 
122 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77. He identifies four risks of a sudden shift 
from property rule protection to liability rule protection: see section 5 3 1 above.  
123 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 77. 
124 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 5, 43-44. Section 4.8 reads as follows:  
4.8 Location, Relocation, and Dimensions of a Servitude  
(3) Unless expressly denied by the terms of an easement, as defined in § 1.2, the owner of the 
servient estate is entitled to make reasonable changes in the location or dimensions of an 
easement, at the servient owner's expense, to permit normal use or development of the servient 
estate, but only if the changes do not  
(a) significantly lessen the utility of the easement, 
(b) increase the burdens on the owner of the easement in its use and enjoyment, or 
(c) frustrate the purpose for which the easement was created. 
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coercion.125 However, Lovett states that servitude situations are different because the 
distinction between the voluntary and the coercive is not clear cut. In short, an acquirer 
of servitudal rights (as opposed to an acquirer of a thing) voluntarily enters into a “long-
term relationship that necessarily will entail a degree of mutual neighbourly 
accommodation and liability rule regulation”.126 Accordingly, pliability rules are 
specifically well suited to these situations in that they are able to integrate and balance 
the functions of property and liability rules in a single remedy. Because pliability rules 
are flexible and able to adapt to different circumstances, they are perfectly applicable 
to the long-term nature of servitudes. Furthermore, as Bell and Parchomovsky point 
out, they function particularly well in situations where competing interests must be 
accommodated in one remedy, as is the case with servitude disputes.127 
Based on the arguments by Bell and Parchomovsky, Lovett comes to the 
conclusion that the normative justification for the use of pliability rules is strongest in 
cases where the original entitlement holder has a measure of control over the change 
in circumstances that triggers the protection provided to him and weaker in situations 
where he has no influence over the change. Although servitudes might more often fall 
                                                          
 
125 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 11-12 referring in this regard to JE Krier 
& SJ Schwab “Property rules and liability rules: The cathedral in another light” (1995) 70 Northwestern 
University Law Review 440-48. Also see RA Epstein “A clear view of the cathedral: The dominance of 
property rules” (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2091-2120.  
126 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 11-12. GS Alexander “Freedom, 
coercion, and the law of servitudes” (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 883-905 900-902 also remarks on 
this point that servitude situations are not necessarily free of coercive means simply because they 
involve private regulation.  
127 A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 67-68.  
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into the last category, Lovett asserts that pliability rules are “invaluable tools to respond 
to the problems and needs of parties involved in [servitude] relationships”.128 
With regard to the specific consideration of the pliability rule in section 4.8(3) of 
the Restatement, more needs to be said. According to Lovett, the new rule in section 
4.8(3) is an example of a classic, simultaneous or multi-stage pliability rule, 129 as 
described by Bell and Parchomovsky. In the first phase, the servitude holder enjoys 
the entitlement of exercising his servitude in a certain location, as was initially agreed 
upon between the parties. This entitlement is protected by way of a property rule – this 
is the baseline protection. A triggering event (the need for development or normal use 
of the servient estate) initiates the second phase in which the owner of the servient 
land can obtain the entitlement to determine the location of the servitude and has to 
pay for the expenses of implementing this change – the liability rule phase. 
Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that the need to develop or use the property in a 
different way might arise again later. This could mean that this is a multi-stage pliability 
rule.  
As mentioned earlier, the acceptance of this rule was (and remains) an unsettled 
topic in US law. Conventional lawyers prefer the traditional rule and offer a number of 
good reasons for their choice.130 These include that the traditional approach, 
                                                          
 
128 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 19.  
129 Bell and Parchomovsky identify six “prototypical” pliability rules, namely classic pliability rules, loperty 
rules, simultaneous pliability rules, multi-stage pliability rules, title-shifting pliability rules and zero order 
pliability rules: see A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-79 
31-65 and JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement 
(Third) of Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 17.  
130 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 20-26. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
187 
 
prohibiting unilateral relocation of a servitude, provides legal certainty and encourages 
investment by purchasers who know exactly what they buy.131 The second argument 
in defence of the traditional rule is that a sudden change to allow modification would 
have disproportionate economic effects in that owners of servient land would suddenly 
gain an advantage and be in a better position economically because they will enjoy 
more freedom to develop and exploit their land, while owners of dominant land might 
suddenly be deprived of part of their initial entitlements in terms of the servitude 
arrangements. This could in turn affect the value of their property and they could argue 
that they would have paid less for the land (and will now receive less upon sale) had 
they known the particular details of the new relocated servitude. A third argument in 
favour of the traditional non-relocation rule holds that the new rule does not reach the 
same equality objectives as are promoted by the traditional rule. In terms of the 
traditional rule both parties to a servitude were restricted in terms of the ability to 
relocate the servitude, but the new rule maintains the restriction only for the servitude 
holder. The final argument that Lovett mentions in favour of the traditional approach 
holds that servitudes are specified property rights of which the contents cannot be 
violated or altered by any court.132 This argument accords with the conservative view 
on servitudes that courts have no discretion to allow amendments (against the will of 
the parties) to rights that were specifically and consensually created, even if this could 
promote a more efficient use of the land involved.133  
                                                          
 
131 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 20-21.  
132 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 23. 
133 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 23. 
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Lovett considers the effect of the new rule and the extent of the change it has 
brought about in diverging from the traditional common law approach. He draws the 
conclusion, after considering case law of different states over the last 60 years, that 
there has been a significant shift in the attitude of American courts toward a more 
flexible approach to servitudes in that they have been willing to take into account a 
range of policy considerations such as efficient land-use and a “doctrine of 
accommodation,” in order to balance different interests in servitude disputes.134 
Arguments for the new rule in favour of a more flexible approach promote the idea that 
servitudes should not be seen as “absolute” property rights135 but should be treated 
and advanced as resources to maximise the use of land.136 This “reconceptualization 
of easements as property interests” is to Lovett the most convincing factor in favour of 
the new Restatement’s approach. However, he admits that the approach is inherently 
limited and needs to be modified into a more subtle pliability rule.137 The three minor 
changes, or “refinements” that he proposes are discussed below. Lovett’s arguments 
pertain specifically to the change or amendment effected by the unilateral relocation 
                                                          
 
134 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 30; Roaring Fork Club LP v St Jude’s 
Co (Colo 2001) 36 P 3d 1229.  
135 It is mentioned also in the references that Lovett makes to case-law, that the nature of servitudes 
are non-possessory, and that rendering them absolute and not amendable or adaptable, defies this 
characteristic: JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement 
(Third) of Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 37 with reference to MPM 
Builders LLC v Dwyer 809 NE 2d 1053 (2004) 1058.  
136 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 32. 
137 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 6 35. 
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of a specified servitude of right of way. His discussion can, however, add value to the 
consideration of amendments to servitudes more generally. 
As his first refinement to the rule in section 4.8(3) Lovett proposes what he calls 
a two-step triggering mechanism.138 This entails that the first phase of baseline 
(property rule) protection be temporally limited. Thus, for a set period of time the 
servitude will be protected and no modification will be allowed. After the lapse of this 
period, the non-consensual modification of the servitude will be possible and an 
accessible means will be provided by which a modification might be achieved.139 The 
inspiration for this refinement came as a result of several previous suggestions by 
property scholars to impose durational limits on servitudes. As mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, Carol Rose has proposed that the parties themselves should ideally 
determine the expected lifespan of the particular servitude they are creating.140 In 
                                                          
 
138 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 47.  
139 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 52-55.  
140 CM Rose “Servitudes, security and assent: Some comments on Professors French and Reichman” 
(1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 1403-1417 1413-1414.  
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addition to this Lovett also refers to the influence of Dunham,141 Berger,142 Sterk143 
and Reichman144 in support for durational limitations on the protection of servitudes.145 
An example of a rule implementing a temporal limit on absolute protection of 
servitude rights is article 5:78 of the Dutch Civil Code, discussed in Chapter 3.146 
Confirming the position in Dutch law, Lovett states that his main motivation for this 
refinement is to address the critiques based on the idea that flexible servitudal rights 
will lead to uncertainty and discourage investment in dominant properties. He 
proposes a period of 30 years as appropriate for the initial protection stage147 and 
concludes that the implementation of a limited-period property-rule protection phase, 
followed by a classic pliability rule phase, would provide clear incentives for 
development of dominant estates (and the easements that serve them for fixed periods 
of time) and yet still limit the “social deadweight loss” that can result from perpetual 
and exclusive property rule protection.148 
                                                          
 
141 A Dunham ‘Statutory reformation of land obligations’ (1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 
1345-1352 1351.  
142 CJ Berger “Some reflections on a unified law of servitudes” (1982) 55 Southern California Law 
Review 1323-1338 1330.  
143 S Sterk “Freedom from freedom of contract: The enduring value of servitude restrictions” (1985) 70 
Iowa Law Review 615-661 656.  
144 U Reichman “Toward a unified concept of servitudes” (1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 
1177-1260 1256.  
145 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 50-52.  
146 See section 3 3 1 (fn 67) above.  
147 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 53. 
148 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 54-55.  
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The second refinement proposed by Lovett is incorporation of judicial 
involvement in the process of relocation (or amendment, if this is considered in more 
general terms). In other words, after the first stage of supreme protection has lapsed, 
and amendment has become possible, he suggests that amendment must be subject 
to judicial authorisation, in the form of a declaration of compliance with the 
requirements set in section 4.8(3).149 Lovett mentions in this regard that the 
authoritative body providing this declaration need not necessarily be a court, but can 
be an independent body duly authorised with the necessary jurisdiction to make these 
decisions.150  
 Thirdly, Lovett proposes the possibility of awarding additional monetary 
compensation to a party who does not receive any gain from the amendment of the 
servitude. He explains that the motivation behind this proposal is to prevent situations 
where one private party captures all the economic gain of a unilaterally imposed 
transaction.151 Where a servient land owner seeks a relocation of a servitude in terms 
of section 4.8(3) he will necessarily gain from such relocation, while the relocation of 
the servitude to a position that is equally suitable for the purposes of the dominant land 
owner holds no real gain for the latter. However, if the parties had been forced to 
bargain for their respective interests, the dominant owner would likely have bargained 
                                                          
 
149 See fn 124 above for the requirements set out in s 4.8(3). The same measure has been incorporated 
in South African Law by the decision in the case of Linvestment CC v Hammersley 2008 (3) SA 283 
(SCA). 
150 He makes reference in particular to the Lands Tribunal in Scotland as an example of a quasi-judicial 
institution. See section 3 4 4 above for a discussion of the authority of the Scottish Lands Tribunal in 
the variation and termination of servitudes.   
151 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 64.  
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for a better position.152 Accordingly, Lovett’s suggestion of allowing a judicial authority 
to award premium compensation, will prevent these unfair advantages and will further 
provide the possibility for decision makers to take into account any subjective factors 
that might be relevant to the specific circumstances and which could cause a dominant 
owner to place a higher value on his entitlements than may be expected.153 Apart from 
providing protection to easement holders from being exploited by servient land owners 
who want to gain exclusively from land re-arrangements, this refinement will have the 
added effect of providing an incentive to servient land owners to bargain with their 
neighbours for the outcome they desire, rather than applying to a judicial authority that 
might award compensation to the other party for (even subjective) losses.154 
Introducing the option of premium compensation will align the relocation rule with the 
other sections of the Restatement advancing the idea of modification and termination 
of servitudes in general.155 These sections seem to promote a “judicial flexibility” in the 
available remedies and, when considered in line with Lovett’s approach, the 
framework for effective pliability rule problem solving is already available throughout 
the Restatement.156  
Lovett’s contribution is thus to recognise and implement pliability rules to reach 
remedial outcomes which are flexible and do not simply provide blunt remedies based 
                                                          
 
152 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 64. 
153 This is one of the risks of a shift toward liability rules discussed in section 5 3 2 above.  
154 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 70.  
155 Section 7.10(1) allows courts to wards compensation for harm resulting from an order for modification 
or termination of servitudes.  
156 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 71-72. 
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on title without further consideration of options that could better suit the needs involved 
in a particular situation.157 This ties in with the objectives of the interest-outcome 
approach that is discussed in the following section relating to property sharing. Both 
these approaches aim to find just and pragmatic solutions to property disputes, without 
being inhibited by the rigidity of a system that only considers limited, known remedies. 
While Lovett’s pliability approach is motivated by efficiency, the interest-outcome 
model aims to take account of the moral and social elements present in property 
disputes. 
 
4 3 4  The interest-outcome perspective  
The final perspective to be considered under the flexible approach to servitudes is the 
interest-outcome model proposed by Rashmi Dyal-Chand.158 Dyal-Chand summarises 
the essence of the model as follows: 
“The interest-outcome approach is a means of resolving property disputes 
where more than one legitimate interest exists concerning use, possession, or 
access to a piece of property and where such interests are represented in the 
form of conflicting positions concerning the property”.159 
She discusses a number of cases relating to nuisance law, adverse possession and 
implied easements and argues that judges are intuitively inclined to “sharing” remedies 
                                                          
 
157 The discussion of Bell and Parchomovsky’s proposal of how the court could have approached the 
Boomer case provides a good example contrasting the blunt remedies courts often choose to the 
flexible ones that pliability rules could allow them to implement. See section 5 3 2 1 above for this 
discussion. See further A Bell & G Parchomovsky “Pliability rules” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 1-
79 5. 
158 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723. 
159 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 677.  
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in resolving disputes justly. However, their options of remedies are limited by doctrine 
and this does not leave room to address the specific situation at hand to reach the 
best outcome.160 The aim of her article, Dyal-Chand states, is to respond to this 
impulse to create or implement remedies that allow the sharing of property.161  She 
considers property disputes in a new light by proposing that they be resolved on the 
basis of a new or rearranged set of values. She contrasts the notion of property sharing 
with the current exclusionist view of property,162 and places the ideal of sharing at the 
top of her value-hierarchy.  
The interest-outcome model draws inspiration from a variety of different 
movements such as the common law writ system, negotiation theory and the property 
and liability rule paradigm as well as the view of the legal realists.163 Dyal-Chand 
further considers the criticism of the progressive property scholars on the lack of moral 
integrity in the efficiency view of property, and develops the interest outcome approach 
as an alternative which is, in Van der Walt’s words, “explicitly informed by notions of 
morality, fairness and distributive justice”.164 
Stacking these building blocks together, Dyal-Chand constructs a model which 
is aimed at providing more equitable outcomes than the winner-takes-all type of results 
                                                          
 
160 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 683-700.  
161 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 653, 683-684. 
162 JE Penner The idea of property in law (1997) 68–74; TW Merrill “Property and the right to exclude” 
(1998) 77 Nebraska Law Review 730-755 730-731. 
163 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 663 674 with 
reference to OW Holmes “The path of the law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457-478, republished 
(1997) 110 Harvard Law Review 991-1009.  
164 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 675; AJ van der 
Walt “Sharing servitudes” (2016) (forthcoming) 4.  
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yielded by an exclusionist view of property. 165 Not only does she try to provide parties 
who can show legitimate interests with some stake in the property they are pursuing, 
but she also aims to provide a route to allow the natural instincts of judges to manifest 
in real remedies. She discusses examples where judges instinctively feel the urge to 
provide the very remedies that she proposes but “lack the vocabulary and remedial 
building blocks to prioritize sharing as a practice and norm”.166 
Practically, the model proposes three steps or phases in the resolution of 
disputes. The first step is to determine what the legitimate interests of interested 
parties are in relation to the property in dispute.167 To determine legitimate interests, 
courts need to consider not only the actual and intended uses168 of the property by a 
party, but also how such use is perceived by outsiders.169 In this evaluation, a myriad 
of different factors must be considered, including the subjective needs of parties and 
their moral ties to the property at hand.170 The aim of this step is ultimately to gain 
information that could enable a court to accommodate different uses of the property 
based on the needs and intentions of the parties.171 
                                                          
 
165 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 655, 677.  
166 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 655.  
167 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 677.  
168 The consideration of intended use is aimed at facilitating long-term planning, protecting the current 
reliance interest of the parties and at a fair evaluation of compatible uses.  
169 See R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 707-708 
(explaining that the consideration of perceived use will include contemplation of the needs of the 
community concerning the specific type of property, the current development trends relating to such 
property, and the ways in which the type of property supports local and regional economic 
development).  
170 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 707-708.  
171 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 708. 
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The second step is to consider the possible outcomes that would best suit each 
party’s interests.172 Based on the legitimacy of the interests determined in the previous 
phase, this part of the process is aimed at developing an outcome (preferably in the 
form of injunctive relief) that suits and accommodates the specific situation of the 
parties, that is nuanced to their needs and can effectively solve their dispute.173 Dyal-
Chand emphasises the importance in this phase to view use not as one of the factors 
considered in determining an appropriate outcome, but as an outcome in and of 
itself.174 The ideal would be for courts to create solutions encompassing shared use 
of property that could satisfy the needs of both parties in a dispute.175 
The third step of the process includes a consideration of ownership and other 
formal entitlements to evaluate their relevance and determine the weight they will carry 
in guiding a court toward the most appropriate outcome in a particular dispute.176 Dyal-
Chand proposes that the use-considerations in the previous two steps should have 
revealed the moral connection of the parties to the property. The result is that these 
moral connections should inform the weight of the formal entitlements to the property 
in determining an appropriate remedy. The stronger the moral and personal 
connection to the property, the stronger the protection a party will enjoy.177 In the same 
                                                          
 
172 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 677. 
173 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 710-712.  
174 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 711.  
175 See R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 where it is 
stated that: “[T]he simultaneity of uses is possible in more settings than those involving investors on the 
one hand and those making physical use of the property on the other. Even in the case of an owner 
with a strong moral connection to a particular parcel of land, it is quite likely that such an owner would 
not require the use of her property down to the ‘centre of the earth’, and that a court could find ways in 
which to accommodate other uses beyond the limitations imposed by traditional implied easements.” 
176 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 677. 
177 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 714. 
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sense, if the moral connection to the property is weak, a party might lose certain use-
rights and be required to share the property with a party who has obtained some 
legitimate interest in the property. The result of this phase of dispute resolution is a 
reversal of the traditional approach in which title is first established and remedies 
assigned based on the strongest right. What Dyal-Chand aims to achieve is a system 
where the remedy is determined based on the legitimacy of a party’s interest in the 
property, and thereafter, entitlements are assigned to the parties based on the 
appropriate remedy decided on by the court.178 
Dyal-Chand acknowledges that there are certain challenges to the model, the 
most significant of these probably being that the model would create uncertainty and 
unpredictability of property rights and that this would cause market instability.179  
Van der Walt applies this sharing perspective to the context of South African 
servitude law.180 What becomes apparent through this practical application is that 
although considerations of morality and fairness or “equity” might require a wider range 
of remedies to enable fair outcomes, the law does not always provide these remedies. 
One of the examples Van der Walt refers to is the case of Roseveare v Katmer,181 an 
                                                          
 
178 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 715.  
179 R Dyal-Chand “Sharing the cathedral” (2013) 46 Connecticut Law Review 647-723 681. Dyal-Chand 
explains the view of law and economics scholars based on the notion that low transaction costs exist 
where exclusive ownership is easily ascertainable and clear-cut. On the other hand, where exclusive 
ownership is not as easily determined, as would be the case in a system of property sharing, transaction 
costs are drastically increased. She further states that according to HE Smith “Property and property 
rules” (2004) 79 New York University Law Review 1719-1798 1754-1755 & 1763-64 it would be too 
costly for anyone other than the owners of property to identify and allocate different property uses to 
different entitlement holders.  
180 AJ van der Walt “Sharing servitudes” (2016) (forthcoming).  
181 Roseveare v Katmer [2013] ZAGPJHC 18 (28 February 2013). 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
198 
 
encroachment case in which the court found that the solution to an existing 
encroachment dispute was to leave in place the minimal encroachment and order the 
registration of a servitude over the affected land.182 Although courts have the authority 
to leave an encroachment in place,183 the authoritative grounds for the creation of a 
servitude in this manner, against the will of the servient owner, is unclear.184 Apart 
from the creation of a right of way of necessity or an order establishing a servitude 
acquired through prescription, there is no common law rule providing courts with the 
authority to order the creation of a servitude.185 However, in this case Willis J makes 
the following statement:  
“I have applied my mind to the question of whether a little ‘judicial imagination’ 
may be appropriate in making the order in this case. Is there a way in which 
one can resolve this dispute that is correct and defensible as a matter of law 
but is one which, as an instrument of conflict resolution, ‘sonde met die bure’ 
may be transformed into ‘vrede met die bure’?”  186 
From this statement, it seems as though Willis J is doing to a large extent what Dyal-
Chand calls for in her sharing approach. He aims to resolve the dispute between the 
parties in a manner that would result in a peaceful continuation of their 
neighbourliness, and in doing so, he enforces a remedy that seems most likely to reach 
                                                          
 
182 Roseveare v Katmer [2013] ZAGPJHC 18 (28 February 2013) para 22.  
183 ZT Boggenpoel “Creating a servitude to solve an encroachment dispute: A solution or creating 
another problem?” (2013) 16 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 455-486 459. 
184 ZT Boggenpoel “Creating a servitude to solve an encroachment dispute: A solution or creating 
another problem?” (2013) 16 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 455-486 472; AJ van der Walt 
“Sharing servitudes” (2016) (forthcoming) 32.  
185 AJ van der Walt “Sharing servitudes” (2016) (forthcoming) 32-33. 
186 Roseveare v Katmer [2013] ZAGPJHC 18 (28 February 2013) para 18.  
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this outcome. Whether this is an approach we want courts to follow in South African 
law, is a different question.  
The value that I believe should be drawn from the property sharing perspective 
lies in the consideration of the different interests of the parties involved, as embodied 
in their respective uses of the property. Servitude cases, always entail the sharing of 
property and courts have a discretion to weigh the interests of the parties and reach 
an outcome favouring one set of interests above another. Dyal-Chand’s suggestions 
urging judges to take account of wider moral interests and subjective factors of the 
parties involved in a dispute can add value to servitude cases. Van der Walt also 
emphasises Dyal-Chand’s focus on actual use of the property by the parties.187 If these 
considerations are taken into account along with economic and other utilitarian factors 
in the exercise of judicial discretion, the possibility for fair and justifiable outcomes will 
increase – even if courts do remain bound by the remedial framework that they have 
at their disposal.  
 
4 4  Conclusion 
The aim of the traditional requirements for the establishment of servitudes is to limit 
the rights which can burden properties perpetually. The effect is that all those rights 
which do not seem to be objectively useful and might not be regarded as beneficial by 
future owners, are filtered out. Nevertheless, it became apparent in Chapter 3 that 
even though these rights are so strictly regulated at establishment, various 
jurisdictions are struggling with burdens that are created, and accordingly, remain valid 
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over properties, but of which the value that they add to the property is in dispute. In 
this chapter, different theoretical views have showed that unwanted burdens over 
property are obstacles to the free and efficient development of land.  
There are different approaches toward servitudes that aim first and foremost to 
protect the stability of property law and ensure security of title. These arguments are 
aimed at either increasing the ex ante controls over the creation of servitudes, or by 
rendering the law of servitudes free of public regulation as long as notice (by way of 
registration) is ensured. However, both these approaches are inherently flawed as 
they do not properly take account of the character of servitudes as property rights in a 
modern and dynamic property economy. Accordingly, this approach does not enjoy 
much support from the majority of property scholars as the need for flexibility in 
property relations currently outweighs the arguments for adherence to such a rigid 
approach. 
The much wider range of literature from various jurisdictions relating to the 
modernisation of servitude law by adding a measure of flexibility indicates an 
acknowledgement of the fact that preferences and circumstances relating to property 
change, and that property law is not isolated from this reality and must be able to 
adapt. 
The economic and utilitarian point of view shows that a shift has taken place in 
recent years towards a tendency of applying compensatory remedies to property 
disputes in general, but also to servitude disputes in particular.188 This shift has 
brought about a certain reconceptualisation of servitudes to be viewed not as the 
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unchangeable and static property rights they once were, but as evolving property 
relationships between parties with concurrent interests in the same land.189 
Accordingly, the need has arisen to also adapt the way in which these rights are 
regulated. To respond to their capacity to evolve, there should be mechanisms to re-
evaluate the status of servitude rights after their creation and reconsider the value that 
they add to property arrangements in an ex post manner.  
One of the main concerns highlighted from different theoretical perspectives is 
that of property fragmentation, or more generally, the problem of obsolete burdens on 
properties curtailing development of and investment in land. There seems to be wide-
ranging support for enabling the removal of burdens, although the ways suggested to 
enforce such removal differ. However, the conclusion that can be drawn from the 
different perspectives is that the incorporation of flexibility into the regulation of 
servitudes does not have to mean sacrificing security or stability in the property 
system.   
Much of the literature on this topic is approached from a utilitarian perspective, 
focussed often on economic or other wealth-maximising outcomes. This is not 
necessarily the most desirable approach. In the democratic society we live in, we need 
to take stock of the values of individuals and the standards of morality and fairness 
that drive our society.  
Lovett’s pliability rule approach is a good example of how existing property law 
remedies can be applied in a manner that accommodates both the security provided 
by property rule protection and the necessesary flexibility that is incorporated by 
                                                          
 
189 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 77.  
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allowing a shift towards liability rule protection where this is necessary in order to avoid 
typical winner-takes-all outcomes. Furthermore, the possibility for courts to award 
premium compensation in certain instances to equalise the outcomes of coersive 
remedies can be a valuable tool to provide the balance between security and flexibility 
in servitude law. Furthermore, in considering compensation awards, courts should 
take account of the values advanced by Dyal-Chand’s interest-outcome model.  
The value of the interest-outcome model lies in its emphasis of the fact that 
formal title to property should not be accepted to trump all other interests and lead to 
blunt exclusion remedies. Because servitudes always involve the sharing of property, 
and entails a weighing of the interests of the parties to reach a justifiable outcome, a 
consideration of wider interests such as the actual use of the property and other 
subjective and moral interests relevant in a dispute can enhance the remedial process.  
By way of summary, a number of conclusions can be drawn from this chapter. 
The more general conclusion is that it is possible to introduce flexibility into property 
law without sacrificing the security of existing rights. Furthermore, a number of 
conclusions have particular relevance to the area of servitude law. Some of the 
strategies used to implement flexibility in servitude law are relatively easily justifiable. 
In this regard the unilateral relocation of a servitude of right of way is theoretically 
easily justified - especially in light of the conditions and limitations that Lovett suggest 
as pliability rule refinements. However, in other cases, where the need for flexibility is 
stronger than the need to ensure the security of existing rights, even though the 
theoretical justifiability is not as strong, compensation can play an important role in 
restoring the balance between these values. Finally, Dyal-Chand’s argument that the 
sharing of property can and should lead to more efficient use of land if it is approached 
from the right perspective, can also play a valuable role in servitude law. As mentioned 
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before, servitudes always require the sharing of property, and Dyal-Chand’s 
arguments increase the need to ensure that servitudes function efficiently. 
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5 1  Introduction 
“The accommodation of change is a continuing challenge that we, as human 
beings, face. On the one hand, we crave the novel, the better, the excitement 
of something new. On the other hand, we seek security, the guaranteed, the 
comfort of what is known. Tensions between these human impulses can be 
found throughout law.”1 
In Chapter 2 it was established that South African law follows a relatively conservative 
approach toward servitudes. According to this approach, servitudes are regulated in a 
predominantly ex ante manner, primarily by limiting the rights that may be established 
as servitudes, with the goal of minimising the burdens on property that might detract 
from the unity of ownership. For the most part, servitudes are given content with 
reference to the wording of the deed of servitude, interpreted in light of the 
circumstances existing at the time the right was created. By their very nature, 
servitudal rights are created to outlive property owners and they often exist for a very 
long time. Consequently, regulating these rights in an ex ante fashion, with the point 
of departure being the time of establishment, is problematic and might lead to 
inefficient use of land as a valuable resource. 
This chapter explores the implications of the comparative and theoretical views 
on the regulation of servitudes. Since the topic of this research is focussed specifically 
on ancillary rights to servitudes, that will be the basis of the discussion that follows. It 
has been established earlier in this dissertation that South African law does not accept 
the doctrine of implied servitudes as it is recognised in English and Scots law (or the 
                                                          
 
1 LS Underkuffler “Property and change: The constitutional conundrum” (2013) 91 Texas Law Review 
2015-2037 2036.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
206 
 
doctrine of destination in Louisiana law).2 Implied servitudes and servitudes created 
by destination are considered in Chapter 3 simply to distinguish these rights, and the 
law that regulates them, from implied ancillary rights and because there are some 
aspects of the law of implication that are interesting and helpful in a discussion of 
implied ancillary rights. The focus is thus on ancillary rights and, where relevant, 
implied ancillary rights.   
The South African law relating to ancillary rights is not currently applied with 
much consistency. It was established in Chapter 2 that the terminology employed by 
courts include references to “implied terms”, “implied rights” and ancillary rights 
(occasionally called accessory or auxiliary rights) and is used interchangeably to refer 
to the same type of rights – those resulting from the maxim that all the rights necessary 
for the effective exercise of a servitude are deemed to be granted along with it.3 
By placing these inconsistencies in South African law in perspective against the 
foreign jurisdictions considered, it becomes apparent that two types of (implied) 
                                                          
 
2 Section 2 6 above contains an overview of the supplementary rights accepted in South African 
servitude law.  
3 The law relating to implied servitudes in the foreign jurisdictions considered, is discussed to reach 
clarity on the confusion of the references in South African law to “implied terms” or implied rights” in 
relation to implied ancillary rights. South African law does not acknowledge the creation of servitudes 
by way of implication as it is seen in the foreign jurisdictions considered. The closest comparison to the 
implied servitudes discussed under foreign jurisdictions is an implied right of access which is created 
when a property is landlocked, either by way of the rules of right of way of necessity or upon subdivision 
of a property, where implied consent is read into the terms of the subdivision to provide access over 
one part of the subdivided property to the part of the land that is now cut off from access to a public 
road, although this second method is disputed. (See section 2 2 (fn 5) above for a discussion of this 
method of implication). Since a right of access from a landlocked property to a public road is rather a 
servitude created by necessity, it cannot be said to constitute an implied servitude as known in English, 
Scots and Louisiana law. See on this point C Sara Boundaries and easements 5 ed (2011) 295; DJ 
Cusine & RRM Paisley Servitudes and rights of way (1998) 286-287, 367-368. 
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ancillary rights can be identified. The first type includes those rights that are always 
implied by law to form part of certain servitudes; for example, in the case of a servitude 
to draw water, a right of access to the water source or a right to inspect the pipes 
carrying the water will always be implied.4 These ancillary rights can be seen as 
forming part of the naturalia, or the expected implied contents of all servitudes of a 
certain type. An access right to the servitude works in order to perform maintenance 
duties will be implied as an ancillary right to most servitudes. A number of other specific 
examples are mentioned by the Roman-Dutch writers.5 The right to draw water always 
includes an ancillary access right to the water source;6 and where only an access right 
to a water source is granted, it can be assumed that a right to draw water is implied.7 
Furthermore, a servitude of pasturage or watering of cattle could include the right to 
erect a hut on the servient land to provide shelter in case of storms;8 and a right of 
way includes the right to build steps or ramps in order to reach the dominant property 
from the servitude road or path, while a servitude of footpassage includes the right to 
build bridges and other structures to make the route properly accessible.9  
The second type of ancillary right is more controversial. Based on Voet’s maxim 
that all rights necessary for the effective exercise of a servitude are deemed to be 
granted along with it, this type of ancillary right includes any right which is necessary 
                                                          
 
4 Voet 8 4 16; D 8 3 3 3; Huber Hedendaegse rechtsgeleertheyt 2 43 16. 
5 See section 2 5 above for a detailed discussion.  
6 D 8 3 3 3. 
7 D 8 3 3 3. 
8 D 8 3 6; R Paisley “The demon drink and the straight and narrow way: The expansion and limitation 
of praedial servitudes” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 
193-237 234. 
9 Voet 8 4 16. 
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in a particular instance for the effective enjoyment of the main servitudal right.10 What 
is necessary in a particular instance will depend on the circumstances surrounding the 
servitude. The controversy surrounding these rights is rooted in the difficulty of 
determining when rights will be regarded as sufficiently necessary to be accepted as 
ancillary rights without requiring a modification or renegotiation of the servitude.  
Options for the possible development of the common law in this area are 
discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, from a comparative and theoretical perspective 
respectively. In the South African context, the Constitution plays a crucial role in any 
development of the law, and a constitutional analysis of possible developments is thus 
necessary to ensure alignment within the single-system-of-law principle under the 
Constitution. The constitutional aspects are discussed in section 5 5 below.  
 
5 2 The problem of rigidity in the South African law of servitudes 
In Chapter 2, a survey of the South African law of servitudes reveals that the current 
approach toward the regulation of servitude rights is not only uncertain and outdated, 
but also problematic in view of the modern function of property.11 Very little provision 
is made in South African law for the flexible regulation of servitudes. 
It is important to mention that there are areas in foreign law where measures 
for flexible regulation have been put in place which are not necessary in South African 
law because the same problems are solved by different means. The function of implied 
servitudes (or servitudes by destination) at subdivision of land is fulfilled in South 
                                                          
 
10 Voet 8 4 16. 
11 See section 2 7 above.  
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African law by the right of way of necessity to solve the problem of inefficient use of 
land after subdivision. Furthermore, the possibility of unilateral relocation of right of 
way servitudes did not previously exist in South African law, but has been provided for 
by the development effected in the case of Linvestment CC v Hammersley.12 This 
matter has also been dealt with in literature to some extent.13  
 Apart from these instances there remains a need for possibilities of flexible ex 
post regulation of servitudes in South African law. The particular questions that I 
address include the possibilities for the acceptance of new ancillary rights to render 
servitudes more flexible in light of changed circumstances; the amendment of existing 
servitudes or ancillary rights for the same purpose; and the possibility for the 
termination of rights that have become obsolete or inefficient.  
The common law principles that currently regulate servitudes can roughly be 
divided into two general categories: those that focus on maintaining stability in the 
property system and those aimed at regulating the continued relationship between the 
parties to a servitude. The former set of principles function primarily through limiting 
the establishment of servitudes by enforcement of ex ante controls, such as the validity 
requirements and the subtraction from the dominium test, to ensure clarity and security 
of title; the latter is aimed at ensuring that the on-going relationship between the parties 
to a servitude is based on the principle of reasonableness. A servitude holder is 
required to exercise his rights civiliter modo, with due regard for the interests of the 
servient proprietor. In this way a servient proprietor is provided protection of his 
                                                          
 
12 Linvestment CC v Hammersley 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA). 
13 LA Kiewitz Relocation of a specified servitude of right of way (unpublished LLM thesis, Stellenbosch 
University, 2010); AJ van der Walt “Development of the common law of servitude” (2013) 130 South 
African Law Journal 722-756.  
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property interests. On the other hand, the dominant proprietor enjoys the right to do 
all that is necessary (and thus enjoy all necessary ancillary rights) to make effective 
use of his servitude. Ancillary rights can therefore be “implied” as part of servitude 
arrangements insofar as they are necessary for the effective exercise of the 
servitude.14 However, these principles are often employed in a manner that effectively 
defies their purpose as forward-looking, ex post regulatory controls.15 
Examples in case law show that the principles intended to govern the 
relationship between the parties are not applied in the flexible ex post, “after the fact” 
manner that can enable them to provide adequate continued regulation of the 
servitude relationship. When courts do not find a sufficient solution by applying the 
basic common law principles of servitude law, they often try to find a solution by shifting 
their focus to the originating document in order to gain more information on exactly 
what the contents and scope of the rights are.16 In doing so, they tend to 
overemphasise the role of the originating agreement and by focussing their attention 
on the time of establishment of the rights, they again approach these rights from an 
ex ante point of view. The outcome is that courts determine “what is necessary for the 
effective use of the servitude” not in light of current circumstances, but by looking back 
at the intention of the original parties and the circumstances existing at the time the 
rights were granted. Not only is it often impossible to do so due to the long time lapse 
since the creation of the rights, but it is also impractical in a modern and dynamic 
society where preferences and circumstances are expected to change over time. 
                                                          
 
14 See section 2 6 above.  
15 See sections 2 4 and 2 7 above.  
16 See section 2 5 above.  
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Courts have stated in various cases that this approach is based on the contention that 
the same rules apply to the interpretation of servitudes as to the interpretation of 
contracts.17 However, in the process of determining the content and scope of a 
servitude, the interpretation of the originating document or deed can only be one of 
various factors that a court should take into consideration, as the outcome should not 
be a contractual one, but a fair determination of the contents of a real right. However, 
courts seem to often confuse the idea of “interpreting a servitude” (determining its 
contents) with interpreting the words of the originating document. These are two 
different things as the former relates to real rights in land, and the latter to purely 
contractual rights.  
The case of Zeeman v De Wet18 provides a good illustration of this point. The 
parties in this case were owners of two neighbouring farms. The dominant property, 
owned by Zeeman, enjoyed a servitude to draw water from the servient land and to 
lead it to the dominant land by way of two pipes laid in a cement ditch over a specified 
route. The servitude deed also contained a clause to the effect that the dominant 
proprietor enjoyed a right of access to the servient land to inspect the pipes and ensure 
the proper flow of water.19 However, when the De Wet family became owners of the 
servient land, they requested an amendment of the original servitude agreement to 
the effect that the cement ditch and pipes be replaced by underground pipelines and 
that the route whereby the water is led to Zeeman’s property be relocated.20 Zeeman 
                                                          
 
17 Le Roux NO & Others v Burger & Others (21020/2008) [2010] ZAWCHC 127 (10 June 2010) para 
12. See the discussion of the case in section 2 5 above.  
18 Zeeman v De Wet NO and Others 2012 (6) SA 1 (SCA). 
19 Zeeman v De Wet NO and Others 2012 (6) SA 1 (SCA) para 8. 
20 Zeeman v De Wet NO and Others 2012 (6) SA 1 (SCA) para 4. 
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agreed to this amendment and a written agreement to this effect was registered. The 
agreement also contained a clause providing that the servient proprietor (De Wet) 
takes upon himself all responsibility for the maintenance and proper functioning of the 
pipes. However, a dispute arose as a result of vineyards planted perpendicular to the 
new route so that the pipeline was no longer easily accessible for inspection. A person 
would be required to walk all along and in between the rows of vineyards to reach the 
pipeline for inspection, and then turn back to do the same in every third row.21 This is 
obviously a significantly more cumbersome way for the dominant land owner to ensure 
the maintenance and proper functioning of his pipes. However, the court found that 
because the servient owner had taken all the maintenance duties on himself, the 
dominant owner no longer had any reason to inspect the pipes.22 In this regard, it must 
be noted that the imposition of maintenance duties on the servient proprietor would 
have the effect of creating a positive obligation on the servient proprietor, which is not 
allowed in terms of South African servitude law. Accordingly, this clause will create a 
personal obligation between the parties but cannot be registered as part of the 
servitude to constitute a real right, and will not be enforceable by or against third 
parties. A third party acquiring the dominant land could claim his reasonable right of 
access to inspect the pipes on the servient land. This case illustrates the significance 
of the distinction between an interpretation of the servitude deed or agreement and 
interpreting or establishing the actual content and scope of the servitude in terms of 
property principles. 
                                                          
 
21 Zeeman v De Wet NO and Others 2012 (6) SA 1 (SCA) para 6.  
22 Zeeman v De Wet NO and Others 2012 (6) SA 1 (SCA) para 18. 
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If courts applied the common law principles intended to regulate the relationship 
between the parties in an ex post manner, being guided not only by the original 
agreement and the intention of the parties who concluded it, but also by the current 
context of the servitude and the needs of the current parties, they might be able to 
reach fair and effective outcomes that are justified in terms of the current common law 
principles. The effect would be flexible regulation of servitudes that takes account of 
changed circumstances, without sacrificing the security that the stabilising servitude 
principles aim to ensure.  
The reality of changed circumstances means that servitudes can no longer be 
seen as static, unchangeable rights. Not only must their content and scope be 
determined with reference to current circumstances and preferences, but it might also 
be necessary to modify existing rights to adapt to changing circumstances so that they 
will not become obsolete or inefficient burdens on land.   
Currently, the common law holds that servitudes may only be amended with the 
mutual consent of the parties. The development of the common law in the case of 
Linvestment CC v Hammersley23 is an exception to this approach. In that case, the 
court allowed unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right of way in favour of 
the servient proprietor. It considered various comparative and policy reasons in favour 
of allowing unilateral relocation and concluded that the interests of justice required the 
development of this area of law. Accordingly, the common law was developed by court 
order to the effect that an owner of a dominant property will henceforth be obliged to 
accept the offer of a servient proprietor to relocate an existing (defined) servitude of 
                                                          
 
23 Linvestment CC v Hammersley 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA). See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the case.  
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right of way, subject to a number of conditions. It must be shown that (i) the servient 
owner is or will be materially inconvenienced in the use of his property by the status 
quo; (ii) the relocation will occur on the servient property; (iii) the change will not 
prejudice the owner of the dominant property; and (iv) the servient proprietor will pay 
all costs relating to the relocation and amendment of the title deeds to that effect. The 
relocation will thus only be allowed on application of the servient proprietor and by 
order of court, after these factors have been considered.  This decision appears to 
create some flexibility in the regulation of servitudes, but the modification created by it 
is limited in scope and the servitude system generally is still subject to rigid ex ante 
regulation. 
If servitudes are viewed in light of their current circumstances and the general 
intention of the original parties to create a long-standing relationship to achieve 
increased productivity in the use of the properties in a specific way, it should be 
possible to amend the scope of the servitude to still reach that goal in changed 
circumstances. This can either be done by way of recognising new ancillary rights that 
might be necessary to render the servitude effective in the new circumstances or by 
allowing amendment of existing servitudes or their ancillary rights. The amendment of 
existing rights should be aimed at achieving an outcome where the servitude can 
function effectively without imposing a burden on the servient tenement that cannot be 
reconciled with the purpose of the servitude in the current context. If this is not 
possible, it might be necessary to consider termination of the rights.  
Consequently, if what is necessary for the proper utilisation of the servitude is 
perceived from the perspective of current circumstances and needs, recognition of 
implied ancillary rights might contribute a measure of flexibility in favour of the 
dominant proprietor without requiring an amendment of the actual terms of the 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
215 
 
servitude. This will also contribute to a fair balance in the protection provided to 
dominant and servient proprietors. Not only are servient proprietors protected by the 
rule that servitudes are to be interpreted strictly, but the development effected in 
Linvestment further created the option for unilateral amendment of the servitude 
conditions by servient proprietors, subject to judicial discretion and a regulatory 
framework that protects the interests of the dominant owner.   
   
5 3  Rationale for a flexible approach  
There seems to be a tendency in some legal systems to modernise servitude law by 
introducing flexibility into the way servitudes are regulated. Apart from the theoretical 
literature on the recent shift that has taken place from a traditionally ex ante approach 
toward ex post regulation of servitudes,24 the implementation of regulatory measures 
in various jurisdictions that allow for the variation and termination of servitudes 
provides a good illustration of this point.25 
 Foreign jurisdictions have approached the incorporation of flexibility into the 
regulatory framework of servitude law in different ways. The possibility of unilateral 
relocation of specified servitudes of right of way is one measure employed to 
overcome the negative effects of the rigidity in servitude law. Another possibility is the 
                                                          
 
24 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 48-50; S French “The American 
Restatement of servitude law: Reforming doctrine by shifting from ex ante to ex post controls on the 
risks posed by servitudes” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of land burdens 
(2006) 109-118 112; AJ van der Walt “The continued relevance of servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law 
Review 3-35. See the discussion in section 4 3 2 of the shift from ex ante to ex post regulation of 
servitudes.  
25 See section 3 6 above.  
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modification or termination of servitude rights, which have been implemented to 
different extents in the jurisdictions considered as part of the comparative overview in 
this regard. While Scotland, for instance, only allows the modification or termination of 
servitude rights in favour of servient proprietors in order to protect the stability of 
property rights, the American Restatement values innovation in land use and 
development more, and allows much wider flexibility in the modification of burdens to 
fully accomplish their original purpose.26 There are also other, more nuanced 
approaches. The Dutch approach allows the modification or termination of servitudes 
on application of servient proprietors, without many restrictions.27 However, 
applications brought by dominant proprietors are subject to specific restrictions and 
strict scrutiny.28 This approach aims to satisfy the need for flexibility by allowing 
modification in favour of both parties but, at the same time, the value of stability is 
given effect to by providing adequate protection of the servient proprietor’s ownership 
entitlements by limiting the possibility for a dominant proprietor to claim more extensive 
rights as part of his servitude.29 Another middle ground that has been suggested is the 
imposition of durational limits on servitudes, requiring renegotiation of servitude rights 
after a set period that is determined upon their creation as the expected lifespan of the 
particular rights.30 Rose suggests the implementation of a durational limit to require 
                                                          
 
26 S 7.10 and s 8.3 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes (2000). See also S French “The 
American Restatement of servitude law: Reforming doctrine by shifting from ex ante to ex post controls 
on the risks posed by servitudes” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of land 
burdens (2006) 109-118 112-114. 
27 BW 5:78-79. See also section 3 2 3 above.  
28 BW 5:80. 
29 See section 3 2 3 above for a detailed discussion of BW 5:80 that regulates this matter.  
30 CM Rose “Servitudes, security and assent: Some comments on Professors French and Reichman” 
(1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 1403-1417 1414 ; A Dunham “Statutory reformation of land 
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parties to determine the expected lifespan of a servitude at the time of its creation and 
to require renegotiation of the rights after this time, or additionally, to have legislation 
determine the lifespan of particular rights. Some US states have implemented 
durational limits of 20 or 30 years on particular rights31 and the option in Dutch law for 
the servient proprietor to apply for the variation or limitation of a servitude based on 
changed circumstances is limited for the first 20 years after creation of the rights.32 In 
Scots law a presumptive durational limit of 100 years has been placed on real burdens, 
and this could be equally applicable to servitudes.33 Another measure of flexibility was 
introduced in Scots law by the decision of Moncrieff v Jamieson,34 which arguably 
created the possibility for the acceptance of new ancillary rights added to an existing 
servitude where this is deemed necessary.  
There are thus a number of possibilities for the incorporation of flexibility into 
the regulatory framework of servitudes that are recurrent across a number of 
                                                          
 
obligations” (1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 1345-1352 1351; CJ Berger “Some reflections 
on a unified law of servitudes” (1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 1323-1338 1330; U Reichman 
“Toward a unified concept of servitudes” (1982) 55 Southern California Law Review 1177-1260 1256; 
S Sterk “Freedom from freedom of contract: The enduring value of servitude restrictions” (1985) 70 
Iowa Law Review 615-661 642-643; JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability 
in the new Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 52-
55. See sections 4 3 2 and 4 3 3 3 above for a discussion of different proposals for durational limits on 
servitudes.   
31 S Sterk “Freedom from freedom of contract: The enduring value of servitude restrictions” (1985) 70 
Iowa Law Review 615-661 642-643.  
32 BW 5:78; JAJ Peter “Erfdienstbaarheden” (Titel 6) in WM Kleijn & AA Velten (eds) Zakelijke rechten 
(supplement 27, 2003) 78-1.  
33 In terms of s 20-21 of the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 the rights are presumptively 
discharged. See section 3 4 3 above.  
34 Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42 para 29-30. See also sections 3 4 3 and 3 4 4 for a discussion 
of the case and its impact.  
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jurisdictions: durational limits on the lifespan of particular servitudes; the possibility of 
relocation of servitudes of right of way; judicial amendment of existing servitude rights; 
or the termination of servitudes in light of changed circumstances. The possibility of 
adding new ancillary rights to an existing servitude, as it was done in the Moncrieff 
case, is one possibility that is not common to all jurisdictions, although it is a valuable 
option to consider in the South African context. It is possible that the need for this 
mechanism is reduced by more liberal options for flexibility (such as judicial 
amendment), but it is not entirely certain how different jurisdictions would approach 
the situation if it were to arise. As is indicated in section 5 2 above, some of these 
flexibility strategies already exist in South African law – the question here is whether 
the others could also be adopted.  
Theoretically, some of these mechanisms will be easily justifiable. The argument 
for flexibility in the form of unilateral relocation of specified servitudes of right of way 
will be justifiable in light of efficiency and other policy reasons, especially taking 
account of the conditions and specific requirements that must be met before it is 
permitted.35 Other measures to allow amendment of servitude entitlements in favour 
of servient proprietors can be supported on the same grounds. However, there is some 
reluctance to allow flexibility in favour of dominant proprietors, based on concerns for 
the effect that this will have on the stability of property rights and the general sense of 
security experienced by property owners.36 In cases where the need for flexibility in 
the regulation of servitudes is greater than the need to maintain security, 
                                                          
 
35 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 77; LA Kiewitz Relocation of a specified 
servitude of right of way (unpublished LLM thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2010) 150.  
36 See section 3 2 3 above.  
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compensation can provide a valuable solution to the imbalance that arises and to 
effect an outcome that ensures stability, albeit by way of liability rule protection.37 
Furthermore, as servitudes are good examples of property sharing, it is necessary to 
consider them not as static rights, but rather in light of their function as long-term 
relationships between property owners to use property efficiently to the shared benefit 
of all interested parties.38 A flexible approach that takes account of all current interests 
in the properties involved in a particular case is thus in line with recent developments 
in property theory.39 
Essentially, all the statutory (and other) interventions considered here are 
aimed at improving on the traditional regulation of servitudes as static and 
unchangeable rights by allowing them flexibility, to different extents, to evolve as long-
term property relationships aimed primarily at the most productive and beneficial 
utilisation of land.40 To effectively achieve this goal servitudes must be viewed and 
accepted as property rights and not as mere creations of contract. Placing undue 
emphasis on the originating agreement means denying servitude relationships the 
opportunity to evolve with changing circumstances or public policy. It diminishes the 
value of servitude rights as real rights in land, aimed to achieve something more than 
personal rights between specific parties. The inadequacy of the contractual approach 
lies not only in its inability to provide for instances where servitudes are created ex 
lege, or in the difficulty of determining the intention of the original parties who might 
                                                          
 
37 See references to compensation in sections 4 3 2 and 4 4 above.  
38 See section 4 3 4 above.  
39 AJ van der Walt “Sharing servitudes” (2016) (forthcoming) 3. 
40 JA Lovett “A bend in the road: Easement relocation and pliability in the new Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes” (2005) 38 Connecticut Law Review 1-77 77.  
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have created the rights in a completely different context, but in the fact that it 
diminishes the protection that the parties should enjoy in terms of the common law 
property principles that are aimed at governing their continued relationship.41 In 
relation to ancillary rights, Reid emphasises that the fact that a (ancillary) right is 
implied does not require that it be implied as a term of a contract.42 His preference for 
a test based on a freestanding rule rather than an implied term is based on the 
convincing argument that the former is rooted in sound legal policy, while the latter is 
a result of something as indeterminate as the presumed intention of the parties at the 
time the servitude was granted.43 
To respond to changed preferences and conditions, a re-evaluation of a 
servitude might be necessary at certain points after its creation. Furthermore, the 
scope of a servitude and “all that is necessary for its effective exercise” might change 
over time. In jurisdictions where the modification of servitude rights is possible, the 
need for a wide or flexible view of “what is necessary for the effective exercise of the 
rights” is reduced significantly.44 In Dutch law, for instance, the issue of ancillary rights 
is not discussed in much detail, although the principle that a servitude includes all 
necessary rights is equally applicable. Furthermore, if one imagines a situation 
                                                          
 
41 See section 5 2 above. Refer also to the discussion in section 2 4 on the interaction between the 
principle that the dominant proprietor may do all that is necessary for the effective use of his servitude 
with the principle that requires civiliter modo exercise of the servitude by imposing the least possible 
burden on the servient proprietor.  
42 KGC Reid “Accessory rights in servitudes” (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 455-459 457. 
43 KGC Reid “Accessory rights in servitudes” (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 455-459 456-457. See 
also See KGC Reid & GL Gretton Conveyancing (2007) 113-114 and KGC Reid “Praedial servitudes” 
in EC Reid & VV Palmer (eds) Mixed jurisdictions compared: Private law in Louisiana and Scotland 
(2009) 1-29 13-14.  
44 See section 3 6 above.  
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regulated by the American Restatement where the amendment or termination of 
servitude rights, by either dominant or servient owners, is available where 
circumstances change, there would be no real need to widen the scope of the doctrine 
for implied ancillary rights.  
However, in South African law, the possibility of statutory intervention to allow for 
the variation or termination of servitude rights is slim.45 The current uncodified system 
of servitude law needs to develop innovative measures within the common law 
framework to incorporate a measure of flexibility into the wider regulatory framework 
of servitude law. Ancillary rights might have a role to play in the South African servitude 
system to introduce a measure of flexibility to servitude rights where circumstances 
change to the extent that the rights of servitude holders are diminished, but cannot 
otherwise be modified. 
However, it is necessary that the law regulating the possibility for ancillary rights 
is clear and flexible at the same time. To achieve this the law must take account not 
only of maintaining the necessary stability in property law by way of ex ante regulation, 
but also of the need to view servitudes in their current context (ex post) and make 
optimal use of the available tools to increase flexibility. Because the test for ancillary 
rights leaves much room for uncertainty, a development of the law pertaining to 
ancillary rights might be enhanced by a non-exclusive list of factors that courts and 
parties may take into consideration in determining when rights will be deemed to 
satisfy the test of “what is necessary for the effective use of the servitude”.46 
                                                          
 
45 See sections 1 2 and 2 7.  
46 See section 3 3 4 explaining that in the process of reforming the law of implied servitudes in English 
law, the Law Commission acknowledged that determining what is necessary in a specific instance might 
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Theoretically such a development of the test for implied ancillary rights would be 
justifiable as it is a good example of the prevalent shift that has taken place in servitude 
law from the ex ante regulation of servitudes toward an ex post approach, allowing for 
flexibility during the course of a servitude’s existence.47 Considering the current 
circumstances surrounding the properties or pertaining to the parties to the servitude 
means that the unreasonable weight of a predecessor’s lack of foresight48 will not 
hinder the full enjoyment of the servitude (and accordingly the efficient use of land) by 
the current servitude holder. At the same time, the servient owner is protected by the 
reasonableness element of the test, and her current position will necessarily also be 
taken into account, providing equal opportunity for her position to be protected.  
 
                                                          
 
be troublesome to parties and courts, and therefore, proposed a non-exclusive list of factors “in order 
to assists parties and the courts in determining whether that test has been passed”. The factors included 
in the list are based on the current law and the practical problems that arise in relation to implied 
easements. The point is that the existence of guiding principles and factors that are considered in the 
determination of what is necessary in different instances creates transparency in the process and adds 
to legal certainty. 
47 See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the theoretical perspectives in this regard. S French “The 
American Restatement of servitude law: Reforming doctrine by shifting from ex ante to ex post controls 
on the risks posed by servitudes” in S van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of land 
burdens (2006) 109-118 112; S French “Servitudes, reform and the new Restatement of Property: 
Creation doctrines and structural simplification (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 928-955 948; BWF 
Depoorter & F Parisi “Fragmentation of property rights: A functional interpretation of the law of 
servitudes” (2003) 3 Global Jurist Frontiers 1-41 36-37; V Sagaert “The fragmented system of land 
burdens in French and Belgian law" in S Van Erp & B Akkermans (eds) Towards a unified system of 
land burdens (2006) 31-52 51.  
48 See S Sterk “Foresight and the law of servitudes” (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 956-970 961.  
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5 4  Development of the common law of servitude in light of the Constitution 
In light of the conclusions drawn here, it is necessary to consider whether promoting 
possibilities for a flexible approach considered throughout the previous chapters 
necessitates a development in the form of a change in the common law of servitude 
as it currently stands, or whether the problems could be solved simply by applying the 
current common law principles differently, in line with a more flexible approach.  
In Linvestment CC v Hammersley49 the Supreme Court of Appeal decided to 
develop the common law of servitude by accepting an amendment of the common law 
position as it stood at the time.50 It was held that:  
“By appropriate application of the knowledge thus derived, a modification of 
our existing law may better serve the interests of justice when the existing law 
is uncertain or does not adequately serve modern demands on it.”51 
The court declared that a servient proprietor would forthwith be permitted to unilaterally 
relocate a specified servitude of right of way, subject to certain conditions.52 In doing 
so, it referred to the unresolved dichotomy between the arguments in favour of the 
sanctity of contract and those favouring a measure of flexibility in servitude law. 
Nevertheless, the court took a step in the direction of flexibility and stated its reasons 
for doing so:  
                                                          
 
49 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA). 
50 The common law position at the time held that the unilateral relocation of a specified servitude of right 
of way could only be effected by mutual consent of the parties: Linvestment CC v Hammersley and 
Another 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA) para 11; Gardens Estate Ltd v Lewis 1920 AD 144 at 150; LA Kiewitz 
Relocation of a specified servitude of right of way (unpublished LLM thesis, Stellenbosch University, 
2010) 20. Refer also to the discussion of this case in section 2 5 above.   
51 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA) para 25. Refer also to the 
discussion in section 5 2 above.  
52 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA) para 33. 
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“I am persuaded that the interests of justice do indeed require a change in our 
established law on the subject. The rigid enforcement of a servitude when the 
sanctity of the contract or the strict terms of the grant benefit neither party but, 
on the contrary, operate prejudicially on one of them, seems to me 
indefensible. Servitudes are by their nature often the creation of preceding 
generations devised in another time to serve ends which must now be satisfied 
in a different environment.”53 
“Properly regulated flexibility will not set an unhealthy precedent or encourage 
abuse. Nor will it cheapen the value of registered title or prejudice third 
parties.”54 
A development such as this, which changes, and in effect replaces, the existing law 
must necessarily be justified. In light of the Constitution as the supreme law in South 
Africa,55 it is necessary to consider any possible development in light of constitutionally 
guaranteed rights and values.56 The Constitutional Court in Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South 
Africa SA 674 (CC) held that” 
“There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the 
supreme law, and all law, including the common law, derives its force from the 
Constitution and is subject to constitutional control”.57 
It is important to ensure that any development within the system of servitude reflects 
the fact that it is inspired and empowered by the Constitution and that it is directly 
subject to constitutional control. Any particular development must be the result of a 
                                                          
 
53 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA) para 31. 
54 Linvestment CC v Hammersley and Another 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA) para 31. 
55 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 2.  
56 AJ van der Walt “The continued relevance of servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 31. See 
also AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) Chapter 2.  
57 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 44. 
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constitutional need and should respond to that need in a way that accords with the 
current constitutional dispensation. 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the 
Constitution”) states that when interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law, courts must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security58 the Constitutional Court said that it 
is implicit in section 39(2), read with section 173, that where the common law as it 
stands is deficient in promoting the section 39(2) objectives, the courts are under a 
general obligation to develop it appropriately. The superior courts59 thus have the 
power to apply and develop the common law, but this power can only be exercised 
within the limits of the authority granted by the Constitution. They cannot exceed their 
authority to develop existing law by creating new rules of law that are not underpinned 
by existing common law principles.60 This would require legislative action. 
Consequently, the judiciary will not have the authority to implement some of the 
changes that could bring about a more flexible approach to servitude law. 
The mechanisms that have recurrently been implemented in foreign 
jurisdictions must be considered carefully with reference to the South African context, 
                                                          
 
58 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
intervening) 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 39. 
59 The superior courts include the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court 
and any other court of a status similar to that of the High Court, as established by the Superior Courts 
Act 10 of 2013.  
60 Not only would they exceed the authority granted to them by the Constitution, but they would be 
imposing on the sphere of the legislative authority.  
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in light of the fact that any change in the South African law will probably have to be 
implemented by the judiciary, since legislation is not currently a plausible option.  
The matter of relocation of a servitude of right of way has been settled by the 
decision in Linvestment and thus does not require further consideration. However, this 
serves as a good example to illustrate the power of the judiciary to effect relatively 
dramatic changes in the law through its authority to develop the common law.  
The imposition of durational limits on servitudes might prove problematic in the 
South African context. Because there is no common law foundation for imposing 
durational limits on servitudes, any change in the law on this matter will not fall within 
the authority of the judiciary to develop the common law. The mechanism for 
termination of servitudes on the grounds that they have become obsolete or inefficient 
in light of changed circumstances faces the same challenge. These changes of the 
law can only be effected by legislative action. Because of the current political 
landscape in South Africa, there are major issues relating to land, especially in the 
area of land reform, that need urgent attention from the legislator. Consequently, even 
though servitudes cause problems between private land owners, these are minor 
issues and a codification of the whole system of servitude law is not plausible while 
there are far more serious land-related matters that require legislative intervention.  
The two options that remain are the possibility of amendment of existing 
entitlements in light of changed circumstances and the possibility for the acceptance 
of new ancillary rights to restore the efficient functioning of existing servitudes. 
Considering the current common law framework for the regulation of the continued 
relationship between the parties to a servitude, both of these options tie in well with 
the existing common law principles that hold that a servitude includes all the rights 
necessary for the effective exercise of the servitude entitlements and the principle that 
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requires that servitudes be exercised reasonably or civiliter modo. Since it was 
established in Chapter 2 that the efforts of South African courts to solve the problems 
of inflexibility by focussing on the interpretation of the words and intentions of servitude 
deeds mostly has the opposite result, as it leads to rigid and ineffective outcomes, a 
better approach would be for courts to focus on the application of the two common law 
principles. Within this framework, a flexible approach would mean that courts will 
consider in each case whether it might be necessary and justified to amend existing 
servitude entitlements or possibly whether it might be necessary and justified to accept 
certain ancillary entitlements in order for a servitude to fulfil the functional purpose for 
which it was established.  
The possibility for a flexible approach towards servitudes in South African law 
is thus rooted in a shift in the focus of servitude disputes from the interpretation of the 
words and intentions of the servitude deed toward an ex post consideration and 
application of the existing common law principles. This conclusion is motivated by the 
argument that a freestanding rule considering the current circumstances surrounding 
a servitude is based on legal policy and thus preferable to an approach that considers 
the indeterminate intention of the parties at creation of a servitude.  
Although the development that is proposed does not amount to a change of the 
existing common law principles, and will fall within the authority of the courts to develop 
the common law, it will only be possible if it is justifiable in terms of the Constitution. It 
is not hard to see that the effect of a development that allows the amendment of 
existing servitude entitlements or allows for the acceptance of new ancillary 
entitlements to a servitude will have an impact on the rights of the parties to a 
servitude.  Accordingly, it must be determined whether this impact is justifiable in terms 
of the Constitution. As the proposed developments are based on utilitarian and policy 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
228 
 
reasons, any Constitutional reasons for or against the development will trump these 
arguments. 61 
 
5 5 Section 25 analysis 
According to the model proposed by Van der Walt the first step of constitutional 
analysis would be to determine whether an amendment of an existing servitude or the 
acceptance of new ancillary rights to servitudes will infringe on any democratic, non-
utilitarian constitutional rights.62 Because the development of the common law 
proposed here merely pertains to minor modifications of servitude entitlements or the 
acceptance of new entitlements that are ancillary to existing servitudes, it is doubtful 
whether they would affect any of the fundamentally liberty-enhancing rights such as 
equality and non-discrimination;63 human dignity;64 freedom and security of the 
person; 65 or the prohibition against slavery, servitude and forced labour.66 The right 
not to be deprived of property, as it is set out in section 25(1) of the Constitution, is the 
right which will be most obviously affected by an action that amends the law of 
                                                          
 
61 AJ van der Walt “Development of the common law of servitude” (2013) 130 South African Law Journal 
722-756 745.  
62 AJ van der Walt “The continued relevance of servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 32.  
63 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 9.  
64 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 10.  
65 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 12.  
66 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 13. I single out these rights because they are 
mentioned as non-derogable rights in the Constitution. AJ van der Walt “The continued relevance of 
servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 mentions that the other rights that might be applicable, 
although they do not seem obvious, are freedom of expression s 16); assembly, demonstration, picket 
and petition (s 17); freedom of movement and residence (s 21); freedom of trade, occupation and 
profession (s 22); the right to a healthy environment (s 24); access to adequate housing (s 26); just 
administrative action (s 33); and access to courts (s 34). 
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servitude to the extent proposed. Van der Walt argues that where any of the “higher” 
democratic constitutional provisions are relevant, a section 25 analysis should “take a 
backseat”, as it can be regarded to a certain extent as an economic, or utilitarian 
interest.67 Once it has been established that “higher” constitutional provisions will not 
be invoked by the proposed development, as would be the case in the present 
example, section 25 implications can be considered.68  
Lending any measure of flexibility to the rights of a dominant proprietor that 
could increase the burden on the servient property can effect a deprivation of the 
ownership entitlements of a servient proprietor. Furthermore, an amendment of 
existing entitlements could favour either the dominant or the servient proprietor: if an 
amendment is allowed in favour of a servient proprietor, this might mean that the 
servitude rights of the dominant proprietor are limited, and he is thus impacted 
negatively; on the other hand, if the servitude is amended in a manner that favours the 
dominant proprietor, this will have a negative impact on the ownership entitlements of 
the servient proprietor.   
Section 25 provides protection to property owners against unlawful deprivation 
or expropriation of their property. The case of First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service & another; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC)69 is regarded 
as a landmark case for the constitutional protection of property rights, as it cleared up 
                                                          
 
67 AJ van der Walt “The continued relevance of servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 34. 
68 AJ van der Walt “The continued relevance of servitude” (2013) 3 Property Law Review 3-35 34.  
69 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service & 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 100. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
230 
 
a lot of the uncertainty that surrounded the interpretation of the property clause and 
provides a methodological framework for the application of the clause.70 The purpose 
of the constitutional property clause is to strike a proportionate balance between the 
functions of protection existing private property rights on the one hand, and promoting 
the public interest, on the other.71 
The distinction between expropriation and deprivation can be based on a 
number of aspects. Roux holds that the term expropriation is reserved for situations 
where the state forces the transfer of a property right to itself or to a third party.72 In 
Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy73 the Constitutional Court held that: 
“Deprivation relates to sacrifices that holders of private property rights may 
have to make without compensation, whereas expropriation entails state 
acquisition of that property in the public interest and must always be 
accompanied by compensation.”74 
Van der Walt provides a “preliminary and provisional description of expropriation” with 
reference to a number of characteristics including the following: expropriation is 
brought about unilaterally by state action, without the cooperation of the affected 
owner; it always involves a dispossession or loss of property for an owner; it is brought 
about for a public purpose or in the public interest and it is normally accompanied by 
                                                          
 
70 T Roux “Property” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa vol 
3 2 ed (2003) 46 2.  
71 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service & 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 50; T Roux “Property” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
vol 3 2 ed (2003) 46 2. 
72 T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law after FNB” in S Woolman and 
M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Conversations (2008) 265-281 266-267.  
73 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
74 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 48.  
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compensation. 75 Considering the nature of the developments of the common law that 
are suggested here, the fact that they will only cause minor modifications of existing 
property entitlements means that there will not be any real dispossession or loss of 
property by either of the parties. The effect will more likely be classified as a regulatory 
deprivation of property entitlements. A further distinguishing feature between 
deprivation and expropriation lies in the authorising source of the action. Expropriation 
is a state action, and can only be authorised by statute.76 If the amendment of 
servitude entitlements and the acceptance of ancillary rights are permitted by a 
development of the common law, it will be the principles of the common law that 
authorise these actions. The effect can thus not be expropriatory, as there is no 
authority in South African law for an expropriation to be carried out in terms of the 
common law.77 
 The possibility of the proposed developments causing the deprivation of 
property must be considered more closely. Whether there is a deprivation depends on 
the extent of the interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of constitutionally 
protected property.78 In terms of the methodology proposed by the Constitutional Court 
                                                          
 
75 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 346-347.  
76 Pretoria City Council v Modimola 1966 (3) SA 250 (A) 258H; Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality and 
Others 2011 (1) SA 601 (KZP) para 81; A Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 2 ed (2001) 49; AJ van der Walt 
Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 453-454.  
77 See also Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Dada NO and Others 2009 (4) SA 463 (SCA) para 
14 and AJ van der Walt “Constitutional property law” (2009) 2 Juta’s Quarterly Review para 2.4 on the 
authority of courts to order expropriation.   
78 National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 66.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
232 
 
in FNB79 a number of questions arise when a particular action is constitutionally 
challenged as a deprivation of property. The first question to consider in this regard is 
whether the affected rights constitute property as it is recognised in terms of section 
25(1). If the interests involved do constitute property, the question that follows is 
whether there has been a deprivation of such property, and further, whether such 
deprivation is consistent with the provisions of section 25(1).  
The amendment of existing servitude entitlements, and the addition of new 
ancillary rights to existing servitude entitlements, can affect the rights of either servient 
or dominant proprietors. According to the court in FNB, ownership of corporeal 
movables (and of land) lies at the heart of the constitutional concept of property and 
must therefore enjoy the protection of section 25.80 An impact on the ownership 
entitlements of a servient proprietor will accordingly constitute property for purposes 
of section 25. Where a servitude is amended in a way that causes a negative impact 
on the servitude rights of a dominant proprietor, the question is slightly more 
complicated. However, the case of Ex Parte Optimal Solutions CC81 serves as 
authority that praedial servitudal rights are recognised as property for purposes of 
section 25.82 Therefore, where the rights of a servitude holder are diminished as a 
                                                          
 
79 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service & 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
100.  
80 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service & 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 51; AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 112.  
81 Ex Parte Optimal Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 19.  
82 Ex Parte Optimal Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 19. The court held as follows: “A purposive 
construction of 'property' means that it should be read to include any right to, or in property. […] 
Registered praedial servitudal rights are therefore included within the concept of 'property' under s 
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result of an amendment to a servitude, this too can amount to a deprivation of property 
in terms of section 25.  
 In Chapter 1, two cases are discussed to set the background for the research 
question in this dissertation. The case of Jersey Lane Properties v Hodgson83 
concerned the construction of a large security gate entrance over an existing servitude 
of right of way, seemingly for reasons of security and in response to a general 
tendency to build similar entrance gates in the area.84 In the Scottish case of Moncrieff 
v Jamieson85 the servitude holder applied to court to have an ancillary right of parking 
recognised as part of his entitlements under a registered right of way.86 What these 
cases have in common is that they seek to add certain entitlements to existing 
servitudes on the basis that they are necessary for the full effective exercise of the 
servitude, even though they were not mentioned in the servitude deed at the time the 
rights were registered. If these additional entitlements were allowed, they would create 
an increase in the burden on the servient property. This will necessarily have an impact 
on existing rights which will amount to a deprivation of the servient owner’s property 
in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. The next question to ask, according to the 
FNB methodology, is whether the deprivation is consistent with the provisions of 
section 25(1).  
                                                          
 
25(1). Accordingly any removal or deletion of such rights is pro tanto a deprivation of property.” See 
also AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 139.  
83 Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa v Hodgson and Another 
(A5030/11) [2012] ZAGPJHC 86 (7 May 2012).  
84 Refer to the discussions of the case in sections 1 1 and 2 5 above.  
85 Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42.  
86 Refer to the discussion of the case in section 1 1 and 3 4 4 above.  
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Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that no one may be deprived of 
property unless it is in terms of law of general application. Furthermore, the section 
stipulates that no law may permit the arbitrary deprivation of property. Considering the 
first part of the provision, “law of general application” entails that the authorising law is 
not “aimed at a specific person or group or being applied without reference to a 
discernible standard.87 Furthermore, the reference to law of general application (as 
opposed to a law)88 extends the application of the provision to the rules of common 
law and customary law.89 It is contended above that the proposed developments will 
be authorised by the existing principles of the common law, applied by courts in a 
different manner, with a focus on ex post considerations of what is relevant at the 
particular time of the dispute. Accordingly, a deprivation that results from such an 
application of the common law rules will be deemed to satisfy the requirement that it 
be authorised by “law of general application”.  
 The second element of the deprivation provision in section 25(1) holds that the 
authorising law may not permit the arbitrary deprivation of property. The court in FNB 
held that a deprivation will be arbitrary where insufficient reason is provided for the 
particular deprivation or where it is procedurally unfair.90 Sufficient reason is 
determined by considering the relationship between the means applied and the ends 
                                                          
 
87 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 237. 
88 See section 28(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 (interim 
Constitution), the corresponding article in the interim Constitution, which refers to “a law”.  
89 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 234.  
90 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service & 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 100.  
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sought to be achieved by the deprivation.91 Furthermore, a complexity of relationships 
must be considered, including the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation 
and the person whose property is affected; the purpose of the deprivation and the 
nature of the property; as well as the extent of the deprivation in respect of the 
particular property.92 It is stated in the FNB case that there may be circumstances 
when sufficient reason is established by no more than a mere rational relationship 
between the means and ends, while in in other circumstances, a full proportionality 
evaluation might be necessary. The more extensive and invasive the impact of the 
deprivation is, the greater the onus will be to justify the burden that is imposed. Van 
der Walt explains that it is hard to imagine that a deprivation authorised by rules of the 
common law would raise any serious issues in terms of section 25(1).93 
 The complexity of relationships can be considered with reference to the 
examples in the Jersey Lane Properties and Moncrieff decisions. In Jersey Lane 
Properties, the servitude holder had constructed a two storey entrance gate on the 
servient land under the contention that this should be deemed as an ancillary right to 
his servitude of right of way. Seeing as the purpose of the registered servitude was to 
                                                          
 
91 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service & 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 100. 
92 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service & 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 100. 
93 With reference to nuisance law, he explains that in terms of the common law principles that require 
landowners to adjust the use of their property so as not to cause a nuisance, the burden placed on the 
owners (or users) can be regarded as a deprivation of property, but that it is hard to see how such 
deprivation can be seen to constitute an insufficient nexus between the reason for the deprivation the 
means employed and the effects that it has on the owner. See AJ van der Walt Constitutional property 
law 3 ed (2011) 234-235.  
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tolerate the passing of vehicles over the servient land, the construction of a permanent 
structure that was so extensive as to block the views from the existing buildings on the 
servient property,94 and prevents the servient proprietor from using or developing that 
part of the servient land, imposes a rather extensive increase in the burden on the 
servient property. The servient proprietor is deprived in this case of various incidents 
of her ownership95 in contravention of the common law principle that a servitude must 
be construed in a manner that imposes the least possible burden on the servient land. 
This constitutes a significant imbalance between the means employed (the 
deprivation) and the ends sought to be achieved by the law (flexibility in the law of 
servitudes). In the Moncrieff case, the ancillary right that the servitude holder wished 
to add to the existing servitude of right of way was a right to park vehicles that reached 
the dominant land by way of the servitude road. The burden imposed in this case is 
temporary and could easily be regulated by way of conditions that limited the time or 
manner of exercise of the rights so as to render it less intrusive to the servient 
proprietors. In this case one would have to consider the fact that the addition of an 
entitlement to park vehicles would increase the burden that the existing servitude 
imposed on the servient property; nonetheless, if the servitude cannot reasonably be 
exercised without the additional right, it might be justified to impose such an increased 
                                                          
 
94 The servient proprietor alleged that the entrance portico “’impedes and blocks views from his 
residence’; that the backyard patio and kitchen are flood-lit at night from the lights in the portico and 
generally, ‘that it renders one with a general sense of encroachment, and instils a feeling of 
claustrophobia when entering the kitchen and the backyard patio’”: Jersey Lane Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Fairlawn Boutique Hotel & Spa v Hodgson and Another (A5030/11) [2012] ZAGPJHC 86 (7 May 2012) 
para 10. Refer also to the discussion of the case in section 2 5 above.   
95 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service & 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 100.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
237 
 
burden. Furthermore, it was argued above that compensation can play a valuable role 
in restoring the balance between the interests of the parties in a servitude dispute if it 
is disturbed by an order allowing the amendment of entitlements or the addition of new 
ancillary rights to existing entitlements.96 
 If a South African court allowed the addition of ancillary rights on facts similar 
to that of Moncrieff and decided to exercise its common law authority to award 
compensation97 to the servient proprietor for the disadvantage he suffers as a result,98 
the deprivation will arguably fall within the definition of a non-arbitrary deprivation in 
terms of section 25(1). The burden imposed on the servient proprietor (the deprivation) 
will be justified to a certain extent by the payment of compensation and it will establish 
a sufficient nexus between the means employed (the deprivation) and the ends sought 
to be achieved (flexibility of the servitude rights to ensure the efficient use of land and 
compliance with public policy reasons in favour of flexibility). Furthermore, the fact that 
the deprivation is realised by a court exercising a judicial discretion in the application 
of the common law principles is an indication that the outcome will most likely not be 
arbitrary in terms of section 25(1).99 
                                                          
 
96 See the discussion in section 5 3 above.  
97 The common law authority of the court to award compensation in these instances is assumed based 
on the authority to award compensation in terms of the common law at establishment of a right of way 
of necessity. 
98 Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 658-659, 660 & 676; Wiles v Praeg 1952 (1) SA 87 
(T) 89-90. It is held in both these cases that the compensation awarded (in case of a right of way of 
necessity) must be in proportion to the advantage gained by the plaintiff and the disadvantages suffered 
by the defendant.  
99 National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) paras 69, 76 & 88. 
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 If the facts of Jersey Lane properties are considered in the same way, it seems 
in all respects that the burden imposed on the servient proprietor would amount to an 
arbitrary deprivation of property. Because there was no constitutional challenge to the 
actions of the servitude holder in this case, the factors that should be considered in 
light of the non-arbitrariness requirement were not considered in the case. However, 
it might be interesting to consider how the Constitutional Court would have approached 
this matter if one assumes for a moment that the servient proprietor had received 
different legal advice and had pursued the case to the Constitutional Court based on 
the argument that there has been an arbitrary deprivation of his property. Moreover, it 
is necessary to assume that the actions of the servitude holder were preceded and 
authorised by the correct procedural steps; thus, it will be assumed that plans were 
submitted to the local authority for the construction of the entrance gate; that these 
plans were approved, and that the increase in the burden on the servient property was 
authorised by an order of the court. Based on the facts, the increased burden on the 
servient property, by the building of a permanent structure, constitutes a significant 
interference with the use, enjoyment and exploitation of constitutionally protected 
property and will amount to a deprivation in terms of section 25.100 Considering 
whether the deprivation is arbitrary, it must be determined whether there was sufficient 
reason for the deprivation, or put differently, whether there was a sufficient nexus 
between the reason for the deprivation, the means employed and the effects that it 
had on the owner. On these facts, and especially considering that there was no reason 
indicating why the entrance gate had to be situated on the servient land, the means 
                                                          
 
100 It is important in this sense that no mention was made of a reason why the structure had to be built 
on the servient property and could not be positioned where the servitude road entered the dominant 
property. 
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employed and the impact of the deprivation on the owner are disproportionate to the 
ends sought by the deprivation. The same ends (flexibility of the servitude rights of the 
dominant owner in light of various policy and efficiency grounds) could probably have 
been achieved by less restrictive means.101 The outcome of a constitutional inquiry 
based on the proposed facts would thus be that it causes an arbitrary deprivation of 
property in terms of section 25(1). Because the deprivation is unsubstantiated and its 
effect is so extensive, an award for compensation would not be able to render it non-
arbitrary. However, neither the court order, nor the actions of the private party can be 
constitutionally challenged in terms of section 25. The constitutional challenge will thus 
have to be directed at the administrative action that constituted the approval of the 
building plans. The appropriate form of review for this outcome will accordingly be the 
provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, as it would enable 
a more appropriate route by which to challenge the administrative action of approving 
the building plans.  
From the discussion above, it becomes apparent that the need for flexibility in 
the law of servitudes can be satisfied by a development of the common law in the form 
of a different application of the existing common law principles. By applying the 
principles that regulate the relationship between the parties to a servitude in a manner 
that takes account of the current context of the relevant properties, many of the 
                                                          
 
101 The availability of less restrictive means to achieve a particular purpose has been considered in a 
number of cases as one of the factors to determine whether a deprivation is arbitrary: National Credit 
Regulator v Opperman 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 79. Section 36(1)(e) requires that the availability of 
less restrictive means must be considered when deciding whether the limitation of a right in the Bill of 
Rights is justified. See T Roux “Property” in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional law 
of South Africa vol 3 2 ed (2003) 46 26-28 for a discussion of the redundancy of section 36 as a result 
of the “arbitrary deprivation vortex” created in the FNB case.  
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problems created by the rigid approach that views servitudes as static and 
unchangeable rights, can be solved. These principles provide protection to both the 
dominant and the servient proprietors, and accordingly, the outcome will be one that 
reaches a fair balance between their interests. Furthermore, because the value of 
security of property rights is deeply imbedded in these principles, the proposed 
flexibility will not compromise the security of property rights and no amendment of 
existing entitlements nor acceptance of new ancillary entitlements should be permitted 
if the result would create an unreasonable impact on the servient proprietor’s property. 
Accordingly, the possibility of any serious constitutional issues resulting from the 
proposed development of the common law seems unlikely. 
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